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Integrating Restorative Justice into the ICC’s Legal Framework: Possibility 
and Necessity 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the only permanent international court 
that has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and the crime of aggression. The ICC is a young international organisation, and is now 
facing many difficulties when dealing with international crimes. One criticism towards 
the ICC is that its legal mechanism cannot well balance peace and justice, and has not 
shown enough attention to victims’ need. It has been argued that the justice at the ICC 
needs to be more restorative. 
This research firstly clarifies the real issues for the ICC to maintain peace and 
achieve justice. It also provides an answer to what restorative justice should mean to 
international criminal justice. In addition, the case studies on the situations at the ICC 
and at some other international criminal tribunals have been carefully analysed to prove 
that the separate utilisation of pure restorative justice approach and the formal criminal 
procedure mechanism cannot bring peace and justice together. They must be combined 
to improve the impact of international criminal justice. 
This research goes deeper to the meaning of justice for international criminal 
justice and the ICC, and displays the pitfalls in achieving the targets. It is concluded 
that for better delivering justice to the stakeholders in international crimes and the 
damaged society, the ICC needs to empower victims and encourage the effective 
communication between victims and perpetrators, and make the justice at the ICC reach 
local communities, rather than setting justice as merely symbol. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The International Criminal Court (the ICC or the Court) is the first permanent 
international court in human history that has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. The ICC is now 
facing many difficulties when prosecuting the perpetrators of international crimes, 
especially under the circumstance of on-going conflicts. One way to improve the ICC’s 
work, as it has been argued, is to make international criminal justice more “restorative 
justice”.1 
The concept of “restorative justice” is relatively new to lawyers and criminologist, 
though many believe that it has deep roots in human history.2 It sees the commission 
of crime as damaging the social relationship among individuals, and emphasises the 
effective and genuine communication between the victim and offender in resolving the 
consequences of crimes. The idea of restorative justice is very different from the justice 
mechanism in most international criminal tribunals, which are based on modern legal 
systems used in domestic courts. Hence, whether it is necessary and possible to 
integrate restorative justice into the International Criminal Court still needs to be 
clarified. This study will focus on three research questions below, to examine the 
necessity and possibility to combine restorative justice and the ICC: 
1. What are the issues between maintaining peace and delivering justice in the 
ICC’s work? 
2. What are the theoretical problems behind the tension between justice and peace 
                                                 
1 See for example, Charles Villa-Vicencio, ‘Why perpetrators should not always be prosecuted: Where the 
International Criminal Court and truth commissions meet’ (2000) 49 Emory Law Journal 205; Carrie J. N. 
Eisnaugle, ‘An International Truth Commission: Utilizing Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution’ 
(2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 209; Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker 
Understanding of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 34(4) Journal of Law and Society 411. 
2 For example, see Elmar G. M. Weitekamp, ‘The History of Restorative Justice’ in G Bazamore and L 




in the ICC’s legal mechanism? 
3. Whether and how can the idea of restorative justice make improvements to the 
ICC’s work? 
1. A brief introduction of the International Criminal Court 
The ICC began to function on 1 July 2002 after the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (the Rome Statute) was ratified by 60 countries. 
Therefore, the Rome Statute, along with other legal texts such as the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence and the Elements of Crime, forms the legal basis of the ICC and codifies 
the fundamental principles and values in international law. 
The establishment of the ICC was strongly backed by a number of countries for 
its favourable purposes. Many States Parties of the ICC have suffered from different 
levels of internal armed conflicts and serious human rights violations. One of the 
original expectations toward the ICC globally was that such an organisation would play 
a new and even revolutionary role in bringing peace and justice to the international 
community.3 In fact, the plan of establishing an independent, treaty-based international 
criminal court had been an on-going effort, following a series of criminal tribunals that 
were established to try heinous criminals of the Second World War.  These efforts could 
be seen as the continuing work of The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. In 1989 
the General Assembly of the United Nations requested that the International Law 
Commission start handling the question of establishing an international criminal court.4 
After the end of the Cold War, especially after witnessing the gross human rights 
violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the desire to establish such a 
                                                 
3 See Roy S. Lee, ‘The Rome Conference and its Contribution to International Law’ in Roy S. K. Lee (ed.), 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations and Results (Kluwer 
International Law 1999), at pp. 1-5. 




permanent court became more urgent. 
At the Diplomatic Conference on the establishment of an international criminal 
court, in 1998, several States showed a preference to prosecute international crimes in 
compliance in domestic courts, without conceding national sovereignty to an 
international jurisdiction.5 The question on complementarity of the ICC proceeded in 
very serious debates, which involved in whether a State should take responsibility, or 
enjoy the priority, to prosecute international crimes. Because the issue related to the 
core values, principles, and legal technical problems of the ICC, the discussions around 
all topics had to be considered carefully within different social cultures, legal traditions 
and through several languages. 
That situation inevitably increased the difficulty of adopting a generally accepted 
code. In spite of the challenges, the need of enforcing international law to protect 
humanity, prevent gross human rights violations and punish the perpetrators responsible 
for international crimes, shined as the determinative factor to ensure the creation of a 
permanent international criminal court. The Rome Statute was finally adopted by most 
of the States at the Rome Diplomatic Conference and no more ad hoc tribunals would 
have to be organised for each occasion of serious human rights violations. The 
International Criminal Court had carried great hope for countries and people that 
suffered and/or are still suffering tremendous pain from serious crimes and for 
international law academics and political activists who, for generations, dreamed of 
such a court. The complement role of the ICC in prosecuting international crimes has 
kept a practical balance between the Court and States Parties. 
The principle of complementarity, which was described as one “key feature” of 
                                                 
5 See John T. Holmes, ‘The Principle of Complementarity’ in Roy S. K. Lee (ed.), International Criminal 





the ICC,6 may have be seen as an issue of “jurisdiction-sharing” in dealing international 
crimes. Yet another effect of the principle of complementarity does not draw as much 
attention as it should be. The complement role of the ICC, in fact, admits that 
international crimes have a very special feature compared with ordinary domestic 
crimes. International crimes influence both the people’s life in the States where the 
crimes have been committed, and the conscience of all humanity. As a result, 
prosecuting perpetrators of international crimes must consider the need of local people 
and the feeling of the international community. It may not be proper to resolve the 
consequences of international crimes by follow the same way of thinking in dealing 
domestic criminal cases. 
The special feature of international crimes has caused the ICC many difficulties 
because the ICC could not provide a satisfactory answer to balance the need of victims 
and the values of international law. After the first few years of its early work in 
preparation to face the most difficult situations of the first cases, the role and the impact 
of the ICC in relation to the original purposes had been noticeably questioned. The 
young ICC was forced to face one of the biggest challenges: how to achieve peace and 
justice under the circumstances of an on-going conflict. Unfortunately, the ICC’s 
interference in some earlier cases resulted in questioning its capability to maintaining 
peace and deliver justice, and to a degree, had shaken people’s trust and confidence in 
the ICC’s work. It showed that the contribution of the ICC to peace in the world is not 
evident or effective. Instead, there have been complaints that the ICC potentially brings 
more complexities to achieving peace in situations of international crimes.7 In addition, 
                                                 
6 See Mauro Politi, ‘Reflections on Complementarity at the Rome Conference and beyond’ in Carsten Stahn 
and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.) The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to 
Practice (Cambridge University Press 2011), at pp. 142-149. 
7 See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report on the work of the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights in Uganda, Addendum, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/10/Add.2 (2 March 2006), para. 11. Also see 
African Union, Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment 




the work on the protection of rights and reparation for victims done by the ICC cannot 
be considered as fully adequate.8 
Despite the fact that certain facilities, such as the Trust Fund for Victims and the 
Office of Public Counsel for Victims, have been established for years for the purpose 
of serving victim protection and reparation, the supportive events to victims at the ICC 
still needs to get some improvements. The lessons and experience on the ICC’s role 
have, in many aspects, reshaped the way people may regard the spirit of peace, the 
meaning of justice, and the role of victims, and have emphasised the necessity to re-
consider the legal mechanism in the ICC’s justice proceedings. 
2. The idea of restorative justice 
The implication of restorative justice 
Restorative justice emerged in judicial practice in many countries as a means to 
address criminal justice issues involving indigenous peoples.9 It was utilised to address 
the internal problems of a country in the first place. Then it was mutually influenced 
with crime victims’ movements. 10  Restorative justice differs from the adversarial 
model of criminal justice or any other mode of justice in which prosecutorial actions 
are practiced. Sometimes it is linked to certain ideas in civil rights litigation, such as 
compensation. It is a criminal procedure that includes alternative dispute resolutions. 
                                                 
8 For example, the ICC awarded each victim of the situation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo only 
250 US dollars as symbolic reparation, which covers housing, education aid, and psychological support. 
9 See Elmar G.M. Weitekamp, ‘The History of Restorative Justice’ in G. Bazamore and L. Walgrave (eds), 
Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime (Criminal Justice Press, New York 1999). Also 
see Moana Jackson, Maori and the Criminal Justice System: A New Perspective, He Whaipaanga Hou (Policy and 
Research Division, Department of Justice, New Zealand 1987). 
10 See Daniel W. Van Ness, Crime and Its Victims: What We Can Do (InterVersity Press 1986). Also see 
Marlene Young and John Stein, ‘The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement in the United States’ (2004), 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service, US < 




Researchers in this area have different understandings about what restorative justice is. 
In John Braithwaite’s opinion, restorative justice is 
“[A] process where all stakeholders affected by an injustice have an 
opportunity to discuss how they have been affected by the injustice and 
to decide what should be done to repair the harm. With crime, 
restorative justice is about the idea that because crime hurts, justice 
should heal. It follows that conversations with those who have been hurt 
and with those who have inflicted the harm must be central to the 
process”.11 
This definition highlights the importance of interactions between victim and 
offender. The distinctive feature in restorative justice compared with modern criminal 
justice, as Braithwaite stated, is that the way to repair the harm caused by crime can be 
discussed and decided by the stakeholders. 
Tony Marshall defined restorative justice in a well-renowned report to the UK 
Home Office as “a problem-solving approach to crime which involves the parties 
themselves, and the community generally, in an active relationship with statutory 
agencies.” 12 In this definition, restorative justice is a “problem-solving approach”, 
which implies that restorative justice is firstly distinct with formal criminal justice in 
ways of practice. It means such approaches must focus on how to solve the problems 
arising in real criminal cases rather than pure theoretical discussion. Marshall’s opinion 
was upheld by many other academics. For example, Menkel-Meadow states in one 
study that 
                                                 
11 John Braithwaite, ‘Restorative Justice and De-Professionalization’ (2004) 13(1) The Good Society 28, at 
pp. 28. 
12 Tony Marshall, Restorative Justice: An Overview (Home Office Research Development and Statistics 




“Restorative justice is the name given to a variety of different practices, 
including apologies, restitution, and acknowledgments of harm and 
injury, as well as to other efforts to provide healing and reintegration of 
offenders into their communities, with or without additional 
punishment.”13 
In this definition, Menkel-Meadow does not only point out that the nature of 
restorative justice rests on its practices, but also list some typical approaches for healing. 
The emphasis on healing, or restoration, to the stakeholders of crimes may have suggest 
that the commission of crime is not simple a violation of criminal law. 
Different from formal criminal justice, which underlines the legal responsibility 
of the prosecution and the defence, the proponents of restorative justice see crimes as 
being personal. Doak and O'Mahony believe crime is not only an illegal conduct but 
also an issue between individuals. They confirm the valuable role of restorative justice 
in connecting all parties when solving the dispute in a criminal case that 
“[R]estorative justice views crime primarily as a breakdown between 
private relationships. Ownership is thus devolved to a broader range 
of stakeholders, including the victim, the offender and the 
community.”14 
The opinions above sketch a general impression about restorative justice, and 
display three dimensions which can define restorative justice. Firstly, restorative justice 
contains some special formats that are different from formal criminal justice. Secondly, 
the purpose of restorative justice is to heal, rather than to punish. Thirdly, crime is an 
                                                 
13 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Restorative Justice: What is it and Does it Work?’ (2007) 3 Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science 161, at pp. 162. 
14  Jonathan Doak and David O'Mahony, ‘'In Search of Legitimacy: Restorative Youth Conferencing in 




issue between individuals, therefore, the damaged relationship must be restored. 
Although advocates of restorative justice concur that crime shall be deemed as a 
personal issue, they view restorative justice from two different angles. Some 
researchers prefer to considering restorative justice as an alternative practice to formal 
criminal justice to resolve the problems caused by crimes. This branch is called a “purist” 
view on restorative justice.15 Some others uphold that the key factor of restorative 
justice is that it aims at healing and repairing, regardless whether special practices have 
been involved in criminal justice.16 This is the “maximalist” view of restorative justice. 
The “maximalist” view of restorative justice emphasises the importance of aiming at 
restoration, 17  the “purist” view underlines the voluntary cooperation of victims, 
offenders and the affected community in the process without coercion or punishment.18 
Both views provide some convincing points in demonstrating the definition, activities, 
and principles of restorative justice. The difficulty of defining restorative justice has 
been recognised by most of criminologists. 
Restorative justice may include many aspects which are beyond the idea and 
principles of criminal law, or even beyond all legal principles. That is because 
restorative justice concentrates on reality and adjusts its concrete practices accordingly. 
From this standpoint, there could be ultimate possible practices in restorative justice as 
long as those practices are able to reach the end of restoration. That is the reason why 
it is hard to agree upon a definition of restorative justice and an exhaustive list of 
restorative justice practices. Hence, some researchers turn to describe restorative justice 
                                                 
15 Paul McCold, ‘Toward a Holistic Vision of Restorative Juvenile Justice: A Reply to the Maximalist Model’ 
(2000) 3(4) Contemporary Justice Review 357. 
16 Lode Walgrave, ‘How Pure Can a Maximalist Approach to Restorative Justice Remain? Or Can a Purist 
Model of Restorative Justice Become Maximalist?’ (2000) 3(4) Contemporary Justice Review 415. 
17 Lode Walgrave, Restorative Justice, Self-interest and Responsible Citizenship (Willian Publishing 2008), at 
pp. 20. 
18 Paul McCold, ‘Toward a Holistic Vision of Restorative Juvenile Justice: A Reply to the Maximalist Model’ 




in other ways 19 . For example, Howard Zehr, one of the earliest scholar studying 
restorative justice, tries to figure out what restorative justice is not about,20 rather than 
describing how restorative justice should be formulated. He further emphasises that 
“[r]estorative justice is a compass, not a map” 21, indicating that there may not be a 
constant pattern for approaching or practicing restorative justice. 
Kathleen Daly contests the idea that restorative justice may not be clearly defined. 
Based on “purist” view, professor Daly argued that restorative justice must be “be 
defined concretely” as “a justice mechanism” for the purpose of satisfying the 
“empirical inquiry”.22 She reviewed different theories on the definition and context of 
restorative justice, and specifically pointed out that formal criminal justice, which is 
often regarded as “retributive justice”, is not contrary to “restorative justice” because 
both retributive justice and restorative justice, “as a coherent system or type of justice, 
[do] not exist.”23 Restorative justice, in Daly’s opinion, shall be included in the concept 
of “innovative justice” which does not solely rely on legal processes but also other 
forms of participation and interaction.24 In other words, she believes that an ideal 
justice mechanism must focus on the forms it intends to include and shall extend its 
processes to solve real problems, and that restorative justice, like formal criminal justice, 
is simply one part of such an “umbrella term”.25 As a conclusion, Daly states that 
“Restorative justice is a contemporary justice mechanism to address 
                                                 
19 Burt Galaway and Joe Hudson, Restorative Justice: International Perspectives (Willow Tree Press 1996). 
Also see Daniel. W. Van Ness and Karen H. Strong, Restoring Justice: An Introduction to Restorative Justice (5th 
ed., Anderson Publishing 2015). 
20 Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Skyhorse Publishing, Inc. 2015). 
21 Ibid, at pp. 8. 
22 Kathleen Daly, ‘What is Restorative Justice? A Fresh Answer to a Vexed Question’ (2016) 11 Victims and 
Offenders 9, at pp. 11. 
23 Ibid, at pp. 15. 
24 Ibid, at pp. 18. 




crime, disputes, and bounded community conflict. The mechanism is a 
meeting (or several meetings) of affected individuals, facilitated by one 
or more impartial people. Meetings can take place at all phases of the 
criminal process- prearrest, diversion from court, presentence, and 
postsentence- as well as for offending or conflicts not reported to the 
police. Specific practices will vary, depending on context, but are guided 
by rules and procedures that align with what is appropriate in the context 
of the crime, dispute, or bounded conflict.”26 
This study does not intend to develop a new definition of restorative justice, or 
challenge professor Daly’s conclusion on the definition of restorative justice. One 
reason is that this study will utilise the restorative justice idea to examine the issues that 
exist in the legal mechanisms of the ICC, rather than discuss what is the very core of 
restorative justice. Further analysis of the definition of restorative justice is not 
necessary for this study. The second reason is that Daly’s idea may have provided some 
thoughts on the technical issues in inter-merging restorative justice and formal criminal 
justice, but does not clearly answer why restorative justice is needed. The purpose of 
making improvements to formal criminal justice system is not to introduce innovations 
into justice. The real purpose for doing justice shall be restoring the damage caused by 
crime to individuals and to the society. 
The final reason why professor Daly’s opinion will not be fully examined is that 
although she aimed to provide a concrete definition of restorative justice, the definition 
she gave was not that “concrete”- there was no clear list of all the practices in restorative 
justice, or a guide about the timing to trigger restorative justice in formal criminal 
justice, or any specific rules which restorative justice must coordinate with. In other 
words, Daly’s effort to create a clearer definition of restorative justice is not very clear 
                                                 




itself. Nevertheless, professor Daly’s intention was to highlight the importance that the 
effects of restorative justice must be actually recorded and assessed, rather than be 
evaluated by the theoretical concept of “victims’ satisfaction”. 27  This statement 
suggests that her research on the definition of restorative justice aims to ensure the 
achievability of restoration in restorative justice. This idea in fact resonates the main 
theme of this study that international criminal justice must work for the people who 
were harmed by the crimes. 
This study holds an opinion close to the “maximalist” view of restorative justice, 
because it primarily values the core of restorative justice in “oriented toward doing 
justice by repairing the harm that has been caused by crime”28 and does not exclude 
necessary coercion and punishment to criminal offenders, which needs to be accented 
in international criminal justice. 
The “purist” view of restorative justice lacks the adequate attention to the 
significance of “restoration”. There could be two reasons why the “purist” view of 
restorative justice does not intend to highlight the meaning of restoration in dealing 
criminal cases. Either, the “purist” view believes that “restoration” is not important; or, 
it insists that exercising the special practices will eventually achieve “restoration”. The 
former assumption ignores the fact that without the focal on “restoration”, criminal 
justice will become detached from the stakeholders in a criminal case. The latter, on the 
other hand, has been proved wrong in some empirical studies.29 If certain practices are 
not carefully guided by the purpose to achieve restoration to victims, offenders, and 
other stakeholders, the participants of restorative justice may be hurt another time. The 
                                                 
27 Kathleen Daly, ‘What is Restorative Justice? A Fresh Answer to a Vexed Question’ (2016) 11 Victims and 
Offenders 9, at pp. 22. 
28 Gordon Bazemore and Lode Walgrave, ‘Restorative juvenile justice: In search of fundamentals and an 
outline for systemic reform’ in in G. Bazemore and L. Walgrave (eds) Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the 
Harm of Youth Crime (Lynne Rienner Publisher 1999) 45, at pp. 48. 




risk is particularly high for victims when offenders do not show enough respect or 
refuse to recognise the consequences of the crime. 
In international crimes, the harm for victims and the community is often too huge 
to be ignore. Many post-conflict States targeted on bringing restoration to local people 
for keeping peace and delivering the desired justice. However, because of following the 
view of “purist” on restorative justice, the function of repairing (or restoring) has been 
often misunderstood as simply launching certain approaches in many domestic legal 
processes in transitional countries, that many victims were forced to accept reparation 
through “victim participation”. Blindly believing that carrying on some practise in the 
name of restorative justice will only exacerbate the injustice upon the victims. This 
position will be explained in chapter 3. 
In short, restorative justice is very flexible and practical and it should not be 
confined into any unchangeable frame. Describing restorative justice as a “practice” or 
an “approach” is intended to indicate the inclusiveness of the core of restorative justice 
theory, but may not be a good way to define restorative justice. The core value of 
restorative justice, restoration, decides the form and the way of the practices. But the 
practices could not change the core. Restorative justice is a comprehensive system in 
which the spirit and value of restoration are expressed in the form of praxis. In other 
words, restorative justice shall be understood as a system where many approaches are 
guided by the idea of restoration. It shall be interpreted as an idea that must be practical 
in real-life problems. The form of restorative justice is less important than its core value. 
The factors of restorative justice 
The development of study on restorative justice has become international. 
Researches based on every State’s experience is abundant, and it is impossible to go all 




Justice Programs (the “RJ handbook”) which is published by the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) will be referred to as the main resource. Furthermore, 
many studies have identified restorative justice as practices/approaches with the value 
of restoration. This study will challenge such acknowledgement. The form that 
restorative justice takes does not matter that much, as long as the value of restoration is 
ensured. The nature of restorative justice can be understood not as practice but as an 
idea, because the practices of restorative justice are diverse but they all recognise the 
value of restoration. 30 For example, restoration is the first principle of restorative 
justice practices in the UK.31 With restoration being placed at the centre of restorative 
justice, restorative justice can be practiced in real life, and the influence of restorative 
justice can be assessed in accordance with such value. 
In the RJ Handbook, the key factors of restorative justice are not introduced 
directly. Rather, it is described as being combined with the word “program”. A 
restorative justice program is any program that uses restorative justice processes to 
achieve outcomes of restoration. The restorative justice process is 
“[A]ny process in which the victim and the offender and, where 
appropriate, any other individuals or community members affected by 
a crime participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising 
from the crime, generally with the help of a facilitator.”32 
The description of restorative justice may appear a “purist” view. According to this 
statement, even after narrowing restorative justice into a “process”, one may still feel 
confused because it seems that restorative justice is a huge “blanket” justice idea, rather 
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than any specific mode. The wording “any process” and “any individuals” leaves the 
operators of restorative justice a very wide range of discretion to decide which form of 
practice to apply. We may get some clue on how to use restorative justice by knowing 
what restorative justice process is, as it is demonstrated in both John Braithwaite’s 
discussion and the RJ handbook’s statement. But there is no clear description on what 
factors restorative justice shall cover. Additionally, restorative justice in real life may 
not function in the form of “justice”. In many countries, such as Canada, New Zealand, 
UK and US, restorative justice does not follow invariant patterns. The ways of using 
restorative justice relies on different cultures, and has to adjust itself to the ever-
changing reality. This is why the restorative justice programs in different countries may 
share many similarities, but it is very hard to find any absolutely identical path to carry 
on the programs. 
There may not be a certain guideline for practicing restorative justice, but it is 
possible to list several goals that restorative justice tries to achieve. In the RJ handbook, 
the goals of restorative justice include: 
“Victims who agree to be involved in the process can do so safely and 
come out of it satisfied; 
Offenders understand how their action has affected the victim and other 
people, assume responsibility for the consequences of their action and 
commit to making reparation; 
Flexible measures are agreed upon by the parties which emphasize 
repairing the harm done and, wherever possible, also address the 
reasons for the offence; 
Offenders live up to their commitment to repair the harm done and 




The victim and the offender both understand the dynamic that led to the 
specific incident, gain a sense of closure and are reintegrated into the 
community.”33 
The goals enumerated above suggest that restorative justice is not simply a system 
of practices, but also needs be to undertaken with just intention. It implies a “maximalist” 
view of restorative justice. However, it is not clear whether those goals are mandatory 
when using restorative justice approaches. It is also unknown whether restorative 
justice should achieve all of the goals or if it only needs to focus on certain goals. This 
study believes that those goals should not be mandatory, and cannot be imposed. 
Restorative justice is different from formal criminal justice which is regulated by 
criminal law and criminal procedural law. In formal criminal justice, prosecuting 
criminals and rendering judgement is a legal duty and thus there must be a result in all 
criminal cases. Restorative justice, however, depends on voluntary participation in 
which people willingly come forward to resolve the issue through collective intellect 
and wisdom. Certain results or goals are not necessary because restorative justice 
procedure itself can be of great effect on all the participants. In other words, the 
participation of all who are involved in the restorative justice process usually transmits 
the value of restoration. If there is any certain goal being forced upon those who take 
part in the process, restorative justice will lose the value of restoration. Also, it may not 
be realistic to achieve all the goals within one process.  
However, it is also possible that offenders may not have any interest in repairing 
the harm caused by their criminal acts34. In such a circumstance, it is acceptable to 
coerce the offenders to be present in restorative justice process to listen to the stories of 
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victims. So, the participation of offenders can be voluntary if they are willing to show 
their regret and respect to victims, and it can also be compulsory if they don’t want to. 
But it is difficult to ask them to actively promise anything to repair the harm to victims. 
More importantly, sometimes restorative justice achieves nothing tangible or visible in 
short term. Such result is not necessarily a failure, because the presence of both 
offenders and victims, and the story-telling from victims and other stakeholders could 
be meaningful. Restorative justice may have symbolic meaning which encourages all 
the parties to figure out a proper way to resolve the issues, and then provides more 
useful information to formal criminal justice. 
The core idea of restorative justice is “restoration”, therefore “knowing each 
other’s stories” among the involved people is one basic step toward this idea. In addition, 
forgiveness and reconciliation are the encouraged targets rather than the obliged 
outcome. That is the reason why restorative justice sometimes has to be described in 
the form of “process”, because it is easier for people to have clear views on what to do 
systematically. To emphasise again, restorative justice, which has been fervently 
discussed by many academics, should not be confined as a non-changeable process. 
There are many approaches to practice restorative justice, such as community 
conferencing, family conferences, victim-offender mediation, and so on35. But there is 
no specific guideline which must be followed to operate restorative justice process. 
Consequently, when using the term restorative justice, it is proper to recognise it as an 
idea that centres on the value of restoration and applies different approaches based on 
reality. 
Based on the discussions above, it can be concluded that there are three core 
factors in restorative justice. The first factor is “wide-ranging involvement”, or 
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engagement of stakeholders. In theory, restorative justice process can include all the 
persons who were affected by criminal acts, whereas in formal criminal justice it is only 
the offenders who are able to truly actively participate in the proceedings as the 
defendant side. The other stakeholders, such as victims, the families of victims, and the 
families of the offenders as well as all the other people who may have been affected by 
the crime, may be in the court as witnesses or audiences. They don’t really get involved 
in criminal justice because they are not given the opportunity to properly express their 
ideas and feelings toward the offenders and the crime. In practice, victims and offenders 
are positioned at the central part of the process in restorative justice, sharing 
information about the crime and feelings about the consequences. 
Formal criminal justice usually lacks such mechanism. Studies and surveys have 
discovered that victims of criminal conducts are significantly concerned about their 
security in the community and in society36 but they are not granted a chance to speak 
out in court. Moreover, in formal criminal justice, the whole process can be seen as a 
“competition” between the defendant and the prosecutor or between the authorities and 
the individuals, trying to persuade the judges to acknowledge their points, rather than 
endeavouring to make clear what really happened in the past. 
The second factor is “flexibility”, or adaptation to realistic needs. The whole 
process of restorative justice can be “discussed” and “decided” by all the participants, 
rather than being “disputed” by the “game players” and “judged” by the “non-
stakeholders” of the crime. As Menkel-Meadow describes, even the form of punishment 
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can be negotiated through discussions by victims and offenders.37 This is the flexibility 
in the result of the restorative justice, that as long as the process is being kept on the 
route to the restoration of victims, offenders and the affected community, the resolution 
to the crime does not need to be locked to pure criminal punishment. The procedure of 
restorative justice is also quite flexible. In restorative justice, all the participants will 
not be named or labelled with unchangeable roles in the court. From the angle of the 
crime itself, there are victims, offenders, and observers; with respect to the restorative 
justice process itself, there are participants and assistants. Everyone in restorative 
justice process has many different roles. This helps the participants to better understand 
what really happened to both the victims and the offenders, as well as other persons in 
the community who have been affected by the crime. What is meaningful in restorative 
justice is that the wrong-doers are not simply treated as offenders whose aim is to 
defend the accusations. They are encouraged to express their real feelings and even 
sufferings about the crime, and to confess to the victims and other people from the 
affected community. In formal criminal justice, however, everyone has a certain and 
constant position throughout the whole procedure. Their main concern is how to play 
their roles better but not to understand the problems of the crime better. 
The third factor of restorative justice which is different from formal criminal 
justice is the “symbol of restoration”, or the true meaning of justice that is sought-after. 
The aim of the restorative justice is to repair the harm caused by crime. The purpose of 
the approaches in restorative justice is to heal the harmed participants and the damaged 
social relationships. Punishment is not excluded from restorative justice, because a 
certain level of punishment functions in the process of “repairing” and “healing” in 
certain circumstance. The deprivation of rights of the convicted persons in punishment 
is not the necessary result of the restorative justice process. Some forms of punishment, 
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such as monetary compensation, apologies, and community services, which contain 
symbolic meaning to heal, are crucial components of restorative justice. The variety of 
options in restorative justice offer different possibilities to the whole process. These 
options must serve the purpose of restoration. In formal criminal justice, there are 
foreseeable results as the solution of the case at hand. The defendant may “win” the 
competition, and consequently the judgment of the court will pronounce that there is no 
punishment. If the prosecution “defeats” the defendant in court, certain forms of penalty 
will be the conclusion of the judgement. Formal criminal justice focuses mainly on the 
elements in relation to “punishment”, including the reasons to inflict punishment and 
for proper sort of punishment. Perhaps formal criminal justice pays attention to 
“restoration” as well, if one regards “sentencing” as restoring law and order. However, 
such “restoration” aims at protecting the dignity of the authority, not the interests of 
individuals who are affected by the crime. 
Finally, from these three factors it can be concluded that restorative justice 
provides all participants with a chance to “accept” and “acknowledge” the occurrence 
of crime, and the responsibility thereof respectively to each person. This is the view of 
accountability in restorative justice. The basis of restorative justice is that all parties in 
the process should be engaged with consciousness in the holistic picture of the crime. 
Offenders recognise the crime committed by them and the harm that the criminal act 
has caused. As well, victims can express true feelings about the crime and that the other 
participants review the whole case and share their experience. Regret, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation are also non-compulsory but important targets. Hence, 
“acknowledgement” will be the key point throughout the whole restorative justice 
process. In formal criminal justice, however, the nature of the judicial process is 
“confrontation”. It is not easy for defendants to accept that they have committed crime 
because by doing so they face certain criminal penalties. Normally, they will make the 




even though in many cases there is sound evidence for their guilt. The right of “denial” 
which is bestowed by the law makes it difficult to access truth through criminal 
procedure. The denial itself by the offender is not helpful in providing comfort to either 
the victims or the offenders because they always treat each other as enemies. In addition, 
the fracture of their relationship may be further deteriorated in the course of the criminal 
procedure, since they stand on opposite sides and do not intend to move closer. When 
a case concludes, the court may feel that the “job” has been “done”, but it can hardly 
assert that the issues arising from the crime have been “resolved”. 
Restorative justice and transitional justice 
The concept of restorative justice discussed above mainly focuses on the usage at 
the national level. Usually, restorative justice is studied by researchers who work 
towards making an amelioration or improvement to the criminal justice system in a 
country. In other words, the main purpose of studying restorative justice is to help the 
national judiciary to have a better understanding of crimes and criminal statistics, to try 
and find other paths to solve the problems that formal criminal justice is unable to, or 
has difficulties handling. Restorative justice, in most cases, needs to be subject to 
domestic law, or at least must find itself an appropriate position in the whole framework 
of criminal justice without causing unnecessary conflicts with criminal law. Restorative 
justice under these circumstances is carefully designed for crimes without international 
characteristics. 
However, typical restorative justice may not be directly applicable to solving 
international crimes. In international crimes, the victims are usually the people of a 
whole group, or even the majority population of a State. International crimes can also 
be committed across the territory of different countries, causing jurisdictional conflicts 
among several States. For achieving restoration in post-conflict States, there needs 




Restorative justice in dealing international crimes is usually seen as one part of 
transitional justice. 38  Transitional justice and restorative justice are often wrongly 
understood as the same in certain situations. Transitional justice is used in countries that 
have experienced democratic transitions primarily following armed conflict, for 
example in Latin American countries 39  and former Soviet countries. A very early 
formulation of this term is found in the book Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes40, published in 1995. The term “transitional 
justice” was used to describe the transformation of the government and the political 
systems from autocracy to democracy in States during the time of “transition”. 41 
However, the definition was not fully discussed in that book. On the website of the 
International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), transitional justice is defined as 
“[T]he set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been 
implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of 
massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various 
kinds of institutional reforms.”42 
In one report of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) in 2004, 
                                                 
38 One example is the transition in Uganda. See International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘Confronting the 
Past: Truth Telling and Reconciliation in Uganda’ (2012); Michael Otim and Kasande Sarah Kihika, ‘On the Path 
to Vindicate Victims’ Rights in Uganda: Reflections on the Transitional Justice Process Since Juba’ (ICTJ 2015). 
Also see Joanna R. Quinn, ‘Social Reconstruction in Uganda: The Role of Customary Mechanisms in Transitional 
Justice’ (2007) 8(4) Human Rights Review 389; Jackee Budesta Batanda, ‘The Role of Civil Society in Advocating 
for Transitional Justice in Uganda’ (2009), Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, South Africa; ‘Towards A 
Comprehensive and Holistic Transitional Justice Policy for Uganda: Exploring linkages between transitional 
justice mechanisms’ (2013) Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF). 
39 See Norberto Bobbio, The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game (University of 
Minnesota Press 1987). Also see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (University of Oklahoma Press 1991); Paige Arthur, ‘How "Transitions" Reshaped Human Rights: A 
Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’ (2009) 31(2) Human Rights Quarterly 321. 
40 See Neil J. Kritz (ed.), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes 
(US Institute of Peace 1995). 
41 Ruti G. Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 69. 





transitional justice is described as 
“[T]he full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation”.43 
Those two expressions are very similar to each other, both underlining the central 
point of redressing the “legacies of large-scale of human rights abuses”. It is not 
emphasised in the UNSG’ expression that transitional justice consists of both formal 
legal justice and alternative ways. Rather, the ultimate goals of transitional justice have 
been strongly linked with accountability, justice, and reconciliation, which suggests that 
transitional justice practices are not limited to judicial measures. The definition given 
by the ICTJ sets equal importance to judicial and non-judicial measures, and 
specifically notes that transitional justice practices may vary according to different 
countries’ situation. Nevertheless, non-judicial measures are often included in 
transitional justice to achieve reconciliation, thus, being restorative is the outstanding 
characteristic of transitional justice. 
Transitional justice shares two main similarities with restorative justice. They both 
accept the goal of restoration. The noteworthy aspect of this similarity is that they 
emphasise the significance of inclusive and non-adversarial frameworks which seek to 
prevent past acts from being recommitted.44 The other similarity is that they both agree 
that multiple measures, rather than pure legal procedure, are essential for achieving the 
goals. Compared with formal criminal justice, transitional justice and restorative justice 
accept the form of dialogue between victims and the perpetrators, something that will 
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not be considered in a punitive punishment-allocating exercise.45 
In fact, since both judicial approaches and non-judicial methods are available to 
transitional justice, restorative justice can be deemed as one component of transitional 
justice. In transitional justice, approaches like truth-telling, reconciliation of victims 
and perpetrators as well as reparations are practices featuring “restorative justice”; 
institutional reformation and rebuilding of law are methods to recover the authority of 
the state; indictment and prosecution (including both domestic prosecution and 
international prosecution) of criminals are the processes of formal criminal justice. The 
paradigm of transitional justice also consists of historical justice, reparatory justice, 
administrative justice, and constitutional justice46. With the effort of internal institutes 
and the assistance from external supports, the country under transition could take 
judicial and non-judicial processes into its mechanism to make progress in rebuilding 
democracy. 
Furthermore, transitional justice should also carefully handle the causes of 
conflicts from their roots, and take human rights values into account.47 In other words, 
exercising transitional justice is in no way easier than establishing a new country. The 
truth is that it may be even more complicated than building up a new country, usually 
because it has to settle the scattering dark clouds of the past in the first place and then 
make a blueprint for the future. Transitional justice must manage all the factors 
holistically in order to bring about a promising result. In this sense, restorative programs 
are needed to solve the problems that legal justice cannot handle. 
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This can also explain why restorative justice is often confused with transitional 
justice. To most people, formal legal justice is more familiar than restorative justice and 
transitional justice. When speaking of justice, the common impression among people is 
that criminal cases shall go through a system which consists of police, prosecutorial 
procedure, and criminal trial. It seems as if only restorative justice represents the core 
of transitional justice because it differentiates itself from formal criminal justice. And 
because formal criminal justice is so well known to the public, the restorative feature 
of transitional justice turns out to be more noticeable for its uncommonness. This 
common recognition about criminal justice leads to a confusion between transitional 
justice and restorative justice.  
As a result, it must be pointed out that restorative justice is similar to, but different 
from, transitional justice. For restorative justice, the goal of achieving restoration is at 
the centre. For transitional justice, restoration is one of the many goals that transitional 
justice aims at. The pivotal goal of transitional justice is to address “legacies of large-
scale human rights abuses”. Transitional justice requests that restorative approaches 
must be contributory to this goal. It means that if restoration is deemed as an obstacle 
to the goal of transitional justice, albeit it is not observed yet in many cases, then in 
principle it has to be changed or even rejected. Restorative justice can play a vital role 
in helping countries that are in a period of transition, if all the necessary conditions have 
been provided. But it is also possible that restorative justice has a negative impact on 
the transition process. For example, there is a voice to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa that it did not achieve genuine forgiveness and restoration. 
Because the restorative process in South Africa was only used as the “method” rather 
than the “purpose”, forgiveness and reconciliation may have not been successfully 
reached.48 
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Restorative justice and transitional justice also have different scopes. Restorative 
justice pursues holistic harmony for order and relationship between individuals inside 
the community. It contributes to re-build the social bond between people within a 
certain area where common values and ideas are shared. But its impact may not be great 
between the people to whom the core social values are significantly different. 
Consequently, restorative justice may not always work to ensure a just settlement of the 
disputes. And it is where formal criminal justice plays a better role. The truth is, for 
many academics, restorative justice is one substitute for formal criminal justice system, 
when formal criminal justice does not work well, but not a trigger of reformation or 
reconstruction of the entire criminal justice.49 
Transitional justice is used to redress the conflicts between different political 
factions, cultural and religious groups, and even States. In many examples, such as 
South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, where transitional 
justice is required or is being applied in reality, the approaches of restorative justice 
function as part of the transitional justice process. Within the bigger plan, restorative 
justice does not generally operate outside the context of transitional justice in post-
conflict situations. Normally, restorative justice, along with other judicial proceedings, 
contributes to transitional justice. That is why many transitional justice is often 
characterised with restoration but does not appear a pure restorative justice forum. From 
this standpoint, restorative justice is associated with transitional justice but the two are 
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not the same. 
The other difference between restorative justice and transitional justice lies in its 
influence upon the people involved. Restorative justice focuses largely on individual 
accountability of all offenders. Only when as many offenders as possible are involved, 
will the efforts to despite the whole scenario of the crime be meaningful. Offenders, 
together with victims, express their feelings from different angles. Words from both 
sides can be crucial to achieving the goal of restoration through revealing the truth and 
together revisiting the stories of the past. 50  It is important for all the parties to 
understand the holistic view of the committed crime before they start to communicate 
with each other. And only when all participants enjoy the same status in the process will 
such communication reach a positive result. However, for transitional justice, getting 
all offenders involved may not be an option. It is uneasy and unrealistic to expect the 
powerful perpetrators to participate in a transition process in the same way as other 
normal persons. As a result, there may not be a equalised position for all the participants 
in the transitional justice process. In countries that have experienced democratic 
transition, the primary phase of transitional justice is not to discover the whole situation 
of human rights violations in the past, but to reform the national institutions and to make 
sure that transitional justice is able to continue.51 The perpetrators of international 
crimes may be needed for the national transition. 
For example, in Argentina, after the return to democracy in 1983, the former 
military leaders still remained in power, making it very difficult to take personal 
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accountabilities of them and their minions. In such circumstances, getting involved in 
the processes of transitional justice of the people who are in charge of great power of a 
country would not be a safe choice. In short, transitional justice depends upon political 
changes, so there may not be equal status for normal citizens and political leaders in 
taking part in transitional justice. Whereas restorative justice requires equal 
conversations between all participants, regardless of some people’s special position in 
society. 
It is also argued that the meaning and value of restorative justice are not totally the 
same as transitional justice.52 Restorative justice is not limited to mass-scale conflicts 
between groups of people. Instead, in respect of conflict, it focuses more on the nature 
and causes of the conflicts between individuals. Transitional justice process usually 
pays attention to bigger issues that involve group interests, collective remedies, and 
political transition of a state, in which both victims and offenders get involved to the 
processes on the behalf of their group. In restorative justice, the personal feelings and 
the chance to express through participating the process is pivotal. In transitional justice, 
the role of individual feeling and participation sometimes can be shadowed by decisions 
made by the group or political interests. Hence, despite that restorative justice is often 
one component in the whole transitional justice of a state, it can still achieve something 
beyond the scope of transitional justice, particularly the sense of restoration at 
individual level. Where the participants of transitional justice may have to take the 
collective reparation without a chance to express personal feelings, restorative justice 
can function as a supplemental part. Restorative justice concentrates on individual 
feelings. By contrast, transitional justice highlights the importance of social stability.  
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This means that transitional justice involves more forms of practices, and restorative 
justice applies to more occasions. 
3. The scope and limit of this study 
Integrating restorative justice can be understood in two directions that are guided 
by the “purist” view or “maximalist” view. It can be discussed in the meaning to apply 
restorative justice practices to the justice mechanism at the ICC and create a new 
mechanism. Or, it can be considered as combining the idea of restorative justice with 
the ICC’s justice procedure, and reshape the meaning of justice into an ideology beyond 
legalism. This study will not discuss the way to purely apply restorative justice practices 
to the ICC’s legal mechanisms, or the method to replace the existing format of justice 
at the ICC. These are the matters that are essentially technical in nature. Introducing 
restorative justice practices into formal criminal justice is still in progress in most of 
the countries. The major format of criminal justice has not been altered globally. In the 
area of international criminal law, the synergetic combination of these two different 
mechanisms may not come true in the coming future. 
Even the technical issues in legislation can be overcome, the reality does not allow 
fundamental changes to the substantive law or the procedural law at the ICC. One 
reason is that the ICC is always seen as the precious heritage of the international 
tribunals against the crimes during the World War II, particularly the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the Nuremberg Trials).53 The core and the special 
status of the ICC in the field of international criminal justice has decided that the 
rudimental rules, which relate to both the procedure and the structure of the court at the 
ICC, are hardly to be changed. Another reason is that in practice, both the formal 
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criminal justice at the ICC and restorative justice mechanism are designed to address 
the issues relating to the personal responsibility in the prosecuted crime with limited 
number of parties concerned. The procedure of formal criminal justice and the 
approaches in restorative justice, ordinarily, are not prepared for atrocities like mass 
violence. That is why international criminal justice is frequently supplemented by state 
activities, such as national reconciliation and memorial, and restorative justice is often 
imbedded into transitional justice. There exists no precedent of an international criminal 
tribunal which has replaced the formal legal procedure with restorative justice 
mechanism. The ICC is not likely to be the frontier of such attempt. 
As a consequence, this study will only focus on integrating restorative justice idea 
into the ICC’s work. It is not to ask the ICC to abandon the existing legal procedures, 
but to encourage it to adopt some new thoughts on justice. One significant thought in 
restorative justice is that severe crimes cause grave harm and therefore should require 
sincere restoration. There exists a direct correlation between the severity of the crime 
and the need for restoration. If this thought is sound and logic, the ICC needs to learn 
from restorative justice idea because international crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC are the most serious crimes for humanity and the whole world. 
To integrate restorative justice idea to the ICC’s work includes many aspects. This 
study aims at the difficulties in achieving justice and peace into the societies suffering 
from mass violence, which urges a creative mode of justice, and examine the 
possibilities and necessities to combine restorative justice and formal criminal justice 
together at the ICC in attaining a more productive resolution of international crimes. 
By learning from restorative justice idea, the meaning of justice in ICC law will be 
enriched. 
Not many studies have gone deep into this question. What is even less researched 




Nancy A. Combs suggests in her study on guilty pleas in different international trials 
that restorative justice, values and principles have been included with or without special 
intention in some aspects of international criminal justice, such as truth-telling, victim 
participation at trial, and reparations to victims and harmed communities. The 
contribution of her research helps to discover the existing clues of the application of 
restorative justice in modern international criminal justice. In her conclusion she 
expresses her disappointment in international criminal law in paying insufficient 
attention to victims and the life in post-conflict states, and implicitly criticises the 
obstinate compliance of the international community with legalism as the price of 
sacrificing victims’ interests. Recalling Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, which 
states that the Court may apply national laws and even legal principles of the concerned 
state, provided that such laws or principles do not constitute a violation of recognised 
international laws and other norms in the Rome Statute, the views in her study provide 
a remarkably improved lens for considering the potential of restorative justice in 
international legal mechanisms.54 
Another study which addresses how to apply restorative justice ideas in the ICC’s 
legal proceedings concentrates on the retributive aspect of the ICC’s justice and the 
benefits of introducing more restorative values into it. Mark Findlay and Ralph Henham 
compared the two most predominant modes of trial, the British mode and the Italian 
mode, the Common law system and the Roman Law system, and pointed out that the 
different forms of the two systems in criminal justice do not make either of them better 
than another; rather, it is the cultural elements behind the trials that decide the 
effectiveness and consequences of justice. They mainly consider restorative justice as 
a form of victim participation, and state that the conceptualisation of sentencing in 
formal criminal justice, including the proceedings at the ICC, must scrutinise the 
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influence of the idea of victim rights. The authors themselves admit that they do not 
offer any concrete plan for the ICC on how to integrate restorative justice. Rather, they 
outline several general parts that need to be improved to include more victim 
participation and more functional roles for communities.55 
There is a wide range of topics relating to restorative justice and the ICC, such as 
whether the ICC is political, how the ICC is dependent on the UN Security Council, 
and how to understand the principle of “complementarity” of the ICC. These questions 
also cause many problems to the work and to the validity of the ICC’s intervention. 
However, these topics do not necessarily connect to the possible improvements that 
restorative justice can make to the ICC. In the contrary, some of those topics, such as 
the “complementarity” issue in the ICC’s work, pose restorative justice and the ICC on 
two opposite side and expose the ICC to the risk of being marginalised. That is because 
in those topics restorative justice is viewed differently from the position of this study, 
and the restorative justice approaches discussed in researches on those topics are 
designed and managed in domestic programs, not in the ICC’s work. It is unreasonable 
to consider the discussions about restorative justice in the topics where restorative 
justice has not been examined as one part of the Justice at the ICC. The purpose of this 
study is not to accomplish an “encyclopaedia”, discussing all the details of restorative 
justice and the issues restorative justice in dealing with international criminal cases. It 
is only essential to examine the political issues, the problem of complementarity, and 
the impartiality of the ICC when they are closely related to restorative justice, and fall 
into the themes of peace, justice, and the need of victims. 
For example, the issues related to complementarity of the ICC involve the 
discussions on restorative justice, but not all its discussions are relevant to the themes 
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of this study. The principle of complementarity indicates the basic order of domestic 
courts and the ICC to take the perpetrators of international crimes into account. Article 
1 of the Rome Statute regulates that the ICC “shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions”. This article is one legal basis of complementarity. Generally 
speaking, according to Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the complementary role of the 
ICC will be triggered when national justice is unable or unwilling to deal with the 
international crime56. The number of studies particularly on the theory and practice of 
complementarity of the ICC has been quite abundant. 57  But studies on 
complementarity either focus on whether the ICC also needs to remain complementary 
to the restorative justice processes of a State or, the political impartiality of the ICC in 
dealing different situations. The former, as it has pointed early in this chapter, does not 
consider the possible effect of restorative justice within the ICC’s work The experience 
in relation to utilising restorative justice outside the ICC shall be learned as a guidance, 
not a tool to weaken the role of the ICC. 
The latter aspect of the complementarity issue marks the influence on the ICC 
from other political power. As for the issue of political influence, several studies express 
concerns about the ICC, pointing to its association with the Ugandan government, and 
its targeting of rebel groups rather than both sides in the conflict.58 Similar debate has 
also been seen in studies of other international criminal tribunals.59 The “bias” of the 
                                                 
56 See William W. Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National 
Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’ (2008) 49(1) Harvard International Law Journal 53. 
57 For example, see Jann K. Kleffner and Gerben Kor (eds), Complementary Views on Complementarity: 
Proceedings of the International Roundtable on the Complementary Nature of the International Criminal Court, 
Amsterdam, 25/26 June 2004 (T.M.C Asser Press 2006); Mohamed M. El Zeidy, Principle of Complementarity in 
International Criminal Law: Origin, Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 2007); Carsten Stahn and 
Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2011); Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The International Criminal Court and National Courts: A 
Contentious Relationship (Ashgate 2011); Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The 
Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
58 Sarah M. H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal 
Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2011) 21(4) The European Journal of International Law 941. 




ICC has been attributed to political influences.60 Studies have shown that external 
political influence on the ICC derives mainly from international politics and is almost 
evitable, which can be witnessed in almost every aspect of the ICC’s work.61 Perhaps 
the reasons why the ICC cannot isolate itself from politics are that international laws is 
inherently political to an extent, and that international law is not powerful enough to 
overcome the motivation of states to show the citizens and the outside world that the 
government is able to solve its problem in the state’s own ways.62 The will of States to 
achieve justice in their own ways may relate to political considerations, but also urges 
for restorative justice in making peace and justice for victims, since restorative justice 
practices are not often regarded as a “typical” legal justice of the West. Therefore, 
although it is not the focus for this study to examine the external political influence to 
the ICC, the reasons inside the influence that are in relation to restorative justice will 
be discussed. 
4. Methodology and the original contribution 
The common research methods in legal study are used as the main methodology. 
Firstly, this study will rely on theoretical analysis in the major body. The analyses 
provide necessary theoretical basis for the discussions in all the chapters. Secondly, 
case study and historical analysis are utilised in chapter 2 and 4, as well as the making 
of different international rules, to clarify the lessons that must be learned from different 
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situations under the jurisdiction of the ICC. These analyses enable the discussions with 
enough details in real cases so that it will be more meaningful in considering the impact 
of restorative justice to the ICC. Thirdly, this study uses many comparative analyses to 
prove that restorative justice is both possible and necessary for the ICC to consider in 
order to make improvements in its work and to avoid to be marginalised in fighting 
international crimes. Fourthly, this study deeply analyses international law and its 
legislative processes to understand the original purpose and the logic behind the 
legislation. Relevant quantitative and qualitative studies are referred in almost all 
chapters and support necessary inform to the discussions and analyses in this study. 
A literature review is not confined to one single chapter because this study 
combines international criminal law with restorative justice, which requires materials 
in both legal studies and criminology. Rather, the existing research materials, including 
academic articles, legal provisions, and relevant books, will be assessed or analysed in 
every chapter for developing the discussions. 
In general, the original contribution of this study can be summarised into three 
points. First of all, this study innovatively explores the topic of combining restorative 
justice idea and international criminal justice in one organisation. The role of restorative 
justice in fighting against international crimes has increasingly drawn attention from 
academics, which means that the idea of restorative justice would become a noteworthy 
option in this area. However, the growing interests in international criminal justice on 
restorative justice may have covered some crucial issues. Restorative justice has 
currently been practiced by national institutions in many countries to deal with the large 
scale violence and serious human rights, but it has not been used in any international 
legal organisation. The significant reason for such reality is that the mechanism of 




alternation, 63  which, in suggestion, is not quite compatible to formal criminal 
procedures. In domestic legislation, albeit restorative justice has gained popularity 
among criminologists and politicians aiming at crime reduction, it has not been fully 
imbedded into formal criminal justice in many countries. For example, in UK (the 
United Kingdom), more specifically in England and Wales, Part2 of Schedule 16 in the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013, which came into force in December 2013, introduces 
criminal courts the power to trigger restorative justice activities when certain 
requirements are met.64 But the legal provisions in this new schedule does not provide 
enough details for applying restorative justice, and only associates with the pose-
sentencing proceeding, not the whole procedure. On international level, restorative 
justice practices are specifically seen in transitional justice. The most renowned 
example of restorative justice utilised in post-violence transition is the practices in the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the TRC) in South Africa, 65  which is still 
encouraging scholars to assess the effects in several aspects. The Gacaca courts in 
Rwanda, which is another example, combined restorative justice with local traditions. 
But those practices, successful or not, have not made restorative justice applicable at 
the international level. The distance between restorative justice and international 
criminal justice needs to be shortened. This study analyses the possibility and necessity 
of utilising restorative justice at an international organisation, the International Criminal 
Court, a subject that has not been addressed in detail by researchers. 
The second original contribution of this study is that it manages to discover the 
connections between restorative justice and the ICC’s legal framework. In most studies, 
restorative justice has been juxtaposed with international criminal justice as they are 
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mutually contradictory because of the reality that is discussed in the last paragraph. 
Usually, restorative justice represents “peace”, and international criminal justice stands 
for “justice”. The ICC’s role in delivering justice has been considered as sacrificing the 
right to peace for local people, which has been debated in the situation of Uganda and 
other situations. However, the relation between restorative justice and peace is not fully 
discussed, and the influence of the justice at the ICC to peace awaits a deeper analysis, 
since it is widely asserted that the ICC is not concerned with promoting peace. The 
President and the Prosecutor of the ICC have claimed that the ICC’s work is important 
to maintaining peace and it has been admitted that the “peace” shall be understood as 
“sustainable peace”, 66  This study opines that the “common/social bond” between 
people shall be the core of peace, and shall link the ICC with restorative justice. In 
addition, many studies have discussed the meaning of justice at the ICC and the ways 
to achieve international justice, but little attention has been devoted to factors in setting 
the penalty and the purposes of punishment. The justice mechanism at the ICC 
concentrates on giving convicted perpetrators proper deserts and achieving deterrence. 
There are serious problems with both aims, but this has not been explored by 
researchers. This study points out the existing and potential problems for the ICC in 
delivering justice to victims and the international community after comparing different 
cases, historical elements and cultural diversity, and suggests that by using restorative 
justice the ICC can make improvements in these areas. In short, this study connects the 
ICC and restorative justice in both the spirit of peace and the meaning of justice. 
Thirdly, it carefully examines the most noteworthy features of international crimes, 
and explains the role of restorative justice in making improvements to the ICC’s work. 
There has been a great attention paid to the impact of the ICC in international criminal 
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cases and restorative justice processes at domestic level separately, suggesting to utilise 
the two on parallel tracks rather than to conjoin them. However, because restorative 
justice is usually practiced according to the local values and traditions, such suggestion 
means that the ICC needs to manage to weigh every tradition and choice within the 
meaning of the complementarity principle that is established in the Rome Statute of the 
ICC. This argument will marginalise the role of the ICC in fighting against international 
crimes since restorative justice is often linked to granting amnesty which will make less 
effective the effort of taking the personal accountability of the perpetrators of 
international crimes.67 In addition, although restorative justice may have occurred in 
the processes dealing with international crimes in many cases, the idea of restorative 
justice may have been misinterpreted. Criminologists understand restorative justice in 
two ways, which either focuses on the core or highlights the form. But they have not 
carefully considered what restorative justice means to international criminal justice. 
That is because there are so many differences between domestic crimes and 
international crimes. One difference is that domestic crimes do not cause damage as 
huge and terrifying as international crimes do. Another difference is that when facing 
international crimes, judges must ponder the very complicated background of historical 
and cultural elements, which is not normally the case in domestic courts. Consequently, 
the gap between understanding restorative justice and international criminal justice has 
not been narrowed yet. This study attempts to confront this gap and to figure out the 
correct way to overcome such a pitfall. 
5. Summary 
This chapter is an introduction to the research topic. It briefly introduces the 
International Criminal Court and the argument of improving its work through 
                                                 




restorative justice in academy. Different opinions on the definition of restorative justice 
have been discussed. It concludes that the “maximalist” view of restorative justice, 
which focuses on the core value of restoration, will be the utilised in this study. The 
chapter also compares restorative justice and transitional justice, and clarifies the scope 





Chapter 2: Unfolding the Criticism toward the 
ICC 
The first chapter has introduced the difficulties for the ICC to maintain peace and 
achieve justice. In fact, the argument- peace versus justice- has been long haunting 
international criminal justice. This chapter selects three situations where the ICC has 
initiated its work, and two situations in which ad hoc tribunals took the role of 
delivering justice. All the selected situations have undergone transitional justice, and 
restorative justice approaches have been utilised in some aspects of the national 
transitions. In all the situations, formal justice process at international courts has been 
operated as a separated platform from the restorative justice process which has been 
practiced in domestic justice programs. 
The situations in Uganda, Sudan and DRC all have their own special features and 
generally reflect relationship between the justice at the ICC and domestic approaches. 
The three ICC situations will be examined to expose the current problems in ICC’s 
work, especially those in relation to peace, justice, and the need of victims. The 
situations in Rwanda and in Sierra Leone are the selected as the situations being dealt 
at ad hoc tribunals. The two situations that are outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction are 
analysed as the comparative examples to the ICC, because they also managed to balance 
the work of formal criminal justice and restorative justice in facing the most serious 
crimes for humanity. Albeit the latter two situation are not about the ICC or the 
restorative justice in the territory of the States where the ICC involved, they provide 
precious lessons for the ICC to consider the proper way to react to the claim of 
supporting restorative justice in international criminal case and to interact with 




1. The situation in Uganda and the critiques 
The tragedy of the Ugandan civil war and the intervention of the ICC 
Uganda is one of the earliest States that joined the ICC. It signed the Rome Statute 
on 17 March 1999, and deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations (the “UN”) on 14 June 2002. Given the 
history of the Ugandan civil war, Uganda’s early supportive attitude to the ICC clearly 
demonstrated that the government had a strong will to cooperate with the ICC and to 
solve the issues caused by armed conflicts with international law. One of the reasons 
for such steady support might be that the whole state had been ruined by a series of 
armed and non-armed conflicts subsequent to its attaining independence. Ugandan 
people, as well as the Government, needed a peaceful time and environment to recover 
from the pain and develop their country. What had been expected by the Ugandan 
people was not only to survive the civil war, but also an opportunity to achieve a stable 
environment in order for them to possess a better future. The desire to solve the internal 
problems resulting from gross violations of human rights and to bring peace and justice 
was the one of the original motivations for Uganda and its people to ratify the Rome 
Statute and become a State Party of the ICC 68 , which is also “a concern to the 
international community as a whole” 69  as stated in the Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court which was completed by and adopted at the International 
Law Commission (ILC) in 1994. Another reason, apart from the good will and hope, 
could be the reality that the Ugandan government at that time was not able to effectively 
deal with its internal intense turmoil, in particular the conflict in northern Uganda with 
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the Lord’s Residence Army (LRA).  
A series of conflicts between the Ugandan government and the LRA was probably 
the most tremendous aspect in the Ugandan civil war. The LRA, all of whose members 
the Ugandan government considered as rebels, was then organised by Joseph Kony, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the LRA who claimed himself to be a “spirit medium”. At its 
early stage, the group was immature in both its organisation and its military force, and 
appeared nameless. Joseph Kony first gathered a large number of followers through 
means of spiritual control. The mind-control made the followers obey any order without 
hesitation, and imitate the activities of other groups which were not satisfied with the 
Government’s policies and actions. For most of his followers, the appearance of the so-
called “Holy Spirit” was convincing enough for them to abide by his words and comply 
with his commands. Soon they were trained by some top leaders of the LRA and were 
transformed from normal civilians into soldiers, and then sent to fight against the 
Ugandan government army. Then Joseph Kony realised that the name “Holy Spirit” 
itself would not be powerful enough to win a political position, and he aligned himself 
with other military and/or spiritual groups, so that he would not be singled out by the 
Government as the main target. On the other hand, he slowly recruited some soldiers 
who belonged to other groups that had been defeated by government forces. 
Furthermore, since the mid-1990s, he received political and military support from the 
Sudanese Government for fighting against the Ugandan government at that time. And 
finally in 1998, Joseph Kony changed the name of his group into the “Lord’s Resistance 
Army” which is the name known to all. Still, neither its number of soldiers was enough 
to fight against the government army nor its warring equipment was compatible to that 
of the government’s. Therefore, the LRA decided to take other actions to further 
strengthen its force, which included the abduction of children. It is believed that by 




force in different forms.70 After being trained through many ways, these children were 
forced to fire at the people who stood in their way, including those who came from the 
same communities where the child soldiers grew up.  
Another problem for the Ugandan government to end the conflict with the LRA 
by military force was that the LRA used guerrilla assaults as the main strategy to 
execute its purposes by hiding in the bushes in the northern part of Uganda. In 1991, 
the Ugandan government started a military action called “Operation North”, aiming at 
suppressing the rebellions in the northern part of Uganda. If everything had gone on as 
planned by the Ugandan government, this military action would have completed its 
mission within a short time. The Ugandan army was always trying to have a face-to-
face fight with the LRA. However, the LRA soldiers did not come out from the bushes 
and for head-on confrontation with the government army. They used the clever tactics 
which had been proven effective and efficient for weaker military groups to fight 
against those stronger. The form of guerrilla warfare made it hard for the Ugandan 
government to finalise the war quickly. And the “Operation North” eventually failed by 
1992. 
The LRA’s advantage in the conflict with the Ugandan government at the early 
stages was that the local people, mainly the Acholi, supported the LRA and antagonised 
the government forces. The turmoil was not simply caused by economic reasons. 
Instead, the hatred between “northerners” and “southerners” was one key reason behind 
that civil war, which fits the characteristics of the conflicts that start from ethnical issues 
and then develop into geographical campaigns. In addition, the dominant party of the 
Ugandan government and its military force was renowned for its brutality and violence 
in both armed conflict and retaliation against the civilian population who were accused 
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of assisting rebel groups. As a consequence, the civilian population in Uganda, 
especially in the north part, were not keen to offer any active support to the Government. 
The Government was composed of perpetrators of international crimes just like the 
LRA. The immediate solution for the conflict with the LRA was not a possible option 
at that time for the Ugandan government. However, while the conflict continued, the 
LRA rebels started to use violence toward the people who took part in local defence. 
The astonishing crimes committed by the LRA rebels against local people included 
mutilations and brutal killings. Since the Ugandan government could not end the civil 
war quickly, and the Ugandan people in the northern part were suffering from grave 
violence, there had to be another way to terminate the atrocities and protect the hope 
for peace and justice. 
The first effort was through a peace agreement between the Government and the 
rebel groups. During 1993 and 1994, a series of peace talks were organised between the 
LRA, other rebel groups, and the Ugandan government. During the negotiations, 
amnesty to the LRA rebels was required by the LRA leaders. After committing those 
atrocities , Joseph Kony justified the violence by asserting that the people, who had 
taken defence actions, had to be blamed for misinterpreting the “commandments” in 
the Bible71. The attempts of all negotiating parties behind the cease-fire in this peace 
process were not for the better future of the country or for a peaceful life of the people. 
The Government, ruled by President Yoweri Museveni, already considered the 
predominant political power, hoped the peace talks could further strengthen its 
advantage over the other parties. Other parties, all equipped with weaponry and military 
force, wanted to weaken the ruling party’s control over the Government so that they 
could share some benefits brought to them by political means. Because they had no 
                                                 
71 Balam Nyeko and Okello Lucima, ‘Profiles of the Parties to the Conflict’ (2011) < http://www.c-
r.org/downloads/Accord%2011_3Profiles%20of%20the%20parties%20to%20the%20conflict_2002_ENG.pdf > 




desire to make compromises, the peace talks moved arduously, and the whole situation 
became more and more complicated. In February 1994, the negotiations broke down, 
and the mutual attacks among the different parties brought them back to their old 
trajectory. The subsequent conflicts lasted for at least another ten years, and thousands 
of innocent people were displaced, seriously injured, and hundreds of children were 
abducted as a result. The Ugandan government, while trying to disarm the captured 
rebels, continued to increase attacks against other military groups.72 It sought help from 
international authorities, turning to another endeavour, realistically and politically. The 
Ugandan government actively communicated with the then Prosecutor of the ICC, and 
explained its “motivation” as 
“Having exhausted every other means of bringing an end to this terrible 
suffering, the Republic of Uganda now turns to the newly established 
ICC and its promise to global justice. Uganda pledges its full 
cooperation to the Prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution of 
LRA crimes, achievement of which is vital not only for the future 
progression of the nation, but also for the suppression of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”73 
Consequently, in December 2003, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda decided 
to refer the crimes committed by the LRA to the Prosecutor of the ICC. President 
Museveni had a meeting with the Prosecutor in London, and negotiated the pattern for 
co-operation between the ICC and Uganda in the future. Thus, with the support and 
mediation of European powers, the Ugandan situation became the first referral case to 
the ICC. The Decision by the Prosecutor to open an investigation in this situation was 
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made on 29 July 2004, slightly later than the opening of the investigation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Partly owing to the supportive attitude to the 
ICC’s initial work and the special symbolic meaning of this situation, as Uganda was 
the first state that referred its own situation to the ICC, after careful consideration and 
investigation, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC issued five warrants of arrest for the top 
leaders of the LRA on 8 July 2005, including the Commander-in-Chief, Joseph Kony, 
and the Vice-Chairman and the Second-in-Command, Vincent Otti, and the only suspect 
who appeared at the ICC, Mr. Dominic Ongwen.74 
The issuance of arrest warrants against those leaders by the ICC eventually caught 
the attention of the top leaders of the LRA, and brought them back to the table of 
negotiation for a peace treaty with the Ugandan government. The LRA promised the 
Ugandan government to make an effort to put an end to the war and to achieve peace, 
in the condition that the Ugandan government should grant all the leaders and soldiers 
of the LRA amnesty and the ICC must cease all the judicial proceedings against them. 
With the desire to put an end to the conflicts as soon as possible and to establish a 
positive image of the Government as well as of President Museveni himself to both the 
Ugandan people and the international community, the Ugandan government agreed on 
the requirement, and consequently hoped that the ICC would terminate the process of 
investigation and revoke those warrants of arrest. After the LRA expressed the intention 
to come back to the negotiations with the Ugandan government, in 2006, a peace 
program of restorative justice called “Juba75 Peace Talks” was initiated, even though 
the ICC did not accept the request of amnesty, asked by both the Ugandan government 
and the LRA. The Juba Peace Talks, and many other peace processes in other regions 
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like Acholi and Gulu, were organised under the legal frame of the Amnesty Act of 2006 
in Uganda, which was specifically prepared by the Government and was enacted at the 
Ugandan People’s Congress for peacefully de-mobilising those armed groups. 
This act was the result of the amendments of the Amnesty Act of 2000 for the 
purpose of better fulfilling the international obligations, especially the legal 
requirements in the Rome Statute. However, even after the amendments, the act still 
gave quite an ambiguous answer to the question whether the leaders who were ordered 
to appear in front of the ICC would be granted amnesty at domestic level. The passing 
of this act in Uganda after the issuance of arrest warrants from the ICC indicated that 
the Ugandan government’s will to assist the ICC to capture and arrest Joseph Kony and 
other LRA leaders had now began to go to blur. Perhaps the Ugandan government had 
gained confidence to end the guerrilla warfare by military methods considering that the 
Ugandan army managed to kill one of the accused LRA leaders on 12 August 200676, 
almost a month after the commencement of the Amnesty Act of 2006, which entered 
into force on 19 July. Such victory could have inspired the ruling party in Uganda to 
capture the indictees in its own way rather than relying on an international organisation 
like the ICC. In response to the request for amnesty, the former Prosecutor of the ICC 
insisted on the investigation of the accused LRA leaders, and refused the Ugandan 
government’s aspiration. It is widely believed that the warrants of arrest against the 
LRA leaders in the end drove Joseph Kony and other leaders, as well as most of the 
LRA soldiers, away from the table of peace negotiations and back to hostility. 
In May 2008, a domestic criminal court assigned to deal with the war crimes 
committed by the LRA was set up in Uganda. It was the last effort made by the 
Government to convince the ICC to revoke its arrest warrants against those LRA leaders. 
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This last effort was shattered because many people, including the Prosecutor of the ICC, 
worried that the domestic court would eventually promise amnesty or other forms of 
impunity to the perpetrators. The failure of yet a second attempt to achieve peace in 
Uganda was attributed to the ICC’s uncompromising stand. Since then, the peace 
process and restorative justice in Uganda has become much more difficult.77 
The ICC’s intervention has been criticised by many researchers, lawyers, 
politicians. Its attitude to the Amnesty Act of Uganda has been blamed by a wide range 
of international NGOs, mediators, activists, and particularly, people living in north 
Uganda. It is argued that the ICC should have taken serious consideration on amnesty 
and restorative justice and a broader inclusion of non-punitive approaches in 
transitional justice. 78  Notwithstanding the fact that a number of human rights 
organisations and activists enthusiastically advocated the Prosecutor’s announcement 
of investigation in the beginning, many of them later became critical of the way in 
which the ICC dealt with the precious opportunity to end the twenty-year-lasting 
Ugandan civil war. The criticism continued to grow and eventually became a 
predominant tendency. The opinion flared out that the ICC was the one bringing 
continuous pain to the Ugandan people and thus it was a “peace-breaker” rather than a 
“peace-bringer”. In addition, it is argued that the ICC did not show enough respect to 
the local people’s traditional concept of justice on criminal cases. 
For the Ugandan people, including those in northern Uganda regions, such as the 
Acholi and the Kakwa, the traditional response to crime and criminals would be that of 
restorative or healing form, rather than that of retributive and punitive form. The 
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mechanism of criminal procedure at the ICC may not be commonly acknowledged by 
all people. The failure to increase the opportunity for peace, as well as the emotional 
distance to the Ugandan people’s concept of justice and peace, evolved into a major 
opinion that the ICC should have honoured Uganda’s choice, or at least allied carefully 
with restorative justice.79 
The critiques against the ICC’s intervention 
Because the Ugandan situation was one of the earliest situations at the ICC, its 
valuable but painful experience provided large space for fervid discussion. The impact 
of the ICC drew much disappointment inside Uganda. One noticeable study (known as 
the “ICC Statement 2004”) on the ICC’s announcement of the formal investigation to 
the LRA, which was made in the Refugee Law Project at the largest national university 
in Uganda, proclaimed an opposite attitude to the involvement of the ICC. The position 
paper appreciates restorative justice over formal criminal justice at the ICC by listing 
four negative consequences80 and one potential danger for the Ugandan people. 
The first negative consequence is that the ICC’s investigation would continue the 
“cycle of violence”. Armed conflicts always cause a large scale of injury and death, and 
usually bring fear and hatred to civilian populations. In fact, the serious violations of 
human rights committed by the LRA, for example the kidnapping of children and 
training them into child soldiers, were globally noticed81 as part of its military activities 
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against the Ugandan government. The parents of the abducted children, as well as the 
whole community where they had lived, felt a huge loss, terror, and pain because of 
that. In addition, the leaders of the LRA would not hesitate to give orders to those child 
soldiers to attack innocent people or loot other communities whenever it was considered 
“necessary”. These actions exposed the children to extreme dangers. The violence 
committed by the LRA soldiers was so brutal that it caused unimaginable damage to 
the local people and to the child soldiers themselves. According to the information 
shown by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (the ICTJ), the criminal 
activities of the LRA soldiers have been widely documented, ranging from murders, 
abductions, and forced marriages to horrific mutilations against the civilian 
population.82 
What should be also noted also is that the longer did the abducted children stay in 
the LRA, the more violent crimes would they commit, and the more difficult could they 
reintegrate into a normal life. The continued violence attributed to the LRA had created 
an undesirable process. The child soldiers of the LRA had committed some crimes that 
would isolate them from a normal life and deepen the emotional hatred between them 
and the innocent people. In turn, those they attacked were obliged to defend themselves 
using similar means of violence.83 Such reactions would not be tolerated by the soldiers, 
who in return drew more fierce attacks.  The peace negotiations between the LRA and 
the Government could have ended this cycle of violence. Therefore, the ICC was under 
the obligation to choose between burying the cycle of violence in Uganda into history 
or upholding its legal process, thus ruining such an opportunity. 
The attacks of the LRA did not only influence Uganda, but also caused disruption 
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in neighbouring countries, such as Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan. In the report to the United Nations 
Security Council (the UNSC or the Security Council) by the Secretary-General in 2006, 
the LRA had caused serious humanitarian crisis to the States above, and 
“Although its forces are believed to have diminished over the past years, 
LRA remains active in the border regions between the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Uganda and southern Sudan.”84 
Given that peace and security are so desired to these countries and the people 
therein, the hostilities of the LRA have already become an inter-regional problem. In 
respect to this situation, the ICC’s “interference” with Uganda’s peace negotiations 
troubled those countries and their civilians too, as it caused the LRA to turn its back to 
peace, re-investing instead its efforts to new attacks. Sadly, this was the consequence 
of the ICC’s insistence on criminal prosecution. In a special report in December 2009, 
the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (the OHCHR) 
revealed that the series of attacks launched by the LRA in DRC from September to 
November 2008, after the collapse of the “Juba Peace Talks”, caused the death of at 
least 76 people and the displacement of over 50,000 people. It seemed, therefore, that 
to end the violence was far more important and desirable than to proceed formal 
criminal prosecution. 
The second claimed result is the damage to the peace-building process. If the 
conflicts between the LRA and the Ugandan government army continue, the seed of 
living without fear of any military threats is not likely to grow to a strong and fruitful 
tree. Viewing the facts from this perspective, it is understandable to describe the ICC’s 
proceedings as one of the biggest problems in the collapse of the efforts for peace. On 
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the one hand the LRA was requested to a cease fire against the Ugandan army and the 
innocent local people, but on the other hand, its requirement of cancelling the arrest 
warrants against its leaders was not fulfilled. After all, the Ugandan government was 
notified by the LRA that the only impediment to achieving peace negotiations was the 
possible prosecution of the LRA leaders, which meant that the involvement of the ICC 
would certainly cause them to carry on the fight. The number of attacks launched by 
the LRA subsequent to the breaking of peace talks clearly indicates that the issuance of 
warrants of arrest at the ICC against them was the main contributor. The LRA leaders 
would not easily give up the fighting if they still faced the risk of prosecution and 
criminal punishment. The continuation of the cycle of violence had been proved to be 
linked to the involvement of the ICC. Consequently, the peace negotiations between the 
LRA and the Ugandan government had not re-appeared since its second break. 
Although after 2005, the region where the LRA rebels mainly took military 
activities was not Uganda, there were still reports of sporadic assaults by the LRA in 
Ugandan territory. For example, during Christmas time of 2009 and 2010, the LRA’s 
military attack killed hundreds of villagers, as a reprisal action against the military 
operation launched by the Ugandan government. 85  The ICC now has become the 
archenemy of the LRA top leaders, and with the ICC’s involvement, peace negotiations 
will not be an option for the LRA soldiers. In 2016, the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
ICC announced that stable information indicates that the ICC was described as one 
place where people would be either imprisoned or tortured or killed.86 The image of 
the ICC passed to the LRA soldiers was undoubtedly wrong, but it clearly conveys one 
message that peace between the LRA and the Ugandan government would not be 
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achieved if the ICC continued its formal criminal procedure. 
The third one is that the ICC’s proceedings would “undermine” the power and 
effectiveness of national law in Uganda, namely, the Amnesty Act. As it was previously 
mentioned, the Ugandan government had put much effort to end the long-lasting war, 
an end anticipated by the Ugandan people as well as by the international community. 
The peace-building process significantly depended on the Amnesty Act. The Amnesty 
Act had already entered into force in Uganda in 2000 before Uganda ratified the Rome 
Statute. The investigation by the ICC Prosecutor of the Ugandan situation was opened 
in July 2004 as the result of the referral of the case by the Ugandan government in early 
2004. This led to quite a problematic dilemma that was faced by both the ICC and the 
Ugandan government: either to choose a national legal framework which would weaken 
the legitimacy of the ICC, or to execute an international obligation and neglect the 
internal needs and reality. 
The solution of this conflict between the Rome Statute of the ICC and the Amnesty 
Act of Uganda should not be simplified as a conflict of law or jurisdiction, because it 
relates to the authoritativeness of both sides. In temporal effect, the rules in the Amnesty 
Act in Uganda should be respected by the ICC. However, since the Ugandan 
government itself referred the situation to the ICC, it was suggested that the Ugandan 
government had admitted that it was unable or unwilling to carry out a proper 
investigation or prosecution against the crimes, as is required in the principle of 
“complementarity” in article 17 of the Rome Statute.87 In the Ugandan situation, with 
the Amnesty Act there was hope that at long last the Ugandan people would peacefully 
solve the armed conflict. Instead, the ICC “won” the jurisdiction over the serious crimes 
committed by the LRA. The involvement of the ICC brought more uncertainties to the 
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Ugandan people’s hopes and aspirations that the conflict would end in a short time, 
especially considering that the LRA’s trust in the peace negotiations lays on amnesty.88 
The amnesty processes in Uganda could not move forward because the Rome Statute 
does not provide any space for amnesty. The disappointment of the local people in the 
Government’s incapability of bringing peace and to the ICC’s role of ruining the 
precious opportunity for peace talks increased as the LRA withdrew from the 
negotiations. This gradually led the people to question whether the Ugandan 
government was sincere in keeping its promise of amnesty and peace.89 
The last consequence stated in that position paper is that the ICC did not show 
enough respect for the local notion of justice, nor for the traditional way of solving 
conflicts. Local people supported the Amnesty Act because it resembled the traditional 
principles in local cultural views of crime and criminals. The undermining of the 
Amnesty Act by the involvement of the ICC presented an omission to the local people’s 
will. Formal criminal justice, represented by the ICC in the Ugandan situation, is 
sometimes shaped by many academics as the “occidental value” amongst post-colonial 
African countries and the shadow of European nationalism.90 Restorative justice, to the 
contrary, is deemed a “non-western way” of justice. This statement in fact elevated the 
collision between formal criminal justice and restorative justice, putting them on to a 
level of an intense ideology conflict, an opinion which is not only seen in studies of 
international law. To many renowned academics in the field of criminology, this 
collision forms a fundamental pillar for the research on restorative justice91, especially 
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for those encouraging the practice of traditional and restorative justice to indigenous 
people as a replacement for the formal criminal justice procedure. Such an opinion may 
be helpful to advocate the practice of restorative justice in real life, however, it is 
undoubtedly unsupportive to the problem between the ICC and the Ugandan 
government. 
The paper also exposed one highly possible risk to the safety of victims and 
witnesses. This risk to safety does not relate to the damage and violence which may 
inevitably result from armed conflict. Instead, such risk comes from the fact that victims 
will be seen as the potential threat to the accused LRA leaders if the ICC maintains the 
investigation and accusation against them. That is because the work of the ICC, 
especially the prosecutorial work, largely depends on information gathered from the 
local people. The importance of the local people to the situation has two sides. For the 
ICC Prosecutor, local people are the witnesses of the alleged crimes and the narrators 
of the committed violence. But for the LRA leaders, the local people are the big threat. 
As a result, the ICC should exhaust all measures to protect the victims. But the LRA 
would do anything possible to cleanse the “blood stains” of their crimes by making 
prosecution at the ICC against them more difficult or even infeasible. In other words, 
the LRA would react to the ICC’s involvement that victims, particularly the direct 
witnesses, would suffer extra damage because of the ICC’s investigation. Therefore, it 
is understandable why the concern about the ICC’s investigation arose: 
“[T]he announcement of initiation of investigations might drastically 
increase the incentive for the top leadership of the LRA to fight, evade 
arrest and destroy evidence. In wars such as the one in northern Uganda, 
the primary evidence is the people themselves”.92 
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Criticism of the failure of the ICC to recognise the possible danger and needs of 
victims, which are acknowledged in the Rome Statute93, extends the argument to what 
the proper way to pursue justice could be: that local traditional justice is preferable to 
the formal justice procedure at the ICC in dealing with the situation in Uganda and other 
similar situations. The application of local traditional justice has been often understood 
as restorative justice in studies on ongoing armed conflicts and post conflict 
transitions.94 On this view, the restorative justice approach has been highlighted to 
indicate that the formal mechanism at the ICC would be inadequate to achieve peace 
and bring justice to Africa’s cases, especially to the ongoing conflicts, under the 
presumption that the LRA keep pressure onto the Ugandan government to stop the 
cooperation with the ICC for an exchange of peace talks.95 
It is clear that the problem of the ICC’s intervention in the Uganda situation was 
that its mechanism for the interest of justice did not satisfy the anticipation of the 
Ugandan people and the international community that peace should be considered to be 
more important than justice. The idea that peace must go prior to justice was upheld by 
many persons working for both the Ugandan government and the LRA, and human 
rights activists in both Uganda and other states. The LRA had made its position very 
clear to the ICC investigation that there would be no peace agreement signed as long as 
the arrest warrants against its leaders still remained in force. The Ugandan government 
also hoped that the ICC could agree to cease exercising jurisdiction over the crimes and 
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allow the local courts to take over the cases. The LRA did not want any involvement of 
international jurisdiction, nor were its top leaders willing to serve any punishment 
sentenced by the ICC. In effect, the LRA rebels utilised the “conflict” between peace 
and international justice to divert the focus of the international community to the role 
of the ICC in the Uganda situation so that there would be a higher rate for the LRA 
leaders to go unpunished. 
The Ugandan government held a very complicated attitude to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over the intrastate armed conflict. On the one hand, the government of 
Uganda needed the ICC’s indictment against the LRA’s leaders to increase the chance 
of temporary or permanent cease fire between all the military forces, especially between 
the Government and the LRA. On the other hand, in the calculation of the government 
of Uganda, ICC’s intervention could be restrained to a certain degree that allowed the 
Government to be in the dominant positon in the negotiation with LRA leaders without 
pushing them away. It was not expected that all the efforts toward peace would be 
ruined by the ICC’s involvement. The pressure from the ICC on the LRA was important, 
but the best situation for the Ugandan government was that the ICC would only keep 
putting pressure on the LRA to make LRA disarm, rather than really take any further 
action in criminal procedure. In other words, the ICC might have been a good “tool” to 
achieve political targets for the Ugandan government. 
It was a miscalculation. The ICC did not take back the indictments against the 
LRA leaders. “[T]he [establishment of the] ICC reminds governments that realpolitik, 
which sacrifices justice at the altar of political settlements, is no longer accepted.”96 In 
the warrant of arrest against Joseph Kony issued by Pre-Trial Chamber II, the Chamber 
recalled the self-referral of the Ugandan government of the situation, which admitted 
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that the Government of Uganda was unable to arrest the most responsible persons, and 
had not taken proper national judicial action and had no intention to conduct any 
judicial action against those persons.97 The rationales in Joseph Kony’s warrant of 
arrest were seen in all the warrants of arrest for the other four indicted persons, leaving 
no space for national judicial process to deal with the indicted persons in the situation 
of Uganda. 
Some observers opposed the involvement of the ICC in Uganda even before the 
issuance of the arrest warrants against the LRA top leaders. As “outsiders”, some 
researchers examined the negative role of the ICC. They favoured amnesty, which was 
seen as the underpinning factor to convincing all warring parties to conclude a peace 
agreement.98 Other researchers suspected that the impact of the ICC had been over-
stated by challenging two points: the indictment of the LRA leaders would put pressure 
on the Sudanese government, preventing it from providing assistance to the LRA 
rebels99 ; and the arrest warrants of the LRA leaders would isolate them from their 
fighters and eventually expose them to justice. 100  The first point seemed to 
underestimate the “determination” of the Sudanese government, because it had already 
been under the pressure because of its human rights violations in Darfur101; the second 
point was simply disproved by reality itself, since there is no convincing evidence to 
show that the arrest warrants had weakened the authority of the LRA leaders within the 
rebel group. Therefore, many believed that the involvement of the ICC would only 
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cause more complications and obstacles to achieving peace.102 It has been emphasised 
that seeking justice during the on-going conflicts would endanger the opportunity for 
both peace and justice; this is because judicial procedure alone is powerless to build up 
a peaceful solution when facing such a conflict.103 As underscored by the study from 
the Refugee Law Project that is referred in the early section and also upheld by many 
activists and political leaders in Uganda104, peace is more desirable than justice.  
The impact of the ICC on the on-going conflict in Northern Uganda was also 
criticised by local people, according to some field studies. The criticism was 
concentrated on the negative influence that the ICC actions would have in ending 
violence and promoting the peace process. For example, in one study, a local council 
officer was reported to have said the following in an interview: 
“I feel this ceasefire should be there, so that the children in the bush are 
not killed. And about the ICC, the rebels should not be taken to court. 
If they are taken to court it should be after the war. If they issue arrest 
warrants while they are still in the bush, the rebels will be discouraged 
to come back. They will take revenge and kill us in the camp here … 
The soldiers are trying to protect us, but if you move a distance away 
you get them [the LRA]. It makes it difficult to get food.”105 
Such concerns related to individual interests respecting peace and violence, rather than 
the metaphysical form of justice that is often the central idea of formal criminal justice, 
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especially in international criminal justice. For many Ugandan people, the concept of 
“justice” at the ICC was forced upon them by “Western States”; this concept strongly 
ignores local ideas of justice. For local people who had suffered from long-lasting 
conflicts, peace seemed to be the main objective, not legal justice.106 In addition, the 
involvement of the ICC was also seen as a potential threat to some vulnerable groups, 
in particular, witnesses, women, and children.107  
One study concluded: “[It] [the ICC] is biased; it will exacerbate the violence; it 
will endanger vulnerable groups – notably witnesses and children; it is spoiling the 
peace process by undermining the amnesty and the ceasefire; and it ignores and 
disempowers local justice procedures.”108 These four points can be further narrowed 
into two big aspects, peace versus justice and the needs of victims; the first point 
focuses on peace; the second one concerns both peace and the needs of victims (though 
the word “victims” was replaced by “vulnerable groups”); the third and fourth points 
pay attention to “peace versus justice” and the proper understanding of justice. As a 
response to the reports done in the Refugee Law Project in Uganda, that have been used 
as an introduction to the criticism in the first section, the four points were examined 
one by one, indicating that the criticism was overstated. In dealing with the situation in 
Uganda, the ICC was still learning from its mistakes, though it sounds quite unfair to 
the Ugandan people that their situation was not dealt with in the way that they had 
wished. ICC involvement did not stop the violence immediately. However, immediate 
peace is probably beyond any organisation’s capability.  Even the capability of the 
Security Council of the United Nations, which is the international body with the highest 
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level of authority to prevent armed conflict, cannot guarantee the peace as such. The 
expectations placed upon the ICC were far too heavy. 
Under such circumstance, the recommendation of restorative justice to 
solving other situations similar to the Uganda’s had been raised, since restorative 
justice shares many similarities with the non-punitive justice process. However, the 
concept of Africa’s traditional justice, as well as many other forms of traditional justice 
in Asia, Latin America, the Pacific, cannot be seen as the same as restorative justice. 
One crucial reason is that the occurrence and development of restorative justice is the 
consequence of dissatisfaction with and re-imagination of the modern criminal justice 
system rather than the resurrection of old traditions. Restorative justice resonates with 
some older and informal ideas of a dispute solution109, and is based on some principles 
of formal criminal justice. But in the case of the Ugandan situation (and most of the 
situations involving mass human rights violations), formal criminal justice has 
malfunctioned or been significantly undermined, which deprives the foundation of 
discussing restorative justice in solving disputes. Furthermore, though many studies 
have expressed different attitudes towards the impact of the ICC in peace-building and 
justice-achieving, only a few go deeper to inquire into the internal logic of the criticism 
and analyse the relationship between justice and peace, and between restorative justice 
and international criminal justice. 
2. Re-thinking the critiques on the ICC’s impact in the situation 
in Uganda 
The influence of amnesty and the opinions of victims 
The debates about the impact of the ICC on international criminal cases derive 
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mainly from the role of the ICC on peace negotiations between the Ugandan 
government and the rebel group, the LRA. According to the criticism, there are two 
points that need to be considered. First of all, it assumed peace would be promised 
through amnesty, which was supported by restorative justice but rejected by the formal 
criminal justice of the ICC; secondly, peace was more important than justice because it 
was more desired by local Ugandan people as well as by the international community. 
The logic behind the assumptions concentrates on the short-term result, after the ICC’s 
mechanism was triggered, during the time when armed conflict was still terrifying the 
people in Uganda. But careful consideration must be given to the problems, or variables, 
that were created by the ICC’s involvement, rather than just blaming its short-term 
consequences. The restorative justice critique may be seen as a hypothesis, because it 
is hard to imagine what the situation would be if the ICC revoked its indictments. 
Perhaps the topic of the impact of the ICC itself is a moving target that needs to be 
examined through more cases. 
The claim that amnesty will guarantee peace is questionable. As announced by the 
LRA leaders, and well recognised by the Ugandan government and many researchers, 
ICC prosecution would be the only barrier for the rebels to discontinue violence, thus, 
that amnesty should have been bestowed to end the armed conflict. But the amnesty 
effort in which the ICC “interfered” had a predecessor in the year 2000. Before the last 
attempt to end the civil war, the Ugandan government promised a blanket amnesty to 
all rebels through the Amnesty Act 2000. The legislation covered those who were in 
“(a) actual participation in combat; 
(b) collaborating with the perpetrators of the war or armed rebellion; 





(d) assisting or aiding the conduct or prosecution of the war or armed 
rebellion”110 
As to the form of amnesty promised, in Article 3 (2), the act promised that 
perpetrators “shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any form of punishment for the 
participation in the war or rebellion for any crime committed in the cause of the war or 
armed rebellion” after they go through the process. Many guerrillas came out of bush 
and ceased hostilities, receiving total forgiveness in accordance with the Amnesty Act 
2000. However, such favourable amnesty did not end the war as expected. In the 
warrants of arrest issued against Joseph Kony, the Pre-Trial Chamber II revealed some 
crucial facts that in or around the middle of the year 2002, LRA forces were ordered to 
begin a campaign of attacks upon civilians in two regions; and in 2003, LRA fighters 
were commanded to move into a certain region to attack the Ugandan army and civilian 
settlements, and to “abduct civilians for the purpose of recruitment to the ranks of the 
LRA” 111 . It is reasonable to conclude that it was not amnesty that those main 
perpetrators, indicted by the ICC, thirsted for; or at least, not being punished was not 
the original motivation with which they resumed violence. 
The Legal Advisor to the Chief mediator on the Uganda peace process negotiations 
observed that the Juba Talks might be only another peace negotiation of which the LRA 
leaders took advantage and then withdrew.112 The reasons for the withdrawal from 
peace negotiation of the LRA leaders might be complicated, in which the greedy for 
more political benefit could have play a more important. Bing granted of amnesty for 
the LRA leaders could only be the first step for the ultimate goal. The power of amnesty 
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in peace negotiation might not be as great as was presumed. Hence, the idea in favour 
of restorative justice idea in current researches that was based on the influence of 
amnesty to the perpetrators may not be reliable. 
The statement that peace is more important than justice, because it is the desire of 
local people, is also worthy of examination. One study from Uganda suggested that 
local people strongly expressed the aspiration for amnesty, as they believed peace could 
only be achieved through amnesty to the LRA rebels. The opposition of the ICC to the 
amnesty in Uganda “had a serious negative impact on the potential for resolution of the 
conflict”.113 
But another positivistic quantitative study made by a foreign institute, which was 
updated and released on the Internet by the International Centre for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) in 2005, produced some more complex statistics on this issue.114 It suggested 
that peace and justice were equally desired. According to the statistics, about 76 per 
cent of the people interviewed expressed the will that those who were responsible for 
abuses of human rights “should be held accountable for their actions”. And when they 
were asked whether they would support amnesty if it were the only path to achieving 
peace, 29 per cent of the respondents gave a negative answer.115 The second discovery 
is that even for the people who accepted the granting of amnesty for the perpetrators, 
the blanket amnesty could hardly be a choice. Only 4 per cent of respondents agreed 
that “amnesties should be granted unconditionally”. The vast majority considered that 
the acknowledgement of the wrongness, criminal conducts and penalty as retribution in 
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certain form “should be required of all those granted amnesty”. 116  The third 
observations was that neither the traditional justice mechanism nor formal criminal 
justice mechanisms were entirely understood by the Ugandan people. There was also 
an imbalance in the understanding of restorative justice amongst people from different 
areas. In Acholi areas, traditional justice ceremonies, similar to restorative justice, were 
acknowledged by 59 per cent of the local people. However, in non-Acholi areas, this 
number dropped down to 19 per cent. Another noticeable problem was that only 17 per 
cent of the respondents knew about the ICC and its work. The two reports drew quite 
different conclusions about public opinion with respect to the ICC’s involvement. It is 
not necessary to assess the validity of the two reports because they were prepared under 
different circumstances. The importance of the comparison between them is that it may 
not be possible to give a simple answer to what victims of international crimes want. 
Their opinion varies through time and is driven by the information provided. 
Nevertheless, the studies convey one message which is so illuminating and which 
should not be neglected in international criminal justice: The voice of victims must be 
heard, and there must be a more comprehensive way to achieve such a goal. The voice 
from victims is more crucial than theoretical discussions, if not a conjecture, on the 
impact of the ICC’s work. 
In the analysis above, the stress on the short-term effect of the ICC’s involvement 
may have distracted attention from the correct direction. Fortunately, such short-term 
effect is not the only focus of all studies. There are also many proponents of the ICC’s 
impact in the Ugandan situation, especially those who have reviewed this issue in recent 
years. For example, after visiting Uganda, delegates from different States Parties 
discovered that local people have a strong will to enforce the warrants of arrest against 
those indicted LRA leaders. A report on a mission confirmed that 





“Delegates heard repeatedly from victims and communities the need for 
arrest warrants against the LRA leadership to be enforced…The failure 
to arrest suspected perpetrators of mass crimes results in a lasting, 
tangible fear that violence will recur, which hinders ‘recovery’ at the 
level of both individual healing and regional rebuilding. Communities 
were often aware of news reports of LRA attacks in DRC, CAR or 
Sudan, which exacerbated their insecurity and raised concern that LRA 
would return to Uganda.”117 
    Other studies have examined the limits of local traditional justice process, pointing 
out several flaws of the opinions, which disprove the impact of the ICC through 
supporting traditional justice approach. Firstly, such process depends far too much on 
the power of spirit medium and monetary compensation, making it too close to a 
“trade”.118 There will be more problems if restorative justice is used to exchange the 
dignity of victims with limited financial compensation. Secondly, the local elders or 
chiefs could hardly handle the process fairly enough, considering that the soldiers in 
the army of the Ugandan government also committed serious crimes.119 And the so-
called “traditional process” may not be very representative of all the victims, so that a 
certain procedure must comply with international norms on victim’s rights.120 So, on 
many occasions restorative justice alone does not function well in giving satisfying 
answers to the international community when dealing with mass scale international 
                                                 
117 No Peace Without Justice, ‘Visits by ICC States Parties Delegates to Uganda’, Final Report, January-June 
2010, at pp. 33. 
118 Erin K. Baines, ‘The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern 
Uganda’ (2007) 1 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 91, at pp. 105. 
119 Refugees International, ‘Inadequate Response to Protection Crisis in Northern Uganda’, Mission Report, 
14 December 2004. 
120 Tim Allen, ‘War and justice in North Uganda: An Assessment of the International Criminal Court’s 
Intervention’ (February 2005) Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 




crimes with huge numbers of victims. 
For a large number of the Ugandan people, including citizens and academics, the 
ICC’s role is primarily negative in solving the problems of how to end the conflict or 
at least reach a ceasefire. But for many researchers outside Uganda, the ICC has made 
a big contribution to legal transition in Uganda, though it was promoted largely by civil 
society rather than Ugandan government agencies.121 For academics in legal study, the 
formal justice procedure has obvious advantages in dealing with international criminal 
cases, such as helping to instill a feeling of guilt in perpetrators, minimising the desire 
of victims to seek revenge, and strengthening peace building and reconciliation in 
society.122 However, for many criminologists, such “advantages” are just “good wishes” 
because legalism has limitations and even at times may endanger the peace building 
and the delivery of justice.123 It must be acknowledged that the ICC did not achieve 
peace or security, or dispense justice in short term in Uganda. 124  But the ICC’s 
involvement “was carefully utilised at Juba in order to negotiate a solution that would 
seek to achieve a comprehensive approach to justice at the national level”.125 
What is more important is that there is now a promising future of a Uganda without 
armed conflict. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the top leaders of the 
                                                 
121 See Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International 
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge University Press 2013), at pp. 234. 
122 See N.J. Kritz, ‘Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass 
Violations of Human Rights’ (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 127; Payam Akhavan, ‘Justice in The 
Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal’ (1998) 20 
Human Rights Quarterly 737; Antonio Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and 
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 2; 
K.C. Moghalu, ‘Reconciling Fractured Societies: An African Perspective on the Role of Judicial Prosecutions’ in 
R. Thakur and P. Malcontent (eds), From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for 
Justice in a World of States (United Nations University Press 2004), at pp.197. 
123 Kieran McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’ (2007) 
34(4) Journal of Law and Society 411; Vincenzo Ruggiero, ‘An Abolitionist View of Restorative Justice’ (2011) 39 
International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 100. 
124 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The ICC- Quo Vadis?’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 421. 
125 Michael Otim and Marieke Wierda, ‘Uganda: Impact of the Rome Statute and the International Criminal 




LRA, President Museveni won the multi-party election. The Commonwealth 
highlighted that though there were several serious shortfalls, the election had enabled 
the will of the people to be expressed and that the result “reflected the wishes of those 
able to vote”.126 Since the election in 2006, even considering the failure of the “Juba 
Peace Talks”, there has not been any significant attack reported that was launched by 
the LRA in the territory of Uganda. So, it is not correct to criticise the ICC for its flaws 
made in early stage because the people did not see instant peace. The assertion that 
pursuit of justice will risk the chance for peace may not be the outcome in international 
criminal justice. The ICC might have delayed peace during the on-going conflict, but 
also had encouraged the Ugandan people and the government to embrace justice, which 
facilitated peace building in another way. Therefore, the real question in judging the 
impact of the ICC in justice and peace should be as to how to achieve them with less 
difficulty through the legal mechanism of the ICC in combination with other forms of 
justice, and in particular restorative justice. 
The focal questions in the relation between restorative justice and the ICC 
The example of the ICC’s impact on the situation in Uganda has exposed two 
aspects in the relation between restorative justice and the legal mechanism of the ICC. 
The struggle of the ICC to accept amnesty in international criminal cases clearly 
indicates that amnesty will not be able to be regarded as a proper measure to end the 
impunity of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes for humanity. The justice at the 
ICC does not tolerate amnesty granted to the most responsible persons for the charged 
crimes at the ICC. However, there is not a direct interpretation on whether amnesty 
violates the nature or the form of the justice at the ICC, nor is there any enlightening 
statement from the authorities of the Court addressing the question. Because the attitude 
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of the ICC shown in the situation in Uganda, all the parties in the cases proceeded at 
the ICC realised that national amnesty had become unavailable as a defence rationale 
in court. Consequently, amnesty has been studied less and less in researches around the 
issues in relation to the ICC. The ICC shall not ignore amnesty, because amnesty may 
not be completely incompatible with the spirit of the Court. The last chapter will analyse 
how restorative justice connects amnesty and the ICC within the meaning of justice. 
Another aspect in the relation between restorative justice and the ICC concerns the 
way to combine them to overcome the flaws in the ICC’s work. In theory, the ICC could 
either compromise to the national process run in each State, or manage to utilise 
restorative justice idea in its own legal framework. In addition, restorative justice and 
formal criminal justice can be operated in one trail, or in two trails. As a result, there 
can be six possibilities for combining restorative justice and formal criminal justice: 
Restorative justice and formal criminal justice could be run in domestic process in one 
authority, or in two separate institutions; they can be both operated at international level 
by one organisation, or by two organisations; on some special occasions, restorative 
justice and formal criminal justice can be executed in two trails respectively at domestic 
level and international level. The theoretical possibilities to combine restorative justice 
and the formal justice mechanism at the ICC is based on whether it is legitimate to 
integrate the core value of restorative justice into the ICC’s legal framework. This 
question will be analysed in the last chapter. 
In reality, however, the relation between restorative justice formal criminal justice 
is more complicated and in the meantime simpler than theory. There is the example of 
the transitional justice in South Africa through the TRC model, which utilised only 
restorative form of justice-not properly a restorative justice process- but no formal 
criminal justice to address the crime of apartheid. In the Eichmann Trial, the domestic 
court in Israel utilised formal criminal justice, but also put victims at the centre of the 




justice, usually operated in transitional justice process, can be closely cooperative with 
formal criminal justice, like the Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
with the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Or, restorative justice could be far from formal 
criminal justice, like the Gacaca Courts and the ICTR in Rwanda. 
3. The situation in Darfur, Sudan 
An assessment of the ICC’s impact on justice, peace and victims 
The selection of the situation in Darfur, Sudan is based on the fact that the ICC 
investigation may have not obviously influenced either the justice or peace in the whole 
situation. Even worse, as the ICC has shown no sign of restraining the prosecutorial 
investigation against the governmental officials in Sudan, the influence of the ICC has 
been marginalised by the Government in almost all aspects. It gives very limited space 
for assessing the impact of the ICC on justice, peace and victims’ interests, however, it 
enables researchers to reconsider- or assume- the possible consequence if the 
relationship between the Court and Sudan could be improved. 
The situation of international crimes occurring in Darfur, Sudan (hereinafter 
“Sudan”) has been analysed together with the situation in Uganda in several studies, 
notably those on the principle of complementarity of the ICC in Africa by Nouwen127, 
Peskin128 and Jurdi129. The situations in Uganda and Sudan share many similarities, but 
also distinguish in some aspects. Uganda is one State Party to the Rome Statute, but 
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Sudan is not. The situation of Uganda was referred to the ICC by the Ugandan 
government, whereas the situation in Sudan was referred to the ICC by the Security 
Council of the United Nations.130 In accordance with the Rome Statute, a situation can 
be referred to the Court by the Security Council of the United Nations acting pursuant 
to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.131 The different types of referrals 
in the two situations in fact have implied that the ICC may have faced more difficulties 
in the Sudan situation because self-referral often means the State would be cooperative 
with the ICC. 
Another big difference between these two situations, which made the work of the 
ICC in Sudan more challenging, is that several targets of the prosecution in the situation 
in Sudan were or still are working for the Government of Sudan. On 14 July 2008, the 
Prosecutor applied for the issuance of an arrest warrant against President Omar Al 
Bashir. Since then, the attitude of the Sudanese government shifted from non-
cooperative to totally hostile. The whole situation involving Sudanese governmental 
officials became a “combat” between the ICC and the Sudanese government. In this 
circumstance, the African Union intervened, demanding the deferral of the investigation 
by the ICC in the situation in Sudan, so that both judicial and reconciliation process 
would be proceeded.132 In 2009, Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
established a High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) to assist and monitor the national 
process for the serious human rights violation in  Darfur. In the Report on October 
2009, the AUPD indicated that the deferral of the investigation required by the African 
Union was strongly opposed by many people in Sudan and that the ICC prosecutions 
had been seen as the only proper mechanism to deal with the atrocities in Darfur by the 
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displaced people of Darfur 133 . The AUPD also emphasised that “all the Sudanese 
stakeholders it consulted expressed with candour their commitment to peace and 
reconciliation”.134 The AUPD report was adopted on 20 October 2009, and thus a High-
Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) was appointed, aiming at implementing the 
recommendations in the AUPD report.135 The claims with respect to peace, justice and 
the needs of victims became the central points in the situation in Sudan. The conclusion 
based on the AUPD’s survey resembles the situation in Uganda, though these two 
situations are quite different in background. Both peace and justice are urgently 
required by victims for human rights protection. 
The first concern about the involvement of the ICC in Darfur is that it could bedim 
the effort of Sudanese government to make a ceasefire or a permanent peace agreement 
with other belligerent groups. On 9 January 2005, about two months before the referral 
of the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC by the Security Council of the United 
Nations, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed between the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan to settle the prolonged 
conflicts in Southern Sudan. The peace agreement acknowledged the rights of people 
in South Sudan to control and govern their regional affairs, as well as the right to self-
determination. It also regulated that the status of South Sudan would be determined 
through referendum, which provided the legal basis for the independence of South 
Sudan in 2011. It was a sacrifice on the territorial integrity made by the Sudanese 
government, which did not exchange the result hoped. The representative of Sudan 
consequently complained in 2005 in one Security Council meeting that the decision of 
the Security Council to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC was “[unwisely] rewarded 
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for putting an end to the longest conflict in Africa with further sanctions and 
procedures”, and “the question of accountability have nothing whatsoever to do with 
the achievement of stability in Darfur”.136 Since then the Government of Sudan became 
more cautious in peace negotiation, and managed to avoid any cooperation with the 
ICC in judicial affairs. 
One example is the Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Nigeria in 2006, also known 
as the Abuja Agreement, which aimed at a peace settlement of conflicts between the 
Sudanese government and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Darfur. The Abuja Agreement entitled the 
Government of Sudan to prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities committed in Darfur137, 
but provisions of facilitating international prosecution were totally missed. In 2011, the 
All Darfur Stakeholders Conference was held in Doha, Qatar, and finalised with 
the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The DDPD reaffirmed the need to 
respect the sovereignty of Sudan in domestic judicial process in the first paragraph in 
its Preamble, which was re-stressed in Article 2 of the DDPD as the first principle to 
obey for power sharing in Darfur.138 
The emphasis on State’s sovereignty might have influences to the involvement of 
the ICC in two points. Firstly, the relevant issues in Darfur, including regional justice, 
reconciliation and healing, should be regarded as internal affairs.139 It indicates that the 
crisis in Darfur would not be addressed as the way in Southern Sudan, which eventually 
caused the independence of South Sudan. Secondly, and more importantly, it planned 
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in the DDPD to establish Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission to manage the 
transition in Darfur, and Special Court for Darfur to deal with the violence, with no 
amnesty granted to ICC crimes. 140  It implied that the Sudanese government has 
determined not to compromise with the ICC’s investigation. In other words, these 
initiatives might be designed to exclude the work of the ICC in the situation but not for 
sincere resolution of the crisis, even though the ICC Prosecutor had already determined 
to open the investigation on 1 June 2005. However, there has not any proper domestic 
prosecution against the alleged persons at the ICC. The domestic justice mechanism 
may have been utilised as shielding the indicted persons from being charged at the ICC. 
Studies also express concerns that the warrants of arrest at the ICC had made 
positioned the Sudanese government at a disadvantageous place in peace negotiation in 
future, which in turn motivated the Sudanese government to become a rejectionist to 
international criminal justice.141 The political effects of the proceedings of the ICC 
Prosecutor had been observed by researchers. For example, Sarah Nouwen and Wouter 
Werner advised the ICC to accept the reality that trying the President of Sudan had not 
only been attacked by the Sudanese government as a political interference from the 
West, but also been objected by Sudanese people.142 The Court planned to label the 
officials of Sudanese government, especially the President, as the enemy of humanity. 
But in the end it turned out that the ICC has become the enemy of Sudan and Sudanese 
people. There was a worry that the Court would be largely marginalised and used as a 
“bargaining chip” in peace negotiations in future.143 Now the ICC has already been 
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marginalised in the situation in Sudan, and the role of the ICC’s prosecution would be 
hardly influential, since the rebel groups must have noticed that no States is willingly 
to cooperate with the ICC in arresting or surrendering the alleged persons in the 
situation in Sudan.  
In fact, the efforts of the ICC were not absolutely in vain. One noticeable result 
has been reflected in a series of changes in legislations in Sudan, in particular, the 
developments in human rights legislation. In 2005, an Interim National 
Constitution was adopted and came into force in Sudan. This constitution mandated that 
all the rights and freedoms enshrined in international human rights instruments, which 
had been ratified by Sudan, must be integrated into its national legislation in the form 
of a Bill of Rights. However, such a requirement was not applied to the reform of 
criminal law in Sudan, which could be seen as a move to shield the perpetrators of 
human rights violations from being punished. This situation lasted for many years until 
the intervention of the ICC into Darfur. In 2009, the National Human Rights 
Commission was created in Sudan to function as the supervisory institute of any human 
rights violations. In the same year, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime 
of genocide were integrated into the Criminal Law of Sudan144. It is unclear whether it 
was the African Union’s involvement or the ICC’s intervention that prompted those 
changes in Sudan. Given the overwhelming power of the Sudanese government over 
the local rebel groups in Darfur, it is not convincing that the Sudanese government made 
the changes only because of the inter-state factors, without adjusting its policies and 
strategies pursuant to the prosecution of the ICC and relevant human rights principles. 
More importantly, it is revealed that the work of the ICC, including the warrants 
of arrest and the opening of investigation in the situation in Darfur, Sudan, changed the 
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balanced of military power between the Sudanese government and the strongest rebel 
force in Darfur, 145 compelling the Sudanese government to sign the Darfur Peace 
Agreement on 5 May 2006 to solve the conflicts in Darfur. The African Union alone 
might not be able to put considerable pressure to the top leaders of the Sudanese 
government, for the Sudanese militia and opposition forces had no fear about attacking 
the personnel for Peacekeeping Missions as many reports disclosed146. The impact of 
the intervention by the ICC was also acknowledged as the “deterrent effect” of the 
international prosecution and it should not be underestimated.147 
Admittedly, such an effect is hard to assess,148 because it is “likely to be modest 
and incremental, rather than dramatic and transformative”149. However, some deterrent 
effects have been witnessed. In 2009 and 2010, two men who were alleged to be from 
rebel groups and were charged to be responsible for the attacks on AU Peace Keeping 
Missions voluntarily appeared in front of the ICC. Although the indicted officials of the 
Sudanese government still refused to cooperate with the ICC, the surrender of the rebel 
group leaders obviously proved the importance of the ICC to peace and justice. 
The truth about the impact of the ICC to the justice and peace in Sudan, especially 
in Darfur, is that the ICC investigation has not been a significant hinder, but also has 
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not been a decisive factor to stable the societal environment either. Despite the signing 
of peace agreements between the Sudanese government and the rebel forces and the 
deterrent effect of the prosecution of the ICC, none of those peace agreements lasted 
very long or truly functioned well. The conflicts in the whole area continue while the 
United Nations is trying to maintain peace. Delegates from rebel factions and the 
Sudanese government met numerous times, and no good news had come from these 
meetings as to when the conflicts would finally end.150 The continuation of conflicts in 
Darfur in fact confirms the limits of the capability of the ICC and the cruel reality that 
in order to achieve peace, formal justice procedure alone may not be enough. 
With respect to the protection of victims, and the prevention of human rights 
violations, studies have not shown a very positive image. What surprisingly resembles 
the warning to the intervention of the ICC in Uganda by the LRA is that the Sudanese 
government used victims as a tool to isolate the ICC. As a response to the arrest warrants 
against its officials, especially the one against its president Al Bashir, the Sudanese 
government expelled many non-governmental organisations that were leading 
humanitarian operations and human rights protection in Darfur in early years. 151 
Subsequently, the expulsion policy was extended to other parts of Sudan as well.152 It 
was estimated that without the work of those agencies, “50 to 70 per cent of the total 
humanitarian assistance in Darfur, including food, water, and medical care” could be 
suspended according to the reports.153 
Considering the conflicts in Darfur are mainly the competition over natural 
                                                 
150 ‘Sudan: Peace Talks End without Deal’ (December 2015) 52(11) Africa Research Bulletin: Political, 
Social, and Cultural Series, pp. 20797C-20798A. 
151 ‘Expulsions of Aid Groups from Darfur Will Have Wide Impact, UN Agencies Warn’, UN News Centre (6 
March 2009); Sara Pantuliano, Susanne Jaspars and Deepayan Basu Ray, ‘Where to Now? Agency Expulsions in 
Sudan: Consequences and Next Steps’ (2009) Humanitarian Policy Group, ALNAP Lessons Paper. 
152 ‘Khartoum Expels Foreign Agencies from East Sudan’, BBC News (1 June 2012). 




recourses, the poverty of Sudan has been one of the most crucial reason for the civil 
war. As the life of local people largely depends on external assistance, the consequence 
of the actions taken by the Sudanese authorities could be lethal to peace and security in 
Darfur. The refusal of the Sudanese government to cooperate with the ICC simply 
focuses on the ICC investigation and prosecution, but the top leaders would vent their 
anger to other international organisations, aggravating the living conditions of victims. 
Although similar actions have not been reported in recent years, the fear that the 
Sudanese government may over-react to the ICC’s work one more time requires the 
Prosecutor to re-calculate the tactics in future. 
Another weakness of the ICC’s work in protecting victims’ rights and needs is that 
such requirement usually exceeds the capability of justice, legalism and the ICC itself. 
According to the United Nations’ Fact Sheet on the crisis in Darfur, more than 200,000 
people have died and at least two million have been displaced from their homes in 
Darfur since the fighting broke out in 2003.154 The mass atrocities determine the large 
number of victims and the scale of needs. Damage which was caused by both the 
Sudanese government and rebel groups could not be recovered through delivery of 
justice, because justice may satisfy the sense of retribution of the victims but it hardly 
enables the recovery of what they have lost because of the conflicts. The living 
conditions, as has been mentioned above, force the victims to seek something other than 
justice alone, by virtue of the fact that the victims must survive in the first place, before 
asking for revenge through punishing those perpetrators, among whom governmental 
officials should be included. As a result, peace must be achieved in Darfur as the most 
important protection of victims. 
Research on the peace process and reparations to victims of the conflicts in Darfur 
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by the International Centre for Transitional Justice point out that the Sudanese 
government did not or does not have enough resources to complete the work of 
reparation.155 So, firstly, the Sudanese government needs international assistance. Even 
if the Sudanese government were to decide to cooperate with the ICC and accordingly 
leave reparations to the ICC, the ICC could do very little on this issue.156 And again, 
after the monetary reparation, if it is possible to be accomplished, remedies for mental 
damages will be the inevitable demand. As well, the hope for a permanent resolution of 
the conflicts will grow, in accordance to what was asked of the ICC as a bringer of 
peace and a peace-builder. 
The reconciliation process and ICC’s potential role 
The Darfur crisis was generated by many different causes, but unfortunately the 
ICC can only focus on legal issues. Of course, lack of democracy, rule of law, good 
legislation, and serious corruption, are among the acute problems that have contributed 
to crises in Darfur and the whole of Sudan157 . Attention to other urgent causes of 
conflicts in Darfur and other regions of Sudan perhaps are more realistic than reforming 
the rule of law and the intervention of international justice. Economic interests, poor 
governance, geopolitics, political ambition, hostility between ethnic groups, and even 
religious conflicts, are believed to be the root causes of the Darfur crisis, and together 
they depict the whole scenario in Darfur.158 Addressing these root causes is beyond the 
capacity of legal mechanisms and international justice. The role of international law in 
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on going conflicts may not be to deter, but to “compel”- by using force to overturn the 
rule of the perpetrators or to defeat them (brute force), or to utilise force as a threat to 
coerce them to surrender to international justice or to change their behaviour 
(coercion).159 
Unfortunately, defeating the perpetrators of the situation in Darfur, Sudan is not 
realistic, because it seems that all warring parties would have to be defeated, since they 
all have committed international crimes. What is even worse is that many local people 
have “dual-identities”, they are both the victims and perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations160, making it difficult to decide whom to defeat. International criminal justice 
cannot fully coerce the perpetrators to surrender to the court, as seen by the international 
community. The only two suspects who surrendered to the ICC accepted the charges of 
attacking the UN Peacekeeping Mission rather than all the atrocities they had 
committed during the conflicts. They bent their knee to political power, not to the value 
of human rights and humanitarianism. 
 In history, national reconciliation has been attempted several times to unite 
different regions in Sudan. None of those efforts succeeded in bringing real 
reconciliation to the country. As to the crisis in Darfur, the programs of truth, 
reconciliation, and restoration have not been organised at national level. Many practices 
based on local traditions have been taken in the form of reconciliation commission and 
restorative justice process, trying to hold together the small sporadic achievements in 
the region of Darfur. But the complex situation in religion, ethnicity, language, and the 
history between religious and ethnical groups may have rendered difficulties to include 
those tribe-based restorative justice process into one wide program. After the 
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independence of South Sudan in 2011, international community has endeavoured to 
assist the new State to operate an effective national transition, including training staff 
for the proposed truth and reconciliation commission. But the reconciliation in Darfur 
has not been carried out by the Government of Sudan effectively. 
Rules on justice and reconciliation were regulated in Chapter V of the DDPD, 
recognising that “[j]ustice and reconciliation are integral and interlinked elements in 
for achieving lasting peace in Darfur and are essential for upholding the rule of law”.161 
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was established according 
to article 58 of DDPD, consisting of Justice Committee and Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee. The Justice Committee shall be responsible for the affairs relating to 
victims, such as receiving the claims and assessing the compensation. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee, on the other hand, shall be the main body to execute 
restorative justice approaches.162 However, the reconciliation mechanism has hardly 
delivered effective restorative solution to the religious and ethnical tension in Darfur 
since its establishment. In an early observation by the UN Independent Expert, it was 
stated that the reconciliation mechanism could not function because of the lack of 
necessary resource.163 This difficulty has not been overcome yet. The UN Secretary-
General examined the implementation of DDPD and noticed that while the concerns to 
insecurity and poverty still harassed human rights protection, “the Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission has reportedly completed the mapping and analysis of 
conflicts, but there have been no further activities” because of the very similar reasons 
since 2012. 164  The national reconciliation by Sudanese government has failed its 
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The community level of reconciliation and restorative justice has been slowly 
moving forward. In 2006, African Union deployed the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, 
followed by the hybrid operation led by both the UN and AU. The Hybrid Operation, 
named United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), has observed the 
development of restorative justice in different tribes and communities, and held many 
judicial sessions and workshops on justice and corrections for local trainees. However, 
the community conflicts keep raising challenges to the effort. In 2014, the former UN 
Secretary-General noticed that the then on-going tribal conflicts in all areas in Darfur 
exposed the co-existence of two opposite aspects: the efforts to reconciliation and the 
perseverance to military actions of the tribal leaders.165 Almost all belligerent parties 
wanted peace and reconciliation, but no party was willingly to hold back military force. 
The UNAMID continues meeting with group leaders in different regions in Darfur, 
aiming to mitigate the tension between groups and serious violation of human rights, 
but has not gained plausible outcomes. In 2018, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 2429 (2018) to renew the mandate of UNAMID because of the continued 
concern in justice and peace in Darfur and the whole State of Sudan. It noted the 
contribution to local security of the unilateral announcement of ceasefire by the military 
force of the Government with three major rebel groups in Darfur, and the decreased 
inter-communal armed conflicts. But in the meantime, it warned that the conflicts 
between communities still remained as one main source of violence in Darfur, which 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security.166 The contact of the official of 
Sudanese government and the local leaders had been started on 24 July 2018 with the 
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help of UNAMID.167 It could become the initiation of the community reconciliation 
being integrated into the national reconciliation program. 
The ameliorated security in recent years in Darfur could be attributed to many 
factors. The AU Peace and Security Council and UN Security Council underlined two 
significant factors that attributed to the situation, the weakened military capability of 
rebel groups and the weapon collection campaign run by the Sudanese government.168 
In the latest report on the Hybrid Operation, UN Secretary-General confirmed the 
importance of the Government forces in stabilising the situation, and appraised the 
ceasefire between the Government forces and three military groups, suggesting that the 
strong and stable government is the indispensable factor for the security in Darfur.169 
Furthermore, the Secretary-General noted that the tension over land and other natural 
resources among non-militia citizens had increased, which has become the new concern 
in keeping security of the region. The Government forces interfered the intercommunal 
conflicts, and deployed soldiers to suppress the clashes.170 However, it was also stated 
in the Secretary-General report that the governmental militia had involved in several 
human rights violations, and the responsible persons have gone unpunished.171 Such 
situation created a dilemma to the role of Sudanese government when the security in 
Darfur has predominantly relied on the actions of the Government. 
 The ICC’s work has not helped the reconciliation in Darfur. The role of the ICC 
to the restorative justice in Sudan is not witnessed at all. More importantly, it is 
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predictable that the ICC will not be a positive role to the Sudan’s national reconciliation 
since Sudan has deemed the Court as one archenemy. There exists a voice arguing that 
the most significant reason why the ICC failed to proceed with its work in the situation 
of Sudan, is that the ICC does not have coercive power but relies on outside political 
support in order to apprehend the suspects.172 The ICC has kept asking States Parties 
to the Rome Statute and State not parties to surrender or arrest the President of Sudan, 
arguing that it is an international obligation for States Parties to be fully cooperative 
with the Court.173 No State Party has responded such request with real action. On the 
legal question in regard to the immunity as the Head of a State, the obligation of States 
Parties to fully cooperate with the ICC, and the effect of the referral of the situation by 
the UN Security Council, the debate is well balanced. The realistic problem, if the ICC 
succeeded convicting the President of Sudan, would be that the security situation in 
Darfur could be worsened rapidly and the reconciliation at community level would go 
vanished. All the fragile achievements in maintaining peace and establishing justice in 
Darfur and the whole State of Sudan depend on a stable government to communicate 
with local groups leaders and put pressure on rebel military groups. The ICC has to 
pause proceeding the charges against the officials of Sudanese government. Perhaps the 
best possible role for the ICC to the crisis in Darfur is not to impair the Government by 
insisting immediate arrest of the top leaders. 
If the ICC had been aware of the function of restorative justice in the situation in 
Darfur, Sudan, the relationship between the Court and the Sudanese government would 
have not become so intense. The Government of Sudan needs its officials to stay in 
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their roles so that the intrastate conflicts could be controlled. The ICC pursues the aim 
of combating impunity and bringing the persons responsible for the serious violence to 
justice. In the current understanding of justice by the ICC Prosecutor and Judges, the 
alleged persons must be and can only be accountable for international law obligations. 
Restorative justice idea requires the criminal offenders to be accountable to victims and 
the affected communities. By holding the view of restoration on justice, the ICC would 
recognise that the most important obligation for the Sudanese government is to end the 
inter-communal conflicts and proceed the national reconciliation mechanism. 
Another hypothesis on the possible role of the ICC in the situation in Sudan is that 
it could be the organisation to assist the Government to unite the sporadic community-
based reconciliation events. The result of small reconciliation events seated in specific 
communities will be limited to the scope of the community. The conflicts between 
communities require a bigger plan that is operated by national authority. Different 
reconciliations in Darfur are now being run by several organisations, including the 
UNAMID and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). They need to be collectively 
operated and monitored by one entity where both justice and reconciliation could be 
synergised. Restorative justice idea, which does not isolate the Government leaders but 
encourage them to participate national reconciliation, would make the ICC the 
organisation that helps the Sudanese government and achieve justice simultaneously. 
4. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
An analysis on the need of victims in Lubanga case 
One interlink between restorative justice idea and the ICC’s work in the situation 
in DRC dominantly lies in the engagement of victims in justice process. The special 
attention on victims of international crimes has been highlighted frequently in the Rome 




universally in the Conference in the beginning. In particular, many Delegates felt afraid 
that the emphasis on reparation to victims would distract the Court from charging the 
accused persons. But gradually, more Delegates accepted that victim reparation could 
contribute to the reconciliation process, so that awarding reparation would strengthen 
the pursuit of justice.174 
For example, in the first plenary meeting, the then UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi 
Annan, shortly reviewed the history of the efforts fighting impunity of international 
crimes, and expressed the special concern on victims by addressing that a permanent 
international criminal court must recognise that “the overriding interest must be that of 
the victims and of the international community as a whole”.175 In the next discussion, 
the Delegate of UK stated that the Court must “have power to award reparations to 
victims”, and “provide adequate protection and assistance to victims in giving 
evidence”.176 The Delegate of Slovenia underlined that the perpetrators of international 
crimes must be brought to justice and “rehabilitation of individual victims and war-torn 
societies should be made possible”.177 Finally, the reparation to victims was confirmed 
as one basic principle in the Rome Statute.178 Victims are also authorised the right to 
participate the justice procedure at any stage179, which is the procedural right for victims 
distinguished with reparation. More details on the need of victims will be discussed in 
chapter 3 and 4. This section only provides an examination of the ICC onto the situation 
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The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo was referred to the Prosecutor 
of the ICC by the government of the DRC in 2004. In the communication letters, the 
government of DRC asked the ICC to open investigations on the crimes committed 
since 1 July 2002. This time frame just covers the period of the second Congolese Civil 
War, which is also notoriously known as the “Africa’s world war”.180 Like the situation 
of Uganda, all the alleged perpetrators in the situation of DRC are leaders of non-
governmental military groups. What is distinguished from the Ugandan situation is that 
most of those accused do not belong to the same group. This is not the first situation at 
the ICC, but the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case is the first case that was 
judged at the ICC. The special “identity” of this case has attracted many studies to 
discuss its legal issues and effects. The symbolic meaning of this case to international 
criminal justice will not be dealt with in this study; as well, certain legal issues of it will 
not be the focus of this study either181. As it is stated by professor Schabas, this case 
will probably be remembered “for [its] contribution to the articulation and testing of 
the law, rather than [the] motivation and societal impact”.182 The issues related to 
litigation techniques do not play a big role in the search for peace, but do affect people’s 
sense of justice. The milestone aspect of the Lubanga case is that this was the first time 
for the ICC to demand reparation to victims. But the first try on victim reparation 
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exposed many problems. 
In 2008, the Trial Chamber I of the Court ruled the criteria on which the identity 
of victim should be acknowledged for the participation of legal proceedings in Lubanga 
case. The Decision on victim participation considered three questions for all the 
applications to participate: What recognisable document proof for the identity should 
be required; whether to include both the direct and indirect harm suffered by applicant; 
and, whether the harm in the application must be caused by the alleged crime .183 In 
the Chamber’s opinion, the victims in Lubanga case should be legally approved on the 
standard that the victim must be a natural person, with recognisable document proof, 
whose interests were harmed, directly or indirectly, by the crime that fall in the 
jurisdiction of the Court.184 The Decision was then appealed by both the Prosecution 
and the Defence. On the issue of identifying victims, the Appeals Chamber confirmed 
that the harm suffered by the applicant should not be confined to direct harm, but 
reversed the Trial Chamber I’s decision that the harm might not be restricted only to 
the charged crime.185 The conclusion in this Judgement received not further challenge 
in the next phases of the case. 
In the Trial phase, the Trial Chamber I reconfirmed the formulation decided by the 
Appeals Chamber above, and defined the identity of a victim as 
“[S]omeone who experienced personal harm, individually or collectively 
with others, directly or indirectly, in a variety of different ways such as 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss”… “as a 
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result of the crime charged”.186 
The definition of victims may be seemingly in favour of all the victims as long as 
they are able to demonstrate the link between their alleged harm and the crime charged 
in court, but in effect, it is rather narrow in Lubanga case. Given that Mr. Lubanga’s 
charges were mainly on the enlistment and conscription of child soldiers, the major 
victim participants in justice procedure were the former child soldiers from Mr. 
Lubanga’s military group. The standpoint in the Judgement manifested the 
determination of the protection of children during wartime, and is believed to have 
deterrent effect on similar crimes in future. 
However, the Trial Chamber I’s judgement Lubanga case dismissed a wide 
understanding of the victim identification. The narrow definition eventually became the 
consistent standard in the situation in DRC. The Appeals Chamber in Lubanga case 
agreed the definition and reconfirmed that the victims of the Lubanga case eligible for 
reparations must be those who “suffered harm as a result of the commission of the 
crimes of which Mr Lubanga was found guilty”.187 This opinion seems very strange 
because on the one hand it shows full consideration to those child soldiers who 
experienced extreme victimisation, but on the other hand, it does not acknowledge the 
identity to the victims who were attacked by the child soldiers. As the ICC ruled out the 
possibility that the people who were attacked by child soldiers should have been 
counted as victims, the victims as such would not have the right to participate in the 
justice procedure at the Court.188 This decision is very unfair, because in battlefield or 
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in normal places during wartime, child soldiers sometimes commit crimes that are not 
less terrifying than that committed by adults.189 The protection of children is important, 
of course. But it shall never mean that the wrong-doings by children would not be 
measured in an international court. It would be very disappointing for the victims of the 
crime committed by child soldiers if their identity as victim would not even be legally 
approved. Professor Ambos has expressed the concerns that the denial of being 
recognised as victim would cause unnecessary psychological harm and secondary 
traumatisation190. This pitfall has also been challenged by many other studies.191 The 
identity of victim in international crimes shall be an objective fact which indicates the 
very nature of atrocities. But the Lubanga case told people that identification of victims 
is going to be decided- or rather selected- by the judicial branch of the ICC. 
Another problem in the Lubanga case relates to how to understand victims’ 
participation in the justice procedure. According to the opinion of the Court, the 
participation of victims and the crime are connected by the concept of interests- the 
interests harmed by the charged crime. The Trial Chamber I announced that it would 
ensure “the wide-ranging particular needs and interests” which include 
“[A]n interest in receiving reparations, an interest in being allowed to 
express their views and concerns, an interest in verifying particular 
facts and establishing the truth, an interest in protecting their dignity 
during the trial and ensuring their safety, and an interest in being 
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recognised as victims in the case, among others.”192 
The interlink in between interests and the right to participate of victims makes the 
participation relevant to two core aspects in the justice procedure at the Court. Normally, 
there should be a difference between being entitled to participate in the legal procedure 
at the ICC and being able to have access to the reparations process. The right to 
participate is a procedural right, but accessing the reparations process counts to a 
substantive right. The rejection of a procedural right of a victim, in ordinary 
circumstance, does not necessarily cause the denial of the corresponding substantive 
right. Unfortunately, the boundary between the two different rights has become blur in 
Lubanga case. More precisely, the right to reparation is considered as one part of the 
right to participate. Such formulation on victim’s participation is a double-edged blade. 
If the application of a person to participate the justice procedure is accepted by the 
Court, then it guarantees that the applicant will be recognised as a victim and there will 
be no further worry in receiving reparation, unless the conviction of the accused fails. 
However, in the meantime, victim’s non-success in demonstrating the link of the harm 
onto personal interests and the charged crime always results in the loss of any chance 
to get reparation. The shortage of this formulation becomes particularly notable if the 
Prosecutor decides to bring only part of the criminal actions in the case to the Court. 
The Lubanga case has been the first and most famous case for such disadvantage. The 
self-esteemed reparative justice at the ICC, or the restorative side of the justice, which 
is witnessed by the participation of some victims, may have been based on the neglect 
of the interests of more other victims. 
The focus on the crimes in relation to child soldiers in Lubanga case was a safe-
play for the ICC. As the first case at the Court, the Lubanga case must be a success. 
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After this case, both the Prosecutor and the Judges should be more brave in scrutinising 
more serious crimes in other cases. It has been blamed that the mass violation of human 
rights, especially the large scale sexual violence and abuses, was reported but remained 
untouched by the Prosecution in the first case.193 In other two cases, Mr. Katanga was 
prosecuted for being responsible for, inter alia, rape and sexual slavery as crimes 
against humanity, but was judged as not being responsible for those crimes194 ; the 
confirmed charges against Mr. Ntaganda include rape and sexual slavery as both war 
crimes and crimes against humanity under organisational policy.195 The ICC has shown 
its determination of protecting child rights in Lubanga case. It is also necessary gain 
the sense of justice in gender-based crimes. Lack of justice for such crimes may not 
desist potential offenders from committing similar crimes. Victims need the Court to 
address more serious crime, as well as a broader definition of victim. Since the ICC has 
adopted a narrow definition of victim, what crimes will be convicted in the final 
judgement to the perpetrators is the decisive factor to who can receive the reparation. 
The help of victims to the Court may be greater in quantity and quality than the 
contribution of the Court to victims, which will undermine the trust of people on 
international criminal justice. 
The role of the ICC in the situation of DRC 
Despite the shortages, the prosecution against Lubanga at the ICC has been a great 
achievement in ensuring the confidence of the international community and the trust of 
victims in justice, considering the failure of domestic justice in the DRC. This 
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achievement contributes to the relief of pain of those victims, although it is impossible 
that all pain can be relieved through formal justice. 
Beside Mr. Lubanga, there are five other persons being accused in the situation of 
DRC. One wanted person, Mr. Mudacumura, is still at large. The charges against Mr. 
Mbarushimana was not confirmed at Pre-Trial Chamber I, indicating that Mr. 
Mbarushimana was not the main contributor for the charged crimes.196 The charges 
against Mr. Ngudjolo were firstly confirmed jointly with Mr. Katanga on 30 September 
2008,197 but was dropped at Trial Chamber II for insufficient evidence to prove Mr. 
Ngudjolo’s personal responsibility.198 In the cases where the charged crime have been 
confirmed in the situation in DRC, Lubanga case and Katanga case are under reparation 
phase. The Ntaganda case awaits the judgement at Trial Chamber IV by the time this 
study is being written. 
The proceedings of the ICC’s work in the situation in DRC considerably rely on 
the cooperation of the authorities of DRC. Mr. Lubanga was caught by Congolese 
authorities and then surrendered to the ICC on 17 March 2006, approximately one 
month later than his warrant of arrest being issued at Pre-Trial Chamber I. 199 Mr. 
Mbarushimana, according to the information provided by the ICC, obtained the status 
of refugee in France in 2003.200 The French authorities surrendered Mr. Mbarushimana 
to the Court in early 2011. It was reported that before the issuance of his warrant of 
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arrest, Mr. Ngudjolo had signed a peace agreement with the DRC government, and had 
been granted amnesty accordingly.201 He was serving in the military force which is the 
national defending force for DRC when he was arrested and then transferred to the 
Court in February 2008.202 The story of the arrest and surrender of Mr. Katanga was 
very similar to Mr. Ngudjolo. Mr. Ngudjolo was appointed by the President of DRC as 
the Brigadier General of the national defending force before he was arrested by the 
DRC authorities and transferred to the Court. 
Mr. Ntaganda surrendered himself to the ICC in 2013, seven years after Lubanga 
was transferred to The Hague.203 Ntaganda came from the same military group as 
Lubanga and held the position of Deputy Chief controlling the military actions. While 
Lubanga was in detention in The Hague, in 2012, Ntaganda re-organised group led by 
Lubanga and created another one named M23. Ntaganda turned himself to the embassy 
of the United States in Rwanda in the next year, following the internal conflicts amongst 
factions of his own military group.204 It was possible that the example of Lubanga left 
Ntaganda a message that cooperating with the ICC could be a better choice for him to 
keep himself alive. His appearing at the ICC could have been a signal for the M23 to 
work towards a peace settlement with the DRC government. In 2013, the military group 
M23 signed a deal with the DRC government in Kenya, promising the dissolution of 
the group and the reintegration of the combatants.205 
The ICC’s work for DRC, comparing with the support given by DRC to the Court, 
                                                 
201 The Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo (Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-02/12-3-
tENG, Trial Chamber II (18 December 2012), para. 10. 
202 Ibid. 
203 The Prosecutor v Ntaganda (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the 
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda) ICC-01/04-02/06, Pre-Trial Chamber II (9 June 2014), para. 2. 
204 Human Rights Watch, ‘Bosco Ntaganda’ < https://www.hrw.org/topic/international-justice/bosco-
ntaganda > accessed 19 August 2015. 




is a mixture of good consequences and bad news. It is said that the arrest of the 
perpetrators itself was a great success for the international community, since people in 
the DRC have been “crying” for justice for many years.206 Being tried at the ICC of 
some former rebel leaders may have been one of the very few occasions where people 
in DRC gain some satisfaction. Ideally, justice should be done in domestic courts 
because the ICC could only charge the criminals most responsible rather than all of 
them. But after years of civil war and external military interfere from neighbour States, 
DRC could not establish institutions for proper justice. However, the happiness brought 
by the ICC to the State is limited. For lasting security and peace, justice for the most 
responsible persons, for low-rank soldiers, and for civilian combatants shall be 
connected as a whole. Lack of justice on any stage may deepen people’s dissatisfaction, 
intensify the oppositional attitude between groups. The United Nations had emphasised 
the importance of domestic prosecution by saying that the Congolese authorities should 
“bring to justice all perpetrators of these [human rights] violations”.207 Unfortunately, 
the ICC’s decisions and judgements have not contribute to peace or national 
reconciliation in DRC. More will be discussed in the next section. 
The ICC has hardly contributed to the change of life for victims and other people 
in DRC. The insufficiency of care on victims’ need in trial phase has been discussed 
above. Extra attention shall be paid to the influence of the ICC’s work outside the trial. 
As professor Cassese noted, one reason that none of the trials at the ICC was held in 
DRC local areas is that any intention to locate the trial in DRC could have put the 
witness and victims at risk of death or bodily injury.208 The participation of witnesses 
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as well as victims at the ICC in The Hague instead of the DRC is a good protection 
mechanism. However, only some of the witnesses and victims of the international 
crimes in the DRC attended the trial, and it was not possible for them to stay in The 
Hague forever, away from the dangers in DRC. They return to the DRC after they finish 
their “jobs” at the ICC, and their participation at the trials against those former leaders 
of military groups will be revealed sooner or later. Even if the ICC takes careful 
consideration to the confidentiality and safety of those participants, such news may 
have been dispersed already. Then how can the ICC continue its protection of victims 
and witnesses outside the Hague? 
Apart from the Lubanga case, the limits of the ICC to fully involve the victims 
rest on two main points. First, the financial ability of the ICC has limits, so that the ICC 
has to control the participation of the number of victims and witnesses. It is not likely 
for the ICC to provide enough space and time for those victims, given that perhaps all 
the Congolese could qualify as victims. The Prosecutor’s strategy in the selection of 
cases and the charged criminal acts has been widely criticised.209 It could be hard for 
the ICC to clearly identify those who are victims because “all the parties have legitimate 
grievances, but all are also responsible for massive human rights violations”.210 The 
position of the Court becomes crucial because all parties prefer to become the one who 
will be protected by the Court and have their enemies condemned. The ICC must be 
very cautious in selecting cases to avoid such risks.  Even after careful consideration, 
there is the dilemma that in the Lubanga case “[c]hild soldiers are typically victims and 
perpetrators at the same time”.211 Under these conditions, in establishing the principles 
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and procedures for reparation in the Lubanga case, the ICC Prosecutor recommended 
using restorative justice approaches to cover more victims in its reparations program, 
which has been rejected by the Court.212 
The ICC’s intervention to the situation in DRC has not been observed of being 
influential to peace and national reconciliation at all. In April 2002, the DRC 
government and rebel groups unanimously expressed the will to organise a new 
government through a transitional constitution, which would be functioning and 
respected by all parties for two years. On 7 August, the DRC government received a 
loan worth $454 million from the World Bank to assist in national development and 
reconstruction. In July a peace agreement was signed between the DRC and 
Rwanda under which Rwanda would withdraw its troops from the eastern boundary 
and the DRC would be obliged to disarm and arrest Rwandan Hutu combatants who 
were charged for taking part in the Rwanda genocide of 1994.  
In addition, in September, the Ugandan government agreed that Ugandan troops 
would retreat from the territory of DRC. Finally, at the end of 2002, the government of 
the DRC achieved a peace deal with main rebel groups in DRC and promised them 
political benefits in the transitional government.213 However, although more so-called 
peace deals were signed to solve the problems in the DRC, the conflicts had not truly 
ended. In 2003, the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (MONUC) repeatedly reported military activities in different regions in the 
DRC.214 Even after the ICC became involved in the DRC situation, the overall conflict 
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between the Government and rebel groups, and between different military factions, 
remained much the same. In 2012, the year Mr. Lubanga was convicted at the ICC, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations (the UN Secretary-General) reported the 
deteriorated humanitarian situation in the DRC: 
“According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
humanitarian needs increased during the reporting period, in particular 
as displacements grew because of renewed fighting and insecurity in 
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.”215 
It sounded like the DRC was living in another sphere, away from the international 
community, and that the involvement of international justice and even the missions of 
the United Nations could not result in significant changes. Nonetheless, this outcome 
helps, or cautions the international community to realised that the conflict in DRC and 
the whole region of the African Great Lake, which includes Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda,216 is too complicated for 
international law to resolve alone. Even the ICC may be relatively powerless in the face 
of such complexities. 
The continued conflicts are led by several political parties for gaining more 
benefits through negotiations with the DRC Government. In early 2014, the top United 
Nations official in the Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed the concern about 
the security conditions in the country and stated that “[p]reserving peace and security 
for all as well as respect for human rights is everyone’s responsibility”.217 Professor 
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Raymond Murphy carefully analysed the failures in civilian protection in the UN 
Peacekeeping Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), and warned that UN military power had 
limited influence on the too many rebel groups.218 He underscored the problematic but 
realistic fact that the on-going crisis in DRC has been caused by the difficulties in 
making “a successful disarmament and reintegration programme”.219 
Nevertheless, the MONUSCO has been continuing its work on peace and security 
in DRC, trying to provide assistance to reaching a peace agreement between the 
Government and other political factions, and to establishing reconciliation programs at 
communal level.220 Such effort, together with the plan by the DRC government to 
organise a national transition to establish a new government that will include more 
political parties, has moved on with great struggles pacifying the intrastate conflicts, 
and finally brought the 31 December 2016 agreement. However, the implementation of 
the agreement has not gone well. According to the assessment of the UN Secretary-
General, the agreement “has been steadily eroded by a lack of trust between the 
signatory parties and the increasing disaffection of the Congolese population with the 
political class as a whole.”221 
Fairly saying, without the general environment of peace, there can be hardly a 
unified and fair system provided for criminal justice. Criminal prosecution managed by 
one group against the persons belonging to other groups, especially when they were 
enemies before, must be based on commonly agreed conditions. Otherwise, it will be 
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seen as a “vengeance” taken by the victors onto the defeated. Unfortunately, armed 
conflicts have not been stopped in DRC. Similar to the situation in Uganda, the 
Government of  DRC expressed a will to work with one of the alleged perpetrators at 
the ICC, Bosco Ntaganda, as a gamble to make sure peace could be achieved earlier.222 
Inevitably, the complex relationship between the government of the DRC and the 
perpetrators triggered “peace versus justice” debates.223 And not surprisingly, all the 
arguments on the question of “peace versus justice” in the situation of DRC are almost 
the same as the ones in the Uganda situation. The ICC has been lucky in the situation 
in DRC, due to the fact that the wanted person by the ICC were almost all under the 
control of the Government. The Court also benefits from the narrowed view on the 
crisis in DRC, which facilitates the Court with some support the ruling party of the 
DRC government. The failed attempt of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
DRC224 exposed the fact that the DRC government does not have enough experience 
and resource to proceed national reconciliation, and must rely on the ICC to achieve 
justice. 
5. Lessons from the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda 
International crimes are the serious violations of international customary rules, 
which are intended to protect and “considered important by the whole international 
community and consequently binding all the states and individuals”.225 Those values 
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should be universally acknowledged and must be laid down in international legal 
instruments.226 Peace, justice, and human rights have become the most outstanding 
themes amongst those values, which are highlighted in the UN Charter. Although the 
ICC is independent of the UN, those values are still prominent for the ICC if the ICC 
is ready to accept its role and responsibility to the international community. In previous 
examples, the role of the ICC to peace, justice and the need of victims either became a 
hinder to the effort of the concerned State to make peace negotiation and end the 
conflict, or had been limited by its real capability in formal justice procedure to meet 
victims’ requirement. Or, the ICC may be simply of no significant effect on any one of 
the three aspect because of the insistence on retributive action against the top leaders. 
The outcome of not applying restorative justice idea has been seen. 
However, the current discussion needs an analysis on results of a restorative justice 
process without being guided by the important values and principles in international 
criminal justice. The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda provide such a good opportunity. To 
this end, this section will not include the impact of the International Criminal Court for 
Rwanda (ICTR) on peace, justice and victims’ need. 
The background of establishing the Gacaca Courts 
When facing the unimaginable atrocities that constitute international crimes, 
which have threatened or already endangered peace and justice, the mechanism at 
international tribunals may be impeded in achieving proper peace or delivering 
satisfying justice to the harmed society and victims. However, it does not imply that the 
formal criminal justice should be replaced by pure restorative justice methods. One 
frustrating problem is that the “traditional approaches” in many states for handling post-
violence issues, which include processes based on the idea of reconciliation, do not 
                                                 




always serve the purpose of guaranteeing the successful achievement of peace and 
justice. It can be observed more clear if restorative approaches are totally separated 
from the fundamental principles in formal justice. 
The massacre in caused by political disputes between different ethnicities in April 
1994 in Rwanda, which has been acknowledged as one real genocide after the 
Holocaust since the Second World War. 227 About four months after the genocidal 
violence in Rwanda, the UN Security Council decided to establish the ICTR to 
prosecute the persons responsible for the most serious crimes in the genocide.228 Some 
top leaders for the genocide were to be tried at the ICTR, meanwhile, national 
prosecutions against other criminal offenders should be managed at domestic level. 
However, the national justice went on in a very slow pace. The new Government of 
Rwanda insisted on pursuing full accountability to all offenders. But the number of the 
persons to be prosecuted was rather large, which was far beyond the capability of the 
Rwandan judicial system. 
From 1998 to 1999, a series of meetings held by the Rwandan government to 
discuss the issues relation to national prosecution. The meetings found out many 
problems in achieving justice under the then judicial system in Rwanda to take 
accountability of all the offenders, including the huge number of the person in detention 
and the limited number of professional staff as a comparison.229 The meetings also 
noticed that the formal criminal justice could not satisfy people’s need in living and 
working in post-genocide Rwanda. 230  The insufficient capability urged for an 
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alternative form of justice. The conclusion and recommendation of the meetings 
mentioned above was to resurrect the traditional Gacaca process and integrate it into 
modern justice.231 After preparation for more than one year, the Gacaca mechanism 
was set up in 2001 by the decision at the Transitional National Assembly.232 
The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, which were established to offer a broader platform 
for taking accounts of the persons who might be criminally involved in the genocide, 
are paralleled to the formal justice proceedings at ICTR. It served the aims of restoring 
peace and harmony, re-building the State of Rwanda, and punishing the criminals of the 
genocide. 233  It originated from local language and indicate the form of dispute 
resolution in which people sit on the grass and negotiate the offence with all concerned 
persons,234 and abandoned the modern criminal procedure. The system was primarily 
designed for the urge for simplifying the justice process with the necessity of respecting 
local tradition and culture, providing some procedures that were more familiar to local 
people, and helping victims and criminals find belongingness and inclusiveness, which 
included many valuable restorative justice elements.235 In addition, the Gacaca Courts, 
often believed as “community justice”, intended to bring justice to more citizens at 
domestic level by focusing on lower-hierarchy perpetrators in the genocide. So that it 
could be deemed as one great creative attempt to proceed a transitional justice with 
local traditions. Though it was praised for its efficiency and acceptability, 236  and 
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considered that traditional process might be safer than formal trials for genocide 
survivors to participate,237 the problems still remain to be analysed. 
The legacy of Gacaca Courts has been studied by serval researchers and NGOs. 
The assessments, consisting of many positive opinion and more negative comments238, 
mainly concentrate on the issues in the procedure from the perspective of legalism. 
Since the Gacaca was believed as one experience of restorative justice as mentioned 
above, it is also necessary to examine the practices by the spirit of restoration, especially 
on the negative aspects. 
Some positive aspects of the Gacaca Courts 
The initiation of Gacaca Courts in Rwanda is a great innovation. Considering the 
primary aim of designing the Gacaca Courts was to accelerate the domestic justice 
process that was impeded for years after the genocide in Rwanda, it did make the justice 
process faster and cheaper. Human Rights Watch estimated that when the Gacaca 
mechanism was established, more than 125,000 persons were still waiting for trial to 
be taken, even there had already about 5000 trials taking place.239 In the first phase of 
the Gacaca from 2002 to 2004, known as the “pilot phase”, 54,573 cases had been filed 
and were waiting for the next step, which involved the same number of persons in 
total.240 The focus of this phase was on data collection through public hearings and 
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confessions. After the revisions of the procedure and structure of Gacaca Courts in 2004, 
the number of courts in different level of political units reached 12,103 throughout the 
whole country when Gacaca Courts ended the mandate in 2012.241 Considering the 
economic situation of Rwanda, and the ethnical tension still existed during the Gacaca 
Courts, such achievement in delivering justice must be highlighted. The efficiency of 
Gacaca Courts met people’s expectation to see justice done when the pain caused by 
the violence haunted the country and the victims. It provided one possibility to solve 
the problem that justice is always delayed when facing international crimes beyond the 
slow-paced criminal prosecution. 
The efficiency of Gacaca Courts can be attributed to the special form of justice 
procedure, which is also another positive aspects of the system. The basic level of the 
courts was located at the smallest political unit- cell, each one of which can be seen as 
a community. In the bigger units above cell, sectors, there were trial courts and appeal 
courts. In this way, Gacaca system include all the administrative units so that the 
operation of justice was deployed in every community, and all the information was 
gathered and sent to the State authorities.242 The structure of the Gacaca Courts could 
help the judgements made at grass-root level to be linked together and to be imbedded 
into State’s will. More importantly, in cell courts, the participants were neighbours who 
experienced the massacre collectively. Their opinions about the crimes and the view on 
the proper response to the perpetrators were important to clarify the truth and share the 
feelings. The effect of the structure of Gacaca Courts, according to the design, should 
convey people’s voice, including victims, witnesses, as well as the offenders, to the 
Government of Rwanda. It should be a justice that was about everyone and replied on 
everyone. Through the reconciliations at community level, the State could achieve the 
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national reconciliation after the horrible massacre. 
The procedure of Gacaca Courts was not based on formal justice. Rather, dialogues 
between persons, which replaced the quarrel between litigants, were the main form of 
communication. The face-to-face talks between victims, witnesses, and the accused 
persons, encouraged the participants to directly share information and feelings, and 
helped them to let the emotion out in front of the neighbours. As a result, the justice 
process in Gacaca Courts were not only about the disputing with logic and evidence, 
but the re-connecting of each other as the member of a community. The dialogues 
between participants in Gacaca Courts, firstly of all, admitted the different identities 
between victim and offender, making clear the wrong-doings that would be discussed 
in the process. But the Gacaca Courts also merged victims, witnesses and offenders into 
one more important identity- Rwandan, so that the sense of integrity and belonging 
would not be forgotten during the process. In fact, the former perpetrators did live in 
their community together with victims. The persons who committed violence in the 
massacre wished to be accepted by their community, evident by expressing great 
remorse and apologising to the people they hurt. 243  Other than what the former 
perpetrators wanted for themselves, one realistic reason to utilise the power of daily 
conversation into Gacaca Courts was that the broken State needed enough people to get 
involved in the re-build of the country, economically and psychologically. The tragedy 
in the past should be remembered and life must continue. There would be no better 
choice but to decrease the division between different ethnics. Gacaca Courts had play 
a proper role in it.244 
In general, Gacaca Courts was created on the root of the ancient culture among 
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Rwandan people in solving disputes, and adjoined with some core elements in modern 
criminal justice. The Gacaca in history, as many experts have already introduced, was 
on the basis of gender distinguishing that granted men much more power than women, 
and primarily aimed to restore the harmony in the community, with retribution being 
subsidiary to such aim.245 The new Gacaca Courts authorised all people, including both 
men and women, to participate the talks. In addition, the Gacaca Courts in post-
genocide Rwanda underscored the need to inflict punishment onto the convicted 
persons. In trial phase, the law establishing Gacaca Courts categorised three tiers of the 
prosecuted persons by their roles in the crime and the gravity of the criminal acts, and 
set different penalties accordingly with the consideration to the attitude of the accused 
in front of the court. 246 The sanction to the convicted persons could be mitigated 
depending on how remorseful they behaved in the court, but no amnesty would be 
granted. To the end of restoration, though retribution was one driving ideology in 
Gacaca Courts, many criminals received the sanction of community service that kept 
them attached to the place they live and the people they know, and made them pay back 
the damage they caused to others. 247  The criminals were taken accountability for 
victims and the community, but not only because the law required so. In other words, 
the Gacaca resurrected was a combination of the ameliorated traditional justice 
procedure and the retributive idea in formal criminal justice. 
Such combination allowed the State to seek national reconciliation through a 
procedure that is more familiar to local people without violating the international 
obligation to combat impunity of the perpetrators committing international crimes. On 
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this point, as well as the points discussed above, the Gacaca system should be 
considered as a good example of transitional justice practice, which brought restorative 
justice elements and formal justice together. But, on the other hand, the combination of 
restorative form and retributive core in Gacaca Courts brought many problems in 
achieving national reconciliation. 
Some criticisms toward Gacaca Courts 
Among all the studies on the Gacaca Courts, some researches particularly focus 
on the negative aspects. The report by Human Rights Watch, for example, severely 
criticised the lack of due process to the participants of Gacaca Courts, especially the 
lack of effect defendant method for the alleged persons. 248  It is true that harsh 
punishment inflicted on the convicted criminals must be decided through restrict 
procedure, so that the sanction will not turn in the abuse of people. In the standard of 
formal criminal justice, the view of Human Rights Watch caught the dilemma in 
pursuing retribution in the name of restorative justice. However, one fact that pushed 
the then Rwanda government was the lack of professional staff to operate formal justice 
at domestic level. The weakness continued to cause problems in Gacaca Courts, as 
Human Rights Watch also noticed.249 
Other than some extreme examples, most of studies on Gacaca Courts, 
nevertheless, provide quite critical and balanced assessments. The brave step taken by 
the Government of Rwanda to include all Rwandans in justice process through genuine 
conversations has been appraised, but the unprofessional operations of justice and the 
intense influence by the Government have concerned almost all the scholars in this 
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The issue in relation to professionalism in Gacaca Courts firstly has been observed 
in how Gacaca Courts were held. As to the data collection phase, professor Schabas 
described the Gacaca system as it was “really nothing more than a very decentralized 
system of justice administered by non-professionals at the local level”.251 In a vivid 
portrait by Corey and Jorieman, the court in Gacaca system was proceeded in a way 
that 
“Village elders and community members would voluntarily gather 
together on a patch of grass to discuss civil disputes. Elders would 
present a resolution to the issue in an effort to salvage social peace and 
cohesion in the village. The current process differs from the traditional 
process in three key aspects: in the traditional process participation was 
voluntary; it was primarily used to deal with conflicts within a given 
community; and the judges or elders were given leeway to decide any 
punishment they wished within certain boundaries. The highly regulated, 
national and involuntary Gacaca process currently under way is 
substantially different from its traditional predecessor.”252 
The inadequate judges were the first concern to this issue. The judges- the elders 
in the community- did not receive proper training to deal the matters that would 
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possibly send the accused persons to prison. Or, at most, they only underwent informal 
training before managing serious discussions in relation to genocide.253 As a result, 
their decisions were vulnerable to some serious debate, because the final judgement 
might be made on personal feelings rather than rational analysis. The elders might have 
sufficient experience to handle disputes between a limited number of community 
members, but the experience would not work well in the genocide. The cases 
in Gacaca system were national-wide crimes, committed by groups against other 
groups. The crimes had gone beyond the capability of the elders, no matter judged from 
the huge number of victims and offenders, or the gravity of the crime. 
The unprofessional operators of Gacaca Courts brought some dissatisfaction to the 
participants. Under the tradition of Gacaca, the procedure of justice usually went on 
flexibly. But lack of rights to due process in justice undoubtedly create turbulence 
between victims and offenders, because neither of them can express their opinions fairly. 
Both groups feel that they are victims of the procedure.254 The advantage of flexibility 
in restorative justice, as the comparison to formal criminal justice, shall be managed for 
the need of victims and for the best result of the process. It requires long and systematic 
training so that the operators would hold the values in human rights, such as equality 
and mutual respect. The good morality of the staff in Gacaca Courts has been 
emphasised as one of the core criteria in Rwanda’s law.255 Being moral is important for 
judges, but shall not be the decisive factor for a successful restorative justice program. 
The impartiality of judges was also challenged. As to the credibility of judges 
in Gacaca Courts, Human Rights Watch observed some personal biases among the 
elders, and, more controversially, the corruption issues. It is indicated that local 
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Rwandan people who had participated in the Gacaca processes listed many cases of 
corruptions among “judges”, including 
“[J]udges accepting bribes from wealthy accused persons in exchange 
for acquittals or asking the accused to pay money in exchange for an 
acquittal; genocide survivors accusing wealthy people in the community 
of crimes in order to receive monetary compensation to drop the case; 
witnesses taking bribes from the accused; and civil parties bringing 
cases in exchange for making false allegations, changing their testimony, 
or defending an accused person.”256 
It is hard to assess how much the corruption has affected the justice in Gacaca Courts, 
because the decisions from this system are not similar to those in formal justice. But 
the direct consequence of such process, as has been revealed, is that the investigation, 
negotiation, and “judgements” - factors that inevitably influence how people view 
justice as one aspect of post-genocide solution - relied on lies and half-truths.,257 It is 
almost impossible to believe that real justice will be obtained from lies rather than from 
truth, as it is inconceivable to uphold that peace will be achieved on inadequate justice. 
Criminals may not be necessarily punished by deprivation of life, freedom, or property 
rights, but the wrongfulness of their criminal actions must be recognised by the courts. 
Unfinished justice leaves key conflicts unsolved to the people concerned, causing 
difficulties to maintain stable peace in future. 
Another dangerous issue in Gacaca Courts is that forgiveness and reconciliation 
were at times forced upon participants. Timothy Longman abstracts several negative 
points in Gacaca Courts on the strong influence from the then Government according 
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to his own observation in the field. He listed many occasions indicating the Gacaca was 
manipulated, inter alia, which could have undermined the possible benefits of such 
great creation.258 The Gacaca system seemed to have been driven by the desire of the 
Rwandan government to strengthen the image that the massacre in Rwanda in 1994 was 
committed by one ethnical group against another ethnicity. 
In the official statement, Gacaca Courts were designed and prepared specifically 
for the genocide, which has been publicly announced by the Rwandan government as 
the crime “targeting Tutsi”.259 Of course, the genocide against Tutsi was one of the 
biggest tragedy for humanity, and all should endeavour to prevent any similar crime in 
future. However, what must be borne in mind is that, albeit the genocide against Tutsi 
people was biggest piece in the whole picture of the violence, Tutsi people were not the 
only victim in the ethnical conflicts. The genocide should not be isolated from the 
history of Rwandan civil war, nor from the mutual attacks between all ethnical groups. 
The narrowed view inflicted on Gacaca Courts would result in a satisfaction for the 
Government or the ethnical extremists, but not an adequate national reconciliation. 
Instead of bringing re-union of all ethnicities in Rwanda, the narrowed focus on the 
pain suffered by Tutsi people in Gacaca process had labelled people by ethnicity, and 
thus created a new invisible tension through governmental activities. 
The narrowed focus confined the truth to be spoken. It is possible that the 
government of a State, especially the States under transition, exerts its controlling over 
the process and monitor people’s speech so that the reconciliation will not be ruined by 
malicious words. National policy may play a crucial part in national reconciliation, 
because people’s negative emotions need to be pacified and the possible riot, which has 
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been seen in many States during transition, needs to be supressed. However, a good 
national policy on reconciliation must concentrate on the best way to achieve 
restoration, not the way to enforce the government’s preference. The policy implanted 
in Gacaca Courts onto individual persons impeded the truth-telling. 260  Many 
participants in Gacaca Courts, including victims, witnesses, offenders, and even judges, 
could not discuss the facts other than what the Government asked, or they would face 
the punishment for the undesired words. It is believed that “[t]he constant threat of 
sanction [upon participants] means that some ordinary Rwandans adopt a tactical 
approach to performance before the [G]acaca [C]ourts.”261 If people were allowed to 
speak, they must be allowed to express the true feelings; if they had the rights to truth, 
they must be granted the right to access all the concerned truth. Knowing about the 
whole situation of the crime by sharing knowledge and information between 
participants in justice process is one advantage of restorative justice, but the bias in 
selecting the focused crime would deeply weaken such advantage. 
According to some studies, the fear of the government’s such power is the primary 
reason why most citizen participants complied with Gacaca’s demands.262 It meant the 
Rwandan government used restorative justice in a wrong way. The inadequate truth-
telling and involuntary participation could exhaust the confidence of victims toward the 
national authorities where they hoped to seek care and respect. The core value in 
restorative justice, respect to the need of victims, was not carefully esteemed in Gacaca 
process, without which national reconciliation can hardly reach the pursued end of the 
community justice. Truth-telling and hearing the truth can be painful in restorative 
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justice because it recalls the memories of victims when they suffered violence and 
horror, but eventually shall be of healing nature: victims’ pain is shared and 
acknowledged by the collective in a slow process where perpetrators offer an apology 
and respect to victims. The forcible participation, especially the forced “acceptance” to 
reconciliation, has no healing effect but adds more humiliation in that it denies the need 
of victims when facing the past atrocities. 
A re-imagination of Gacaca Courts 
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted the Gacaca Courts and 
the practices, and considered them as an example of “combating impunity, promoting 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance at national level”.263 The evaluation 
resonated an earlier statement by the Rwandan delegation in a working group 
discussion at the Human Rights Council in 2010 where the Gacaca process was 
evaluated as well-serving Rwanda in post genocide nation-build: The number of cases 
dealt through Gacaca was huge; revenge killing had not been seen, which clearly 
proved its impact to peace; former perpetrators and victims lived together in community 
as the result of reconciliation.264 
The evaluation by academics, being compared with the official statement of the 
Rwandan government, showed a quite complex image. The most frequently criticised 
aspect of Gacaca, aside from the lack of professionalism and the partial influence from 
the Government, was the credibility of “truth”. Many victims were summoned 
to Gacaca trials and compelled to accept the “truth” that had been prepared, so that 
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reconciliation could be swiftly achieved.265 The intent to achieve reconciliation and 
restoration should not be criticised, but the treatment of victims will not reach the best 
results if basic requirements to respect their rights and needs are not satisfied.  
The analysis on the criticised design of truth-telling process in Gacaca, however, 
reveals some surprising information. Participants in Gacaca trials, especially women 
who experienced sexual violence during the atrocities, had increasingly spoken of 
traumatisation and insecurity. 266 The process was supposed to heal the victims of 
international crimes, but in fact it evoked more painful feelings. However, those 
negative feelings were not simply caused by the bad pattern of justice in Gacaca Courts. 
Studies suggest that any process involving truth-telling, face-to-face talking, or other 
collective discussion of past crimes, will not avoid negative emotions of victims or of 
other witnesses. 267 A relevant study even found that negative emotions during the 
participation of Gacaca trials, such as fear, sadness, and anxiety, could be redirected 
toward increasing social re-integration between victims and perpetrators. 268  This 
finding is supported by studies based on surveys done in Rwanda in understanding the 
public’s attitude to restorative justice approaches, according to which the majority of 
the Rwandan people see Gacaca positively with the belief that it will help to eradicate 
the culture of impunity and lay a foundation to sustainable peace and social harmony.269 
A more recent survey indicates that the majority of participants responded with 
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expressing support for Gacaca on more general questions, such as whether or not it will 
deliver justice and sustain peace. But in specific questions, including feelings of 
security, credibility of truth and confessions, and the treatment of victims and criminals, 
dissatisfaction in response has clearly been the tendency.270 
As a result, the evaluation of pure restorative justice utilised to deal with 
international crimes - the Gacaca process in this section - is more complicated than 
many have anticipated. The warning lessons from Gacaca utilised in Rwanda show that 
the operation of restorative justice to face the most serious crimes, even by the most 
experienced elder in the community, may not be as easy as many people think. 
Unprofessional restorative justice may lead to a situation where individuals, especially 
victims, receive intolerable disrespect, judging from the view of law and human dignity. 
More importantly, because the success of restorative justice relies on voluntary 
participation, the operators must manage the activities in restorative justice in a way 
facilitating the communication and emotion-sharing. When participation rate decreases 
in restorative justice, the operator shall analyse the reasons and adjust the process 
correspondingly. 
Again, the local elders or respected people who operated the courts in Gacaca may 
be qualified to demonstrate the way the alleged crimes were committed and the real 
feelings of local people to the crimes, or to play a role as to communicate for judges 
with victims. They have very good understanding about the local culture and traditional 
values among people, which can explain the ethnical conflict between groups that 
invoked the tragic genocidal violence. However, the good features of the judges in 
Gacaca did not necessarily make them good operators of restorative justice. They need 
to be combined with professional skills that are required for being a real judge in formal 
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The partial influence from the Government of Rwanda may have suggested that 
even a process based on restorative justice approaches like Gacaca need to be piloted 
by a third party that has no interests in the dispute. It does not lead to the conclusion 
that the Rwandan government then was biased by its own political ambition. Rather, it 
simply means that indifferent party to prosecute the massacre in Rwanda, because the 
then ruling party could be deemed as representing the victimised ethnicity. 
The creative aspect in Gacaca, which abode by the procedure of restorative justice 
and sought the value of retribution as one central part in formal criminal justice, could 
have displayed a not very successful example of how the two modes of justice should 
be combined. Then perhaps the other way of making restorative justice and formal 
criminal justice co-exist in one system is to utilised restorative justice idea (not the 
mechanism) in formal procedure of justice. Following this lead, perhaps the suggestion 
to improve the performance of Gacaca Courts is that it could have been a part of the 
ICTR, enacting the Judges of ICTR to be the operators or mediators in the community-
based justice. Unfortunately, such suggestion can only be a hypothesis, since there 
existed very little interaction between the ICTR and Gacaca Courts. The legal basis for 
ICTR did not leave space for utilising restorative justice, which also made the 
suggestion an impossible re-imagination. 
6. The experience of the TRC in Sierra Leone 
The academic analysis on the impact of Sierra Leone TRC has been abundant.271 
Similar to many other TRCs for post-violence States, the TRC in Sierra Leone 
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employed restorative justice approaches to involve both victims and perpetrators in 
face-to-face talks, and strengthened the sense of justice in a relatively peaceful way. 
Like all the other TRC modes, the Commission managed to make perpetrators confess 
their guilt in front of others, and encouraged the victims to express forgiveness, which 
eventually catalysed reconciliation in the society. In respect with the basic function, the 
Sierra Leone TRC did not show many differences with other TRCs. The outcomes of 
the Sierra Leone TRC had fulfilled its objectives, making the truth come out to surface 
and bringing more stability to the society. Other than that, the Sierra Leone did not 
make a huge breakthrough. In the words of professor Schabas, one of the 
Commissioners of Sierra Leone TRC, “it was probably no better or worse than many 
other truth commissions”.272 In this view, the Gacaca Courts could have been more 
innovative for applying the combination of the procedure of restorative justice and the 
core of formal criminal justice. 
Nonetheless, the TRC in Sierra Leone provides a decent comparison with the 
Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, in the aspects of professionalism and the impartiality of the 
institutions. Some aspects, such as the capability of TRC mode to uncover the truth of 
the past violence in Sierra Leone, and genuineness of the testimony out of the talks 
between victims and perpetrators, have also concerned scholars.273 But fairly speaking, 
the challenges that the Sierra Leone TRC faced in its mandate could be seen in almost 
all transitional justice mechanisms, similar to TRC mode or not. The restorative justice 
approaches in transitional justice, in Sierra Leone and other States, is the way to correct 
the wrong, not to make things flawless. It is very normal that the Sierra Leone TRC 
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made similar mistakes, or appeared powerless to overcome the flaws for some reasons 
beyond the TRC mode itself. For example, the lack of adequate funding has been 
regarded as one significant reason for the TRC to run for only about eighteen months 
and its limited impact to the whole society of Sierra Leone.274 The painful lessons of 
the TRC in Sierra Leone would not be enlightening the transitional justice in future. 
The focus must be on the areas where the Sierra Leone TRC made differences. 
The professionalism and impartiality of the Sierra Leone TRC 
The Gacaca system was established by the then Government of Rwanda after the 
intrastate violence had been settled down, for bringing changes to the slow-paced 
criminal prosecution. The then Government of Rwanda had already been able to 
stabilise the security situation when the decision of resurrecting Gacaca to prosecute 
all the perpetrators responsible for the crimes relating to the Genocide. But it was not 
the case for Sierra Leone. 
The short peace in Sierra Leone was a concession for power-sharing between the 
Government and the rebel group. Around eight years after the outbreak of civil war in 
1991, the Government of Sierra Leone and the main armed group, Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF), reached a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo in 1999. 
Perhaps both sides realised the importance to organise a new government that would be 
run by two political parties, otherwise the conflict would never end. To this end, the 
Lomé Peace Agreement spent many pages introducing the process of the political 
transition, such as the obligation for RUF to transfer into political party and the duty of 
the Government to assist RUF member in training275 and more importantly, granted 
amnesty to all combatants and forbade any further judicial actions against any member 
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of the parries. 276  It also provided the legal basis for establishing a truth and 
reconciliation commission (TRC or the Commission), stating that the aims of such a 
commission shall 
“[C]reate an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of 
human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed 
conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to 
the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to 
respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and 
reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses 
suffered.”277 
The clause in the peace agreement was then absorbed in section 6(1) of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone TRC Act, or 
SLTRC Act), which was the official legal foundation for all the TRC processes. As a 
national mechanism against serious human rights violations, corresponding to the 
wording “address impunity” rather than “end impunity”, the TRC targeted restoration 
and reconciliation to resolve the harm caused by the armed conflicts between the 
Government and RUF. Section 7(2) of the Sierra Leone TRC Act authorised the 
Commission to “seek assistance from traditional and religious leaders to facilitate its 
public sessions”, bringing indigenous experience to an official platform. 
One difference between the TRC in Sierra Leone and the Gacaca in Rwanda, as it 
stated above, rests in the driving factors to establish the institutions. While the Gacaca 
Courts were aiming at prosecuting perpetrators relating to the genocidal violence in an 
alternative way without worrying about further armed conflict, the Sierra Leone TRC 
attempted to make the temporary cessation of armed conflict into a real lasting peace 
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and address the accountability issues under such condition. The difference was caused 
by the fact that there was not a predominant side that could control the whole situation 
and then decide the direction of the transition. In other words, neither the Sierra Leone 
government nor the main Opposition group could make any decisive influence onto the 
TRC in their own will power. They needed some a third power to keep the impartiality 
of the transition process. 
As a result, both the signatories of the peace agreement consented to invite some 
international actors, such as the UN Security Council and the Peacekeeping Mission in 
Sierra Leone, to provide necessary assistance to monitoring and facilitating the 
transition.278 The participation of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in selecting the 
Commissioners, regulated in Section 3 and the Schedule of Subsection (1) of Section 3 
of the Sierra Leone TRC Act, increased more impartiality to the work of the 
Commission. 
Another difference is that although the TRC Act bestowed the Commissioners the 
power to seek traditional and religious elements to facilitate the process, it did not limit 
the Commission to such sole value. The Sierra Leone TRC utilised restorative justice 
idea, not based on pure traditional customs, nor operated as “community justice”. The 
TRC Act fully entrust its Commissioners, allowing them to determine the operating 
procedure and the mode of work according to their discretion. 279  Based on such 
authorisation, it was also confirmed that international human rights law and 
humanitarian law must be respected as the principal guide for its value, process and 
decision-makings. 280  The decisions of the Commission must be made by all 
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Commissioners as a whole, taken by consensus or vote when it did not reach a 
consensus.281 In procedure, the Commission took specific attention to confidentiality, 
appropriateness, and the relevance of the gathered information, and the methods of 
taking testimony, for filling the mandate set in Section 6(1) of the TRC Act.282 The 
authorisation to the Commissioner did not result in abuse of power. Rather, the 
Commissioners prudently managed the work in almost all aspects, and created a public 
and transparent platform to include all concerned citizens, so that the authorisation did 
not undermine the legitimacy of the TRC. 
In addition, when participants who were called by the Commission provided false 
or misleading information to the Commission, certain criminal responsibility could be 
possible to be taken through the Commission’s referral of the case to national courts.283 
Although the Commission did not refer any case to relevant national courts based on 
false testimony, it did suggest the legal feature of the hearings. Those clauses about the 
establishment and functions of the TRC, which are highly close to setting up a real court, 
sent an unmistakable message that the TRC in Sierra Leone would be executing its 
work in a fair, reconciliatory, culture-friendly, and also semi-judicial way. 
Albeit both the Gacaca Courts and the Sierra Leone TRC were organised with 
restorative justice feature, the roles of the main operators were different. In Gacaca 
Courts, all the Judges must be local Rwandans who were not required to be experts in 
handling the process, but must be the people who were considered of having the 
following features, for strengthening the sense of integrity among people: 
“a) to have a good behaviour and morals;   
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b) to be truthful;   
c) to be trustworthy;   
d) to be characterised by a spirit of sharing speech;   
e) not to have been sentenced to a penalty of at least 6 months’ imprisonment;   
f) not to have participated in perpetrating offences constituting the crime of 
Genocide or crimes against humanity;  
g) to be free from the spirit of sectarianism and discrimination.”284 
The election of the Judges in Gacaca should be understood together with the 
objects of the then Rwandan government to acknowledge the genocide as the only 
condemned crime and to re-establish the “oneness” of Rwandan society. The emphasis 
on the moral credibility of the Judges might have suggested that the expertise was not 
the central element to run Gacaca Courts. Furthermore, article 15 of the Organic Law 
no. 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 in Rwanda forbade career magistrates to be elected as Judges 
in Gacaca, which almost completely cut the connection of the Courts with modern legal 
thoughts. There were, of course, some positive sides in those criteria, including 
invoking more moral sensitivity and cultural pride during the justice process. But the 
negative sides were also clear. The Judges were lack of experience managing Gacaca 
to deal with the most heinous crimes like genocide, because the traditional Gacaca did 
not function to solve such serious disputes.285 Furthermore, when facing the influence 
of the authorities to the Gacaca Courts, it could be even harder to remain impartial for 
those “moral, truthful and trustworthy” Judges than the real experts in law.  
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In contrast to Gacaca, the Sierra Leone TRC received much help from international 
community. Unlike in setting Gacaca Courts where the then Rwandan government did 
not accept external assistance, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in Sierra Leone derived from international supports. The United Nations 
intervened the situation in Sierra Leone and aided the State in many aspects, in 
particular, the selection of the four citizen members and the three international members 
of the Commission. The Sierra Leone TRC Act stipulated that the Commissioners 
should be selected on two main aspects: the integrity and credibility, and the highly 
professional experience in law, social sciences, religion, and psychology.286 In the end, 
with the help of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, the UN 
Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
the Commission included religious leaders, culture representatives, law professor, 
sociologists, and expert in running real Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which 
almost covered all the practical risks that might be encountered in the TRC process. 
More than that, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
contributed much to the early work for the establishment of the Sierra Leone TRC, and 
undertook the researches on the historical background, the religious demography, the 
education situation, and even the traditional way to solve disputes in Sierra Leone. All 
the efforts in preparatory activities prepared the Commission with professional 
knowledge and skill, rather than simply moral disciplines. 
The element of mutual respect should not be negligible in Sierra Leone TRC. 
Within the Commission, all the experts as the Commissioners acknowledged the 
importance of each other’s specialty to the whole process, not partly relying on 
traditional approaches or legal concepts. For example, in the final report, the 
Commission specifically emphasised the key role of truth and truth-telling for transition 
                                                 




and justice at social and private level. The Commission noted that in truth-seeking, the 
TRC mode would be better than formal criminal prosecution, especially when amnesty 
had already been granted, to take account of the perpetrators.287 Beyond the existing 
fact, the Commission analysed the “right to truth” in international case law, and 
recognised that such right should be fulfilled as both collective and individual right. 
The former aspect requires State authorities to carry on effective investigation of the 
atrocity in the past, the latter enables victims to access the truth and receive tangible 
reparation for their loss.288 
Being guided by international norms, the Commission learned from the experience 
of South Africa, and categorised the truth into “factual and forensic truth; personal and 
narrative truth; social truth; healing and restorative truth”.289 Each category of truth 
would function on particular issues that might concern participants of the TRC process, 
making sure victims and perpetrators could discuss different forms of evidences from 
more angles. The organic combination of legal concepts and restoration, in fact, 
provided a dual-insurance for confirming the wrongness of the violence, understanding 
better the nature and results thereof, and find the proper resolutions accordingly. 
Because of the professional attitude of all Commissioners toward an effective, efficient, 
and restorative justice for Sierra Leoneans, different ideas could co-exist and merge 
into each other, bringing out the positive and pre-empting the negative to a great degree. 
Re-imaging the relationship between the Sierra Leone TRC and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone 
Before the Sierra Leone TRC was fully established, in May 2000, the Signatory 
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rebel group of the Lomé Peace Agreement took hostage of several hundreds of UN 
peacekeepers. It caused more violent political crisis to the domestic situation, and made 
the UN Security Council authorise a rapid military reinforcement to the Peacekeeping 
Mission in Sierra Leone as a serious response to the hostility, 290 which indirectly 
strengthened the political power of the then Sierra Leonean government. The hostile 
actions taken by one strong rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
undermined the progress made in disarmament and demobilisation of different military 
groups in Sierra Leone, and in turn diminished the political influence of RUF to the 
national transition. The then President of Sierra Leone seized the chance and wrote to 
the UN Security Council for establishing an international criminal tribunal, in order to 
try the perpetrators responsible for the gross violence in formal criminal court. 
In the letter, the then Sierra Leone President highlighted the urgency to try the 
RUF leaders and the collaborators in criminal court, which might challenge the total 
amnesty granted months before.291 The UN Security Council, while underlined the 
contribution of the national truth and reconciliation process to the rule of law, responded 
that “a credible system of justice and accountability for the very serious crimes” were 
necessary for the national reconciliation, and requested the Secretary-General to reach 
an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone for an independent special court.292 
In a following report by the then Security-General to the Security Council, it was 
confirmed that the amnesty clauses in the Lomé Peace Agreement and the TRC Act 
should not confine the prosecutorial power of the Special Court,293 which was re-
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affirmed in Article 10 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL).294 
The mandate of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in effect, created a judicial 
competence between it and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
But the relationship of the SCSL with the TRC was never clarified. One 
noteworthy fact was that when the first trial began in June 2004 at the Special Court, 
the Sierra Leone TRC had almost finalised its work.295 For most of the time, the two 
mechanisms functioned parallel to each other. The TRC was established earlier, 
focusing more on restoration and reconciliation, and the SCSL on cases in regard to 
international crimes. In despite that amnesty had been claimed as invalid for the Special 
Court, the UN Security Council still deemed the TRC as the complementary role in the 
formal justice process.296 On 20 and 21 December 2001, one meeting was organised 
by the UN Office for High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for Legal 
Affairs to discuss the relationship between the two bodies, and concluded three 
principles as follow: 
“(i) The TRC and the Special Court were established at different times, 
under different legal bases and with different mandates. Yet they 
perform complementary roles in ensuring accountability, deterrence, a 
story-telling mechanism for both victims and perpetrators, national 
reconciliation, reparation and restorative justice for the people of Sierra 
Leone. 
 (ii) While the Special Court has primacy over the national courts of 
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Sierra Leone, the TRC does not fall within this mould.  In any event, 
the relationship between the two bodies should not be discussed on the 
basis of primacy or lack of it. The ultimate operational goal of the TRC 
and the Court should be guided by the request of the Security Council 
and the Secretary-General to “operate in a complementary and mutually 
supportive manner fully respectful of their distinct but related functions” 
(S/2001/40, paragraph 9; see also S/2000/1234). 
 (iii) The modalities of cooperation should be institutionalized in an 
agreement between the TRC and the Special Court and, where 
appropriate, also in their respective rules of procedure.  They should 
respect fully the independence of the two institutions and their 
respective mandates.”297 
The above principles admitted that the two organisations should be respectful to 
their different roles, and suggested they should provide mutual supports to each other’s 
work. It still did not indicate how they might be mutually supportive. In practice, the 
two organisations kept a polite, diplomatic and distant relation. But there were always 
some problems in such relation since they both aimed at bringing justice and peace in 
their respective way. In the final report, the Sierra Leone TRC specifically demonstrated 
the issues that had caused some conflicts to the two bodies, which mainly focused on 
the legitimacy of amnesty and information facilitating.298 
Those conflicts constituted the only occasional interactions between the TRC and 
SCSL. In relation to the granted amnesty, the SCSL rejected the challenge of the 
jurisdiction of the Court on the reason that amnesty was bestowed in the Lomé Peace 
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Agreement, indicating that the peace agreement was not a treaty and could not remove 
the criminal prosecution against the perpetrators of international crimes, which fell into 
the jurisdiction of the SCSL.299 Even the acknowledgement of the granted amnesty was 
fundamental for the work of the TRC, the Commission remained “self-restraint” to a 
degree, not to undermine the efforts made by the Prosecutor of the SCSL. Yet on some 
points which related to the core of truth and truth-telling, such as whether to share the 
self-incrimination testimony with the Special Court, the Commission stayed in a very 
prudent position and refused to submit any collected evidence. Because once such 
cooperation between the Commission and the Special Court occurred, the participants 
of TRC process would lose their trust to the Commission, which would make truth-
seeking an impossible mission.300 This steadfast attitude of the Commission might 
have be one of the reason why the Special Court disapproved the request of two accused 
persons to confess in the public hearing at the TRC.301 However, on this issue, the 
Decisions at the Special Court conveyed some complicated messages. 
In Prosecutor v Samuel Hinga Norman (Norman case), the Trial Chamber 
acknowledged the jurisdiction to try the Accused was exclusive to the Special Court, 
which implied that public hearing might be considered as being of similar effect with 
the justice procedure at the Special Court. On the other hand, however, the presiding 
Judge determined that for the interest of justice and the right of the Accused to due 
process, and on the reason that the Judges at the SCSL were more professional to avoid 
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extraneous influence, the Request of the TRC for permitting Mr Norman to present in 
the public hearing in TRC process should be refused. 302  This reasoning, 
euphemistically, did not recognise the legitimacy and the professionalism of the work 
of the TRC. In the Decision made by the President of SCSL answering the appeal of 
this case, similar gist was announced again, indicating that the evidence to be collected 
in the public hearing of the TRC process could not be legally utilised before the Special 
Court because of lack of professionalism.303 Under such idea, it is hard to believe that 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone would equally cooperate with the Sierra Leone 
Commission. Perhaps the best collaboration that the Special Court could offer to the 
Commission was not to forcibly ask the TRC to be banded by the Special Court’s legal 
opinion. 
But the TRC process had great impact to victim, perpetrators, and the whole 
society in Sierra Leone. Professor Schabas, as one of the seven Commissioners at the 
Sierra Leone TRC, observed that 
‘As the TRC hearings progressed during mid-2003, many perpetrators 
came forward to tell their stories to the Commission and, in some cases, 
to ask pardon or forgiveness of the victims. Belying most predictions, 
they did not appear at all concerned about the threat of prosecution by 
the Special Court. Perhaps they had already understood that the Special 
Court was only concerned with “big fish”, and realised that their own 
level of responsibility was more modest or secondary. But even some of 
the “big fish” who had been indicted by the Special Court indicated to 
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the TRC that they would be interested in testifying. This was the 
complete opposite of what anybody had expected.”304 
It is true that most of the Truth Commissions have not been managed by all legal 
professionals. But it shall never be asserted only legal professionals can achieve proper 
justice. The problem is if formal criminal justice and restorative justice are always 
operated within parallel organisations, or restorative justice idea is always inferior to 
formal criminal justice, it may not be easy to realise that restorative justice, when 
administered by experts, could explore the truth, achieve reconciliation, satisfy victims, 
contribute to justice, and bring some positive outcomes beyond the capability of 
international tribunals.305 
The Sierra Leone TRC, where restorative justice functioned well, has showed that 
justice could be achieved in an alternative way. It has many advantages over formal 
criminal justice, such as collecting a wider range of information related to the violence, 
holistically judging the accountability of all parties, utilising more flexible process to 
get more individuals engaged, and managing justice in a less conflictive but more ritual 
and resolving way.306 In contrast, the formal justice at international tribunals is limited 
to jurisdictional issues, like ratione temporis, ratione materiae, and ratione personae, 
which was seen in the complaints of the Liberian people of the fact that their then 
President was brought to another country to face justice, and that the perpetrators were 
charged with the crimes committed in Sierra Leone without including the crimes in 
Liberia.307 There will not be significant improvement to those challenges unless the 
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Prosecutors and Judges could ponder the meaning of justice at a higher level and believe 
justice should be achieved beyond the legal provisions. Unfortunately, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, like most of the other international tribunals, failed to see the value in 
restorative justice. 
If it was true that no fundamental interaction between the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the Sierra Leone TRC, in effect, facilitated each other’s work, then the 
conflicts abovementioned left some opportunities to re-imagine what could have been 
achieved if they did cooperate positively in sharing useful information and mutually 
respecting the validity of the counterpart’s work. It requires, specifically, that the formal 
criminal justice equally treats the decisions made through restorative justice, and 
acknowledges the legal effects of the evidence collected in the communication between 
the participants of restorative justice. Similar advices have been put forward to solve 
the conflicts in the resource fight between the two organisations in Sierra Leone. For 
example, in dealing with the self-incrimination testimony, it is suggested that the 
Special Court could adopt a rule that any confession made in the public hearing in TRC 
process, in particular the self-incriminations, could not be used as the convicting 
evidence against the persons who confessed, unless the persons provided fraud 
testimony.308 The suggestion is bold, because it implied that the TRC process should 
be regarded as having the same effect as the legal procedure at the Special Court. 
There can be an even braver suggestion. The Sierra Leone TRC and the Special 
Court could have been combined in one organisation as two branches. Such situation 
could have granted the them equal status in jurisdiction and judicature, making 
information-sharing natural and reasonable without extra agreement. In addition, 
because investigation and hearings at the Truth Commission could have been seen as 
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being of same effect as criminal investigation and prosecution, under the principle of 
ne bis in idem, participants of restorative justice would not feel worried of being 
charged in another trial chamber for what they had confessed. The Judges, being 
assisted by other experts, could have considered the cases at hand with a bigger 
perspective and calculated the impact of the decisions and judgements to the whole 
society. Moreover, the Judges, or the Operators of justice, could have adjusted the 
judicial approaches according to the reality, so that the it would be more cultural 
friendly to local people. The work for the Prosecutor would be easier, too, since the 
local people and the Government would have known that international criminal justice 
was not only about taking someone into prison without considering whatsoever the 
consequence would be for the State. 
The outcome of the “cooperation” between the Sierra Leone TRC and the SCSL 
could have been more fascinating. But it is just a re-imagination. And it was the formal 
criminal justice that refused to adopt restorative justice idea in TRC mechanism, not 
the opposite. 
From Sierra Leone to ICC 
A similar imagination can be made to the ICC, for example, to the situation in 
Burundi. The Office of the Prosecutor learned the historical context on the violence in 
Burundi, and remarked the “repeated cycles of violence” between ethnical communities 
since its independence in 1962, and emphasised necessity to investigate the violence 
during the period of presidential election in 2015.309 In particular, it was indicated that 
the Prosecutor would not investigate the violence allegedly committed by the 
                                                 





Opposition side, because it did not reach the severity of international crimes.310 
In responding to the preliminary examination of the situation at the ICC, Burundi 
accused the partiality of the Prosecutor, the political influence of the third parties to the 
Court, and disrespect to the choice of Burundian people. It also claimed that the ICC 
Prosecutor had disrespected the effort made by Burundi to end the impunity of the 
alleged crimes, and ignored the “independence and effectiveness” of the domestic 
judicial system. In particular, Burundi stressed the key role of the Transitional Justice 
Institutions in “redressing the socio-economic, cultural and political situation of 
Burundi”.311 The statement was made after Burundi lodged a notification to the UN 
Secretary-General of the withdrawal from the ICC. The reasons that Burundi withdrew 
from the ICC was attributed to the political bias, exerted by Belgium, France, the 
European Union, and even the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
against the President of Burundi, setting the Oppositions at the preferred position. 
The Prosecutor continued the work on the situation in Burundi even Burundi 
announced to withdraw from the Rome Statute, quitting the acceptance of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. Before the withdrawal from the ICC of Burundi official took effect, on in 
September 2017, the Office of the Prosecutor submitted the Request for authorisation 
to open the investigation on the situation of Burundi. In the Request, the Prosecutor 
stated that the national commissions established by Burundian authorisation were only 
for taking the criminal responsibility of the political opposition, but not for examining 
the violence committed by all involved parties,312 which constituted the shielding of 
the responsible persons. Based on the available documentation, Pre-Trial Chamber III 
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concluded that the national Commissions and proceedings in Burundi in relation to the 
alleged crimes had not taken “concrete, tangible and progressive” steps to investigate 
the violence committed by the member of Burundian authorities, security force, and 
youth wing of the ruling party, which made the situation admissible at the ICC.313 In 
the perspective of the ICC, the investigation should be permitted to complete the work 
that the Burundian authorities did not. It is not politically biased as Burundi claimed. 
Instead, it aimed at clarifying the whole situation of the violence. The transitional 
justice process was not examined in the Prosecutor’s Request or the Decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber III to the Request. Perhaps the Burundi government considered to utilise 
restorative justice process to address the violence where the national authorities 
involved, thus to stabilise the society and deliver justice in the meantime. However, the 
plan and purpose of the authorities of Burundi to use restorative justice has never been 
confirmed. Even it was the plan for the authorisation of Burundi to trigger restorative 
justice idea, the ICC would still intervene in the situation, because the approaches of 
restorative justice were not regarded as adequate justice at the Court. 
The optimistic part of utilising restorative justice idea to improve the work of the 
ICC, which is different with other occasions, is that it can become true, because there 
is not legal difficulty in its existing legislation. Furthermore, as it has proven in chapter 
2, the ICC is willingly to involve more restorative justice approaches in its judicature. 
Admittedly, it is not realistic to completely replace the current justice procedure at the 
ICC. The more practicable way, is to introduce the idea of restorative justice deeper into 
the concept of justice for the Prosecutor and the Judges. Once they examine the meaning 
of justice from multi-dimensional angles, they would actively undertake more creative 
approaches into the procedure. 
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This chapter analyses different situations in international tribunals, including the 
situations at the ICC, ICTR, and SCSL. The situation in Uganda has been carefully 
examined to clarity the real issue between peace and justice, concluding that granting 
amnesty to the high-ranking perpetrators is not necessarily the guarantee for peace, and 
that prosecuting the perpetrators at international criminal tribunals is not the only aspect 
for justice. 
The examination of the situation in Darfur, Susan and in DRC discloses that under 
the current legal mechanism and ideology on justice, the ICC has not played a major 
role in bringing peace or delivering justice. The ICC needs to change and make the 
justice closer to local people. 
The analysis on Gacaca Courts indicates that, unlike some studies have claimed, 
restorative justice alone could not bring sustainable peace, especially when there lacks 
professional assistance. Formal criminal justice mechanism is necessary, but needs to 
be combined with restorative justice idea. 
The experience of Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone proves 
that restorative justice and formal criminal justice can work synergistically. 
Unfortunately, it has only occurred when restorative justice stays independent from 
international tribunal. This chapter suggests that the influence of both formal criminal 





Chapter 3: The Meaning of Justice 
The problems in real situations to balance peace and justice in the ICC’s work are 
caused by some deeper reasons. It is revealed in the last chapter that it is a serious pitfall 
that international criminal justice has not included a restorative view of justice. What 
remains to be examined is to understand meaning of justice for the ICC, and what are 
the issues to achieve justice as such. 
The justice mechanism at the ICC to deal with international crimes comes from 
modern criminal justice. The meaning of justice to the ICC does not differentiate much 
from the philosophies, on which the ICC’s prosecution against international crime is 
based. Therefore, such philosophical background shall be clarified before examining 
the problems of achieving the goals at the ICC. 
Currently, the legal justice mechanism at the ICC follows two main schools of 
viewing justice, the legal moralism and the harm principle. The ICC is struggling on 
both aspects. In addition, the philosophy on punishment has been restricted to 
retributivism and deterrence at the ICC, which are also hard to be fully achieved. 
 A general examination on the concept of Justice 
The implications of legal criminal justice 
In modern criminal justice system, the legal response to criminal conducts calls 
for the treatments to the offenders reflecting the will of the nation, the requirements of 
the society, the need of victims and the rights of the accused. The consideration to 
individual’s need in criminal cases has been inferior to the former two elements, 
because it is asserted that individuals must submit their interests to the will of the nation, 
and defer their desire to the requirements of the society. Consequently, the criminal 




reaction to crime as “seeking revenge”. The crime occurred critically influences the 
individuals’ life, yet they are not authorised to fully express their opinions before the 
court. That is the “de-individualisation” of justice in legal procedure. This phenomenon 
is especially noteworthy in victims’ role in criminal justice. To answer what is “de-
individualised” justice for criminal offenses, another related question must be discussed 
as a precondition. The question is how justice shall respond to criminal offenses. In 
most countries, if not all of them, the option for solving such questions is punishment314. 
As a solution and a reaction to crimes, punishment is based on a human’s 
instinctive reaction to wrongdoings, which relates to social moral disciplines and 
human’s personal feelings. It sometimes drives human to find a way to relieve the 
negative emotions and to balance the loss caused by criminal acts. Human instinct is 
not based on rational decisions, so that punishment that is created by human may share 
many similarities with the desire of “taking vengeance”. But punishment is not the 
simple transformation of such an instinct. Punishment must be applied in accordance to 
an established criminal law, and must not be exercised in the situation where conviction 
is not reached through due legal process. This requirement is based on the most 
accepted and fundamental principle in criminal law: nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 
lege. There are many theories in explicating the intrinsic link between crime and 
punishment. This study mainly focuses on two of the most popular theories among them, 
which are the principle of legal moralism and the harm principle. 
Legal moralism 
The principle of legal moralism stems from the natural law tradition.315 This 
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theory considers criminal conduct as morally wrong. It is not hard to understand why 
immoral activities shall be regarded as crimes, because such activities normally violate 
some of the most common moral disciplines and cause damage to the most important 
values of a group. For example, murder takes life from others, and life is the foundation 
for all human activities and can only be owned once by a person. Losing life is losing 
everything that a human can possess. So, when someone commits murder, he/she is 
extremely immoral for that the most valuable thing was destroyed by his/her 
misconduct. The basic idea of the legal moralism principle is that there exists morally 
a wrong conduct, in the first place, and punishment, as the response, is simply necessary 
to re-assure that the violation of law must not be tolerated. So, punishment is not rooted 
in the desire for revenge, but shall be regarded as the manifestation of public denial and 
condemnation of the crime. “The criminal law does not create wrongs: it does not make 
wrong what was not already wrong by criminalising it.”316 
In thinking about the roots of law in the natural law tradition, Hart provided some 
edificatory thoughts to those questions. In examining the influence of morality to law 
and legislation, Hart insisted that there should not a necessary link between morality 
and law.317 He rationalised his assertion in some unique situations. For example, when 
trying to prove that law and morality are not connected, he said: 
“Connection […] between natural conditions and systems of rules are 
not mediated by reasons; for they do not relate the existence of certain 
rules to the conscious aims or purpose of those whose rules they are. 
Being fed in infancy in a certain way may well be shown to be a 
necessary condition or even a cause of a population developing or 
maintaining a moral or legal code, but it is not a reason for their doing 
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It makes sense that taking good care of infants may originate from human’s 
parental instinct or social morality, but not necessarily requested by law. Yet it does not 
mean that law will also stay indifferent when the responsible persons don’t take care of 
infants. Neglecting certain legal obligation will cause serious consequences, and 
punishment may be applied if the gravity of the wrong-doing is high. As many have 
argued, his effort to prove the falsity in the connection between morality and law is 
actually false, because his arguments could not rule out all the possibilities in the 
relationship of morality and law.319 
In another work, Hart used the example of sexual immorality to criticise the 
standing point that “all morality… forms a single seamless web, so that those who 
deviate from any part are likely or perhaps bound to deviate from the whole”.320 In his 
opinion, it is wrong to regard causing damage to social morality as threatening to the 
existence of the society, and it is a mistake to enforce social moral discipline in law. 
However, his argument that was established on sexual morality could not be applied to 
serious crimes like murder, which is undoubtedly a violation of social morality.321 The 
mistake Hart made is that he did not pay attention to the changes in social 
morality.Voluntary sexual activities between adults are becoming more morally 
tolerable in human society, but it does not mean serious crimes can be tolerated too. On 
this point, what Hart opposed in his research was not the link between law and morality, 
but the conservativeness in law making to enforce the social morality without 
considering the necessity to criminalise such immorality. A more accurate statement on 
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the relationship between law (especially criminal law) and morality can be made in this 
way: law and law-making have their roots in moral disciplines of a society; when 
people’s perspective on certain aspects in morality has changed, law shall adjust its 
ideas and rules accordingly.  
Legal moralism focuses on the motivation of people’s actions and then makes 
judgements on the level of evilness. There is a risk in this theory similar to the “de-
individualisation process” in instituting moral standards for the law of humans in which 
the will of individuals might be delegated by a certain small group of persons or 
suppressed by group decisions. Hence, individual may feel detached from the morality 
and less responsible for the wrong-doing. Generally, when achieving and delivering 
justice to individuals, risks may occur in three phases. In the phase of recognising moral 
standards, some top leaders of a group can overstate the common facets in morality and 
thus, individual’s need may not be acknowledged or reflected in law. Admittedly, there 
exist common values among people in a certain society, but detailed understanding to 
specific values could vary. One persuasive example is the extent of the right to express. 
Some topics, especially when they concern religious contents, may draw fierce 
reactions of certain people, but could be totally non-offensive to others. It is necessary 
for law to respect various opinions that are not extremist, thus to cogitate different 
values in morality on which law need to be made. There shall be a carefully considered 
balance between social morality and the private morality in law. 
The second phase is the codification of the moral standards. People might 
commonly believe that some certain conducts in law is not morally acceptable and 
should be brought to justice. However, in the codification of criminal law based on 
certain social morality, the elements of crimes may not be agreed or understood by 
everyone in society. Additionally, people may also have different opinions as to the 
legal thresholds of criminalising relevant acts. Of course, this work shall be given to 




to reflect normal individuals’ anticipation, or at least to avoid severe objections. In the 
third phase, the legal response to crimes, the risk of ignoring individual’s need may 
create the sense of injustice. That is because even if people agree on the question of 
what conducts are crimes and by which criteria law shall recognise those crimes, it may 
still be hard to reach a common agreement on how to treat criminals. Some treatments 
themselves, such as capital punishment and any form of torture, involve moral issues. 
People universally concur that murder is a crime and the legal elements constituting the 
crime of murder are similar. However, the form and harshness of punishment toward it 
differ regionally and temporally. Assertive exercise of the law and the punishment based 
on one culture to people who follow other cultures, under the theory of legal moralism, 
is to enforce moral principles in law blindly. 
The harm principle 
The harm principle is based on an assumption that individuals have the liberty to 
take actions in society and avoid harm for themselves, so that the authorities must offer 
protection to individuals to guarantee their liberty. In his book On Liberty, John Stuart 
Mill notes: 
“That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of 
any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully 
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others, to 
do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for 




entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil 
in case he do otherwise.”322 
In this view, crime must be punished because it causes harm to other people, which 
is a violation of the governmental authority and the requirement for all members in the 
society to behave. In accordance with this principle, people’s actions shall be rational 
to prevent harm for both themselves and for others. On the one hand, people should be 
fully aware of the protected liberty promised by law and seek ways to shield their 
interests from harm. On the other hand, though, it is people’s legal obligation to prevent 
causing harm to other people; therefore, harming others will eventually bring harm to 
the offenders themselves. So for the benefit of every social member, being rational is a 
basic guide for behaviour, as long as the limit of liberty is causing no harm to other 
individuals. The logic for punishment is that since it is every person’s liberty to be free 
from harm caused by others, then the violation to such liberty shall be ended and 
corrected through loss demanded by law. This principle does not only argue for the 
reasons why people utilise punishment as a response to crime, but also shows a way to 
crime prevention by invoking individuals’ fear to loss and pain. Such effect-oriented 
principle has been the subject of some ethical controversies. 
Firstly, if justice is based on the result of harm, can it be justifiable to treat 
variously crimes of different nature that may cause harm of the same type and same 
severity? It seems that the result of the crime -the harm according to harm principle- 
could not suffice alone to decide on how to respond to certain crimes. The harm 
principle links the gravity of the crimes with the actual damage caused by the offender, 
but does not weigh enough the mental factors, which will result in imbalance in 
determining the severity of the punishments given to convicted individuals. 
                                                 




Secondly, it is inaccurate to suppose that certain harm may cause the same 
problems for different persons. Furthermore, one criminal conduct may cause multiple 
effects, which can also be different from person to person. For example, shoplifting 
mainly violates people’s property rights. But in some circumstances, it also has an 
emotional impact on people, such as causing fear or the feeling of insecurity. If that can 
be seen as harm, punishment based on such differences will increase instability in the 
penalty system. Hence, there must be an objective standard for determining the gravity 
of the harm caused by crime. On this point, the way victims feel about the harm done 
to them is not important to law and decision-making in criminal justice. 
Thirdly, when facing victimless crimes, the harm principle may find difficulties to 
endorse its points. The example used most frequently in studying victimless crimes is 
possession of drugs for personal use. Such action seldom causes harm to other people 
except to the drug-users themselves. In theory, according to the harm principle, self-
harming shall not be criminalised because it does not insult others’ liberty. Perhaps one 
can argue that the use of drugs is not rational and that social order may be breached 
because of such actions. But irrationality cannot be used as the necessary connection 
between crime and punishment, nor it may be interpreted as violating social order 
because no other people receive harm from it. 
In spite of many questions remaining in the two theories introduced above, the 
principle of legal moralism and the harm principle constitute the two pillars in the 
modern criminal law system. The principle of legal moralism, which seeks reasons to 
punish crimes on moral disciplines, concentrates on the offenders’ mental elements and 
treats crimes as morally wrong conducts. It contributes to criminal law as the mens rea 
part. The harm principle, in the view of the present study, reflects the part of actus reus 
in criminal law, which measures the objective gravity of criminal conducts and 
consequences. It recognises that one feature of crimes allows criminal law to judge 




It must be admitted that the content of mens rea and actus reus have more legal aspects 
than these two theories. However, their basic ideas and questions arising from them are 
still enlightening in considering those problems that will be discussed in the next 
sections. These two theories have profound influence on the rules of the Rome Statute, 
which may potentially cause a need for many related issues to be discussed in the 
sections that will follow. 
Theories on justice and punishment 
If it may be acceptable to recognise the sense of justice as a natural response to 
crimes committed by others, then there would be no necessity to justify the reasons why 
people incline to “pay back” those criminal offenders. Under this presumption 
executing punishment to crimes is simply a self-vindicated reaction for humans, which 
is not that different from other animals’ behaviour. However, as it must be underlined, 
criminal justice and punishment in human society is not totally comparable with pure 
retaliation, because it reflects the basic moralities of all social members, and supplies a 
sound and stable baseline beyond which actions will be inappropriate or even 
criminalised. Based on the theory of legal moralism and the harm principle, all the 
explanations for imposing penalty to criminal offenders may be concluded in three 
general aims: giving the criminals what they deserve in accordance with the severity of 
the crimes; making the criminals an example to the public to prevent further 
commissions; and when it is necessary, providing assistance for criminals to correct 
their wrongful behaviours. 
Studies based on these three aims have different expectations from criminal justice 
and punishment. Retributivism, which perhaps is the oldest ideology in punishment, 
claims that justice is only about desert. The deterrent theory, which often consults the 
philosophy of Utilitarianism, states that justice should be of preventive function. 




supply education to criminals, so that they will recognise why they were convicted, and 
learn necessary skills to avoid re-offending. These three theories function as the main 
pillars in interpreting the meaning of justice in the criminal justice system, and serve as 
the dominant source in supporting, modifying, or improving punishments pursuant to 
different aims. 
The theory of retributivism 
Retribution may have played the main role in the history of criminal justice, and 
has been the only principle for delivering justice for many hundred years. In some 
ancient codes that had been discovered and wholly or partly deciphered, such as the 
Code of Ur-Nammu and the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, the concept of retribution 
had already been systematically introduced. Retribution in criminal law is based on lex 
talionis, which gives vast importance to mens rea (guilty state of mind) and actus reus 
(guilty act) in judging the criminality of certain conducts. As mens rea and actus reus 
are the two undisputable aspects for elements of crime universally at both domestic and 
international criminal laws, among many other reasons, retributivism is now the 
predominant ideology in viewing criminal justice. 
The concept of “desert” is placed at the centre of the retributivism theory. “Desert” 
firstly relies on the moral responsibility, which bonds all social members so that there 
are shared values and criteria for people to behave with the precondition that every 
social member is equal to another.323 For retributivists, crime should be seen as a 
conduct breaching such moral responsibility and thus causing loss to other people and 
to the whole society. Therefore, criminal offenders must be punished as they failed to 
abide by the obligation to respect other fellow humans equally, which makes the other 
                                                 





people “lower” in value, so that intrinsically rests on the fact that we are all humans.324 
As a consequence of failing the moral responsibility that constitutes crime, punishment 
is imposed to criminal conducts both driven by wicked intention and caused by serious 
omission. 
Retribution is not revenge. The former part of this study has stated that seeking 
revenge stems from a natural reaction of people to criminal conducts that cause loss, 
and ideally directs the same type and level of loss back to the criminal offender. 
Retribution may share a similar origin with revenge, but reflects the will of a society or 
a nation, rather than private desires. In criminal justice, punishment is imposed to 
offenders because they are guilty by legal standards, and such guilt meets the rules set 
in the society, but not because the victim urges so. Through the “de-individualisation” 
process, nations become obliged to protect people from the infliction of crimes. Giving 
deserts to criminals then transforms the nation’s authority to collectively exercise the 
power to punish. Hence, retribution serving as justice requires that “officials have a 
duty to punish deserving offenders and that citizens have a duty to set up and support 
institutions that achieve such punishment”.325 
Retributivism does not establish the severity of punishment without limits. Instead, 
it insists that proportionality should be functioning within desert so that the punishment 
set in criminal law will not turn into revenge in another name by another hand. It means 
that punishment shall not go beyond what the law demands. However, there is hardly 
any entirely convincing argument in clarifying how to decide the desert. One opinion 
cleverly avoids such question by emphasising that the desert is simply commensurate 
in law326; this indicates that the severity of punishment should comfort with the gravity 
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of the crime and with a certain level of “mercy”; the law does not impose on criminals 
exactly the same damage that they have made. As well, law, as this study may infer, 
offers unquestionable rationality since it represents the collective will of the whole 
society. Consequently, the belief that giving criminals what they deserve is the 
incontestable justice, and the way of how to make criminals suffer, as punishment 
appears irrelevant. Retributivism, if being explained in this way, is to make justice and 
punishment become what lawmakers want them to be. 
Deterrence theory 
Deterrence theory in justice has faith in one presumption: it is a part of human 
nature to avoid pain and seek pleasure.327 According to such presumption, punishment 
in criminal law, which stands for pain for anyone who is criminally convicted, will deter 
the criminal from committing a potential crime in the future. Similar to retributivism, 
deterrence theory too develops its arguments from human nature; it also takes into 
consideration what justice could do to criminal offenders, but from another point: how 
punishment should function so as to prevent crime rather than to merely respond to it. 
In other words, the deterrence theory believes that when people are tempted to get 
involved in criminal actions, or not, the fear of punishment will deter them from 
choosing the former. Furthermore, it is the authority’s obligation to guarantee that 
people will not be inclined to commit crime, as Bentham describes: 
“The business of government is to promote the happiness of the society, 
by punishing and rewarding. That part of its business which consists in 
punishing, is more particularly the subject of penal law. In proportion as 
an act tends to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it 
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is pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punishment. What 
happiness consists of we have already seen: enjoyment of pleasures, 
security from pains.”328 
For the proponents of deterrence theory, making criminals suffer from the 
wrongdoing is not the purpose of justice. Rather, it shall only be regarded as an 
approach through which criminal law achieves deterrence. 329  That is to say the 
criminal justice system does not aim at giving criminals punishment. It executes the 
duty to punishment simply for a better future by leading people to be better individuals. 
Justice does not cause equal loss to criminals because loss is an end, but justice shall be 
a new beginning. Otherwise, criminal justice is no better than torment if there is nothing 
more than pain in punishment, and criminal law is but the instrument of cruelty. The 
true and most effective law and justice is, as Cesare Beccaria famously indicated, “that 
everyone would observe and propose while the voice of private interest […] is silent or 
in agreement with the voice of the public interest”.330 As a result, punishment must be 
enforced on behalf of the public interest to fulfil the purpose of justice. The public 
interest is not about causing pain but reducing or ending the committing of crime. 
Deterrence theory highlights the necessity of looking forward to the effect of 
punishment. It upholds that punishment will, and should, prevent future crimes to an 
extent. Or at least, punishment hinders potential criminals to actualise their criminal 
intention. The way to achieve such goal is to escalate the impact of punishment so that 
committing a crime becomes more unattractive. However, though it is understandable 
that pain will keep people from doing certain things, it is very hard to determine how 
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severe punishments should be, established in law for such purpose. Theoretically, the 
higher severity the punishment is set at, the less attractive commission of crime 
becomes. Is it permissible to design punishments without any limitation that the 
suffering for criminals surmounts the damage they caused, for making best use of 
punishment for crime prevention? Pure preventive motivation must be warned because 
it may violate the fundamental value of human rights and dignity, which is widely 
respected in international law as the duty of nations. Indeed, unlimited pain in 
punishment leads to the paradox of the principle of “happiness”, that when the threat of 
punishment becomes over-terrifying for everyone, people would be extremely sensitive 
to all actions they take and will not be able to feel happy at all. The balance between 
deterrent effect and the severity of punishment is the most problematic issue in 
deterrence theory. 
Another problem in deterrence theory is that the reduction rate of crime is hardly 
evident or persuasive. Many studies have revealed that using punishment to achieve 
deterrence may only be able to make limited amelioration to crime statistics; and 
whenever it is believed to attribute to the small amount of crime rate reduction in 
deterrent punishment, there are often non-deterrence reasons for such changes.331 This 
result of empirical research suggests that on the one hand, the potency of the threat in 
punishment to decision-making has been overestimated, and on the other, there are 
more powerful factors pushing people to commit crimes. This suggestion also implies 
that deterrence theory on justice does not truly touch the grounds of crime; punishment, 
no matter how much it is decorated with deterrent elements, lacks the power to be the 
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determinant to refrain people from committing crimes; and as for the non-cruel 
treatment of people, this cannot be the reason for making them consider crime as an 
option in life. 
Crime rehabilitation 
The deterrence theory of justice and punishment is aware of the shortage in the 
traditional view on crime and criminals, and notices that justice should achieve more 
than simply making offenders suffer. If the deterrence theory questions the concept of 
desert, then the rehabilitation theory challenges the very basic function of punishment 
in affecting criminals’ behaviour. 
As the deterrence theory does, criminal rehabilitation also strives to reduce the 
crime rate. Instead of insisting on the impact of punishment as a threat to both criminals 
and other individuals, rehabilitation argues that punishment mainly influences the 
behaviour of those convicted. The convicted have experienced the deprivation of 
freedom, property or other essential rights, and it is relatively difficult for them to bother 
the law-abiding people. So the deterrent effect of punishment on criminals is more 
obvious and tangible if criminals give up committing crime in their life. As evidence 
has shown that a painful experience from punishment could not make criminals better 
persons, advocates of crime rehabilitation attempt to explore more on what criminals 
need, rather than what should criminal justice do to criminals to change their behaviour. 
Several noteworthy studies successfully link the personal factors of criminals that lead 
them to committing a crime. One representative work by Raynor and Robinson 
criticises the idea of making crime less attractive, and applauds the alternative opinion 
of taking away from criminals the desire to commit a crime; they state that 




as the promotion of desistance from offending”.332 
Thence, the rehabilitation theory advances the concern for the need of criminal 
offenders, and argues for more care in criminal justice for them. Rehabilitation theory 
gives answers to both “desert” and “deterrence”; for many external reasons, some 
persons “have” to commit crime for surviving, so that they deserve more resources for 
life than just blame and punishment; because of the difficulties that cannot be overcome 
by the criminals themselves, criminal justice should pay more attention to their personal 
needs to achieve better deterrence.333 Furthermore, supporters of crime rehabilitation 
emphasise the disadvantage of incarceration in formal criminal justice; incarceration 
exacerbates the situations of employability, financial status, social acceptance of 
criminals 334 , and increases the struggles of the criminals’ families as well as the 
community where criminals live.335 In this view, criminal justice should not only rely 
less on punishment, particularly imprisonment, but also it should consider abandoning 
the usage of freedom deprivation. 
The most remarkable issue of the rehabilitation theory is that it does not pay equal 
attention to the victims of crimes. It may be true that the society “owes” criminals some 
level of humane treatment because they were not taken care enough before committing 
the crimes. It may also be true that harsh punishments, by depriving them of the 
necessary resources that had been inadequate for them to survive, will make the 
situation of criminals’ lives worse and consequently force them to reoffend more 
frequently. Admittedly, people shall acquiesce that an individual’s urge to seek 
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“revenge” in criminal cases must be expressed through the formal criminal justice 
procedure. But all the reasons, which affirm the idea that victims should not be in the 
“triangle” structure in modern criminal justice, cannot deny the fact that victims are the 
persons who agonise over the crime directly. If criminals’ need should be a concern to 
criminal justice, so shall the victims’ need. Unfortunately, neither the rehabilitation 
theory, nor retributivism or deterrence seriously contemplates the question of bringing 
qualified consolation to victims. 
 The troubles to achieve the objectives in justice at the ICC 
The crimes falling into the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are 
much more severe than those ordinary crimes in domestic criminal law. Being mindful 
of the fact that establishing legal provisions to prevent and to prosecute international 
crimes is encouraged and sometimes obliged to States 336 , international crimes are 
considered as threatening the safety of humanity as a whole, which at times require 
efforts of States rather than one single State to face. The cases where the ICC is involved 
are more complicated in almost all aspects: the background of the crime, the number of 
people affected, the time scale of the crimes, the spatial influence of the crimes, the 
truth behind the crime, and so on. The special features of international crimes at the 
ICC may also be caused by some reasons behind the crimes, such as root causes of the 
crime, the diversity of culture, and potential risk inside the ICC’s decisions and 
judgements of cases about global security. The nature of the ICC as both an 
international organisation and a court where people seek justice has special effects in 
dealing with international crimes as well. It is an organisation that does not belong to 
either any institution of a sovereign country, such as the High Court in England and 
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Wales for the UK and the Federal Courts for the US. As well, it does not belong to any 
organ of super-national union, like the European Court of Justice for the European 
Union. Therefore, the ICC is independent from any country or international union and 
deals with cases that are very different from domestic cases. But the ICC must comply 
with some universally respected rules, laws, and even certain legal cultures where 
western thoughts predominate. Those specialities play a significant role, which could 
be positive or negative; the existing highly approved principles and theories in criminal 
law and criminal justice are to be applied to international criminal justice, in particular, 
to the work of the ICC. Hence, there must be enough attention paid to those special 
features in order to understand the differences between domestic criminal justice and 
international criminal justice. The possible misunderstanding and underestimation of 
those specialities of international criminal cases will cause, or perhaps have already 
caused many problems to the ICC’s work. 
The penal system at the ICC and the objectives 
The International Criminal Court is organised in conformance to requirements of 
a modern formal criminal justice, following some foundational rules from most of the 
domestic courts. As a result, the penal system at the ICC mainly reflects on the most 
adopted formula of punishments in the world. Article 77 of the Rome Statute establishes 
two major forms of punishment, and it reads as follows: 
1.  Subject to article 110, the Court may impose one of the following 
penalties on a person convicted of a crime referred to in article 5 of this 
Statute:  
(a)  Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed 
a maximum of 30 years; or  




the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. 
2.  In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:  
(a)  A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence;  
(b)  A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or 
indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide 
third parties.  
The legal provisions in the Rome Statute indicate that the penal system is 
predominately guided by the idea of retributivism, because the legal response to 
international crimes is the deprivation of freedom or property. It also includes 
consideration of proportionality such as the maximum level of imprisonment in 
ordinary circumstances and non-inclusion of the death penalty. The principle of 
proportionality is also echoed in article 78 in calculating the joint sentence of the 
convicted; it states that the joint sentence of a convicted person “shall be no less than 
the highest individual sentence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprisonment 
or a sentence of life imprisonment”.337 
The penalties in the Rome Statute are mainly based on retributivism which reflects 
the idea that punishment shall inflict suffering to the convicted criminals. This 
fundamental idea, that punishment at the ICC against the perpetrators of international 
crimes, was not disputed in the Diplomatic Conference in 1998, nor was it questioned 
in drafting the Rome Statute. One noteworthy dispute in the part of the penal system 
involved whether to include death penalty in the Rome Statute,338 which was about the 
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most severe legal response on the basis on retributivism rather than abandon such idea. 
The debates on the maximum level of punishment during the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference finally ended with the conclusion that death penalty should not be included, 
and life imprisonment should be confined to the cases with the most grave aggravating 
elements.339 Overall, during the plenary meetings, the attitude of delegates from all 
States in negotiating the establishment of the ICC on the response to perpetrators of 
international crimes was that they must not go unpunished,340 as is reconfirmed in the 
Preamble of the Rome Statute. However, in the statements made by the delegates of 
Canada and of Azerbaijan in the 2nd and 5th plenary meeting respectively, there were 
the following mentions: “[the establishment of the ICC] would help to end cycles of 
impunity and retribution”341 and that “the objective of the Court was justice rather than 
retribution”342. Given the circumstances that none of the States objected to the idea of 
retributivism during the whole conference, their statement above shall be understood as 
follows: that the ICC should achieve much more than just punishing perpetrators of 
international crimes. The evidence was that neither the delegates nor the States they 
represented evinced negative opinion to the statement of the President in the 1st Plenary 
Meeting: 
“The establishment of an international criminal court would send the 
unmistakable message to all those responsible for abominable crimes 
that they could no longer act with impunity and that they would be 
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brought to justice. It would make it clear that no one was above the law 
and that anyone seen as bearing individual criminal responsibility for 
such atrocities would be punished.”343 
While the idea of retributivism was not contested during the establishment of the 
ICC and the making of the Rome Statute, the impact of deterrence was also highlighted 
on almost all occasions. In fact, the deterrent effect of penalty was highly rated by many 
delegates in the negotiation process. For example, the delegate of the Republic of Korea 
said that “[b]ringing to justice the perpetrators of crimes of international concern would 
serve as an effective deterrent.”344 Such opinion resonated among delegates of many 
States and international organisations, including but not limited to, Afghanistan, Austria, 
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Madagascar, Romania, Samoa, 
Senegal, Turkey, United Arabic Emirates, and the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, and the Observers for institutes like the Council of Europe, the European Court 
of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Peace Centre, the Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom. 
Furthermore, in the dispute on whether to include the death penalty as an 
applicable punishment for those perpetrators of international crimes, it brought the 
deterrent effect of the punishment at the ICC to another dimension. One supporter of 
employing the death penalty in the Rome Statute argued that non-inclusion of the death 
penalty would leave an “ambiguous message, which its absence sent in relation to the 
gravity of the crimes within the Court's jurisdiction, especially in parts of the world 
where the deprivation of liberty was not an adequate deterrent”. 345  The possible 
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powerlessness in deterrence of the ICC without the death penalty turned out to be a 
serious concern for some Delegates during the negotiations. Some countries even 
refused to vote for the adoption of the Rome Statute because of that, saying that the 
political influence of not including death penalty in the Rome Statute would undermine 
their domestic legislation.346 There were also many States where death penalty was still 
applicable in domestic legislation supported to exclude death penalty, suggesting that 
the deterrent effect of international criminal justice does not rely on death penalty.347 
Nevertheless, the States that advocated to include capital punishment in the Rome 
Statue did miss the point that the severity of punishment is not the key to deter 
international crimes in future, and the lack of death penalty was not the cause for the 
perpetrators to commit the most serious crimes for humanity. To achieve the objective 
of deterrence in international criminal justice, the ICC must recognise the real 
complexities in balancing different values in justice at the ICC and the overall 
favourability to human rights protection and humanitarianism, but shall not anticipate 
that harsh treatment to convicted criminals would be important to the deterrent effect. 
The general reliance on retribution and deterrence of punishment at the ICC is also 
seen in its case law. In the Katanga case, the Trial Chamber II signified the two 
prominent roles of the sentence: 
“[O]n the one hand, punishment, or the expression of society’s 
condemnation of the criminal act and of the person who committed it 
[…]; and, on the other hand, deterrence, the aim of which is to deflect 
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those planning to commit similar crimes from their purpose.”348 
Such formulation has been accentuated in some subsequent cases as well, constituting 
a constant attitude to the belief in retribution and deterrence.349 Hence, the values of 
retribution and deterrence for the ICC are peculiarly unshakeable in achieving justice. 
Rehabilitation for perpetrators is not explicated in the Rome Statute. In drafting 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Preparatory Committee received 
proposals on the issue of whether to hold a pre-sentencing hearing to decide the 
possibility of imposing rehabilitation,350 and of designating a State by the International 
Criminal Court as the proper place for social rehabilitation.351 However, in regarding 
the context, the meaning of rehabilitation should be interpreted as the reconciliation 
with victims and the affected community, rather than the treatment and care for 
perpetrators. Although in the commentaries of the International Law Commission onto 
the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, it was confirmed that the Court 
should consider the necessity to promote rehabilitation under the spirit of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, criminal rehabilitations 
may be applied to juvenile offenders only, 352  which mainly rely on each State’s 
domestic process but not the work of the ICC. 
As a comparison, the use of rehabilitation is recommended to the reparations of 
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victims. Article 75(1) of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Court can order the 
convicted persons to offer certain forms of reparations to victims, such as restitution, 
compensation, and rehabilitation.353 This article authorises the ICC to initiate legal 
procedures for victim reparation when it is possible and necessary, but does not enable 
criminal rehabilitation for the convicted persons. This arrangement in the Rome Statute 
implicationally claims that the personal characteristics of perpetrators in alleged crimes 
will not be a concern for introducing alternative treatment thereto. Instead, those 
personal circumstances are scrutinised as factors in aggravating or mitigating sentences, 
not as evidence to apply rehabilitation for the convicted persons.354 The attitude as such 
had been decided in the negotiations of establishing the ICC. It was evident that 
rehabilitative methods were not going to be included in the Rome Statute although 
many NGOs had proposed the rehabilitative approaches to be used for the convicted, 
especially for the under-aged. 355 The salient care of victims that goes beyond the 
limitation of the three main theories on justice and punishment, namely, retributivism 
theory, deterrence theory, and crime rehabilitation, prepared the ICC for a good 
initiation to consider restorative justice. However, the reparation mechanism to victims 
at the ICC, which was at times highlighted as restorative justice, may have been the 
cause of some unexpected problems, which will be analysed in the following sections. 
The objectives to punish in international criminal justice, retribution, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation, has been reviewed in academy356 However, the way to achieve these 
objectives is difficult to be concluded. The combination of the retribution against 
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perpetrators of international crimes and the deterrence to future crimes with the 
rehabilitation to victims and the affected community, which formulates a triangle 
structure in the penal system in the Rome Statute, has indicated the anticipation of 
international community to the ICC. The anticipation, though may be a little ambitious, 
is that through the punishment inflicted upon the perpetrators, the potential perpetrators 
can reconsider their acts in future, and victims as well as the community can feel 
released. It must be pointed out that the punishment alone, which closely links the pain 
that the convicted persons may receive, cannot achieve those three objectives. The 
ICC’s primary purposes of beaconing retribution, maximising deterrence and healing 
the damage are challenged by some features of international crimes, shading the impact 
of the Court, marginalising its role, and somehow being detrimental to its work. Those 
issues are more crucial for the ICC since the flaw or failure to achieve such objectives 
contaminates the very core functions of the Court. 
The complicated background of international crimes 
In domestic criminal cases, the background of a crime often includes personal 
information of the criminal, social influences, and sometimes, situational 
perspectives.357 A criminal’s personality, the relationship with the victim, the economic 
situation, and so many other factors are examined during the police investigation and 
prosecution process in order to clarify the dangerousness of the offender. Relevant 
social influences on the offender’s conducts are also important in criminal procedure 
because they are related to the offender’s criminal responsibility. For criminologists, 
crimes are usually more than the prohibited activities by law. Rather, they can be seen 
as a violation of social morality, as a consequence of conflicts between social classes, 
as an outcome of a poor economic status, or simply as harm to the interests of the whole 
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International criminal cases, however, normally have complicated historical 
reasons. For most of the civil wars in Africa, violence and conflicts are a result of post-
colonial governance. One instance, inter alia, is the serial violence in Kenya. Kenya 
used to be a colony of the British Empire. Like what happened in many colonies, the 
colonisers often initiated their influence by occupying land from indigenous people. 
The occupation of land would normally bring about mass violence and crucial damage 
to the life and economy of the local indigenous populations, involving taking lands 
from local people and redistributing it to new-coming settlers. After the British Empire 
decided to end its colonisation of Kenya, which meant most of the former settlers should 
return the lands to the indigenous people, the land-allocation issues were not peacefully 
resolved but were left to their successors. The deprivation of land caused imbalance and 
financial crisis for the original owners, and weakened their living conditions in contrast 
to other peers in society.359 The injustice and grief of the land policy that was caused 
by colonialism was believed to be an “important underlying factor” in the post-election 
violence in Kenya between 2007 and 2008, according to the Kenyan national 
investigation of these human rights violations.360 As well, an unsatisfying solution of 
crimes and violence, caused by political corruption and biases, in particular the fact that 
some violence leaders went unpunished and even grasped the throne of power, has made 
all political parties and normal people believe that violence might be the most, if not 
the only, reliable means of survival. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) upheld this opinion in its report, and further noticed that the 
dispute over the rights of land foreshadowed recurrent violence and pre-existing 
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violations of social and economic rights to the local people.361 
The complicated background of international crimes leaves the following question 
to the ICC: “who don’t deserve punishment”, rather than “who deserve”. The Truth, 
Justice, and Reconciliation Commission Report (TJRC Report) of Kenya, for example, 
listed the violence and cruelty in four stages: The British colonial era (1895–1963), the 
presidency of Jomo Kenyatta (1963–1978), the presidency of Daniel Arap Moi (1978–
2002), and the presidency of Mwai Kibaki (2002–2008). In each of these stages, there 
were different parties that should be taking specific responsibility.362 In regard to such 
conclusion, the violence between 2007 and 2008 in Kenya might be just the 
continuation of the chaos in history. Therefore, prosecuting the ruling persons who were 
responsible to the recent violence does not provide retribution since it answers nothing 
to the crimes in the past. It must admit that taking responsibilities of all the perpetrators 
in history is unrealistic, especially considering the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC. But 
it does not mean that clarifying the historical reasons for the recent violence is useless. 
In fact, historical examination of the international crimes makes the decisions of the 
ICC more acceptable and persuasive to both the perpetrators and the local people. 
The issues in Kenya are fairly representative of the whole situation of Africa, to 
which the ICC has mainly paid attention. Beyond the issues of Kenya, historical reasons 
in African situations have created numerous problems, which have become the root 
causes of conflicts in Africa. The root causes behind those issues differ from one 
country to another, and render different consequences. The conflicts in African 
countries may be caused by political struggles during post-independence time, or by 
the pain in the period of democratic transitions, or by claims over valuable economic 
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resources such as oil, diamonds, and drugs, or simply by the existence of sporadic local 
powers that do not willingly accept governmental authorities. 363  The complicated 
background of international crimes makes it very difficult to apply one commonly 
accepted idea on justice or the means to deliver justice among so many countries. 
The deterrence at the ICC will not be functioning well under a complicated 
background of atrocities. The threat of being punished will not deter the potential crimes 
as expected. Partly, it is because of the difficulty to identify who deserves punishment 
and to clarify the grounds for the proper punishment; mainly, it is because penalties 
could not make any positive changes to those root causes of the past and the present. 
On the one hand, the urges for advances in political power and economic bonus drives 
those “candidates to power” far from any consideration of “well-being” of the others; 
at times, the greed for their own interests overwhelms the unattractiveness of 
punishment. In Kenya’s example, despite the fact that the ICC has ambitiously initiated 
the cases and charged the high-ranking persons, it has failed to convict anyone. The 
respectful fear to the ICC and its punishment may not constitute a real problem for the 
potential perpetrators who have enough power. These crucial facts have displayed to 
the world how the ICC’s authoritativeness has been discounted. On the other hand, 
similar to the fact that the ICC could not and should not wrap all possible criminals into 
retributive responses, prosecuting and threating to punish some of these selected figures 
at the ICC is hardly a deterrence. Like what has already been analysed above, the 
primary importance for Kenya and all other States, which have been suffering long and 
vast conflicts, is to establish a government of credibility and capability to fairly “deliver 
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the type of public expenditure”364. This requires stable circumstances for officials to 
execute their obligations with a certain level of effective external monitoring other than 
isolating themselves from governmental duties for pursuing the ICC’s procedures. This 
may sound unfair comparing with the crimes in which they might have involved, but it 
is a productive solution. 
It is important to create stable environment in politics to suppress violence, thus 
to deter the possible international crimes more effectively. In many cases, the method 
of violence is simply manipulated for the desire of political power; the desire for 
political power eventually serves for economic benefits of the ruling persons, according 
to some empirical studies on civil wars.365 If that is correct, then imprisoning those 
perpetrators who are in control of power of a State could not be even deterrent at all to 
international crimes. Because by holding them apart from power, the ICC may create 
more opportunities for more ruthless perpetrators to take political positions through 
violence. The experience in transitional justice has told the lesson that criminal 
prosecution against the perpetrators of serious human rights violation usually fails if 
there is not a peaceful environment. If the punishment against the perpetrators cannot 
reflect the whole picture of violence history, retribution may become biased and less 
helpful to decrease the tension between different groups. And if the punishment at the 
ICC cannot decrease such tension, the deterrent effect that the Court aims at may not 
be more than just words. The complicated background of international crimes demands 
that the ICC shall very carefully contemplate the consequences of its decisions. The 
deprivation of the freedom of the perpetrators may be a custom in criminal law, but may 
not result in positive outcomes. 
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The difficulty in delivering condemnation 
There are several similarities in dealing with both international criminal cases and 
domestic criminal cases; for instance, the principle of non-retroactivity and ne bis in 
idem must be followed at both levels. In trying criminal offenders in domestic courts, a 
stable social environment plays a very significant role. For example, at domestic level, 
criminal cases are about criminal offences and loss between individuals, rather than 
between groups of people or between ethnicities. Furthermore, there rarely exist 
complex historical issues in domestic criminal crimes, which requires national 
reconciliation to re-address. Criminals could have a very twisted life in childhood, 
which is believed to be an inductive factor to committing crimes among youth and 
adults.366 
However, a very serious criminal case may leave shocking impressions for people 
in a society for a short period of time, but it would seldom threaten the foundation of a 
government or, cause the whole society disordered. Relatively simple grounds of crimes 
make the process of delivering justice easier at the national level, especially when the 
society of the nation is stable and organised and in good order. Usually criminals are at 
the opposite side to the whole society’s values and traditions. Ordinary crimes cause 
harms that remain between individuals. But the conflicting parties in international 
criminal cases are often tribes, groups, regions, or even States. In reality, people 
belonging to different groups may use the excuse of defending their own interests to 
testify the self-righteousness in their criminal acts, and refuse to acknowledge the fact 
that such righteousness had caused great pain to others. It is not easy to make the 
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perpetrators accept the wrongness of their acts and feel sympathetic to the victims 
through pure punishment. It requires the ICC to reconsider its methods in order to 
establish the condemn-ability within the crimes and deliver the right message to people. 
A feature of international crimes of vast human rights violations and humanitarian 
crises is that they often involve different factions, which are mutually hostile for reasons 
of eagerness for political privileges and hunger for economic advantages. This was 
witnessed again in the situation of Kenya. The post-election violence in Kenya between 
2007 and 2008 was attributed to the alleged electoral manipulation, which simply up-
roused another political contest as occurred in many other political elections before. 
Studies have noted that political contests and social tensions appear inevitable since 
whoever successfully seizes power will enjoy immense political and economic benefits, 
and even impunity from directly or indirectly committing crimes.367 The presidential 
candidates were backed by their followers, so that they joined the election not only for 
their personal benefits but also for the group’s interests. Some participants in this post-
election violence clearly belonged to one of the most powerful parties in the election. 
Those who inclined or refused to accept the electoral result labelled people pursuant to 
which group they supported. Hence, the concept of “us” and “others” was created in 
order to give excuse to the conflict, which is often seen in fights between mafias. 
Surveys also discovered that the violence went beyond the disputes between 
different political parties, and extended to several ethnical military groups where 
soldiers were required combat training and loyalty pledging. The consequence of such 
distinction generated a special pattern of responsibility among those participants in 
violence, which was detached from social moral principles but highly attached to group 
mentality. Each group is responsible to all of its members, and every member was 
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required to take group interests as the primary principles. Thus, the participants of 
violence, either belonging to a political group or to an ethnic group, felt a very limited 
level of guilt when committing serious crimes to other group members. They were, 
according to the opinion of some studies, the achievers of the group’s will.368 As a 
result, they did not easily respect the legitimacy of the justice delivered from courts and 
which were organised by “others”; nor did they accept condemnations from the 
international community. The most effective and efficient way to fully transmit the 
sense of justice and the feelings of guilt is to make them realise the wrongness in the 
ideology of the group and their responsibility toward all the others. 
As an outsider, the International Criminal Court is not going to be recognised as 
an entity to deliver “internal justice” to those perpetrators, and therefore the punishment 
at the ICC will not be respected as a fine solution. That is probably a critical issue for 
the ICC’s decisions and judgements that cannot be accepted easily. At domestic level, 
the court, as an independent institution it may consider the legal facets, evidence, and 
accordingly to make fairly trusted judgements; it owns the basic faith among the 
stakeholders and most of the people who are in the territory where such courts are 
located, as described in Lon Fuller’s study.369 But such a condition may appear absent 
from the ICC because it is not established on the local culture or tradition; it is not 
deemed as a local legal authority, which practices with local values, and cannot deliver 
condemnation to those serious international crimes by representing the groups for 
which those perpetrators fought. The distance between the ICC and both the 
perpetrators and victims makes pure punishment from the ICC merely a tool that shows 
to the world that such international institution is still functioning, but is not held as a 
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symbol for confirming the wrongness of those crimes and the ideas behind them. Thus, 
the punishment, as a form of justice at the ICC, upon the persons who are either under 
investigation, prosecution, or conviction has limited impact in delivering the sense of 
justice. 
The punishment coming from the ICC has great difficulty in playing an effective 
role in repairing the damaged social relationships or in achieving reconciliation. The 
justice at the ICC is not able to holistically ponder the historical background of crimes. 
Rather, it focuses on the restricted temporal scale based on the alleged crimes, 
demanded by both the jurisdiction ratione temporis 370  and the principle of non-
retroactivity371. In theory and reality, the court will not delve into more details in history 
than the information relevant to the criminal charges. For example, in the Ruto and 
Sang case the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC examined some relevant evidence, but 
prior to the alleged crimes, whether the attacks on civilian population that amounted to 
crime against humanity were organised through a previous plan.372 
However, the scope of evidence, including the “facts and circumstances 
underlying the alleged crime as well as their legal characterisation ”, examined by the 
Pre-Chamber II, had the purpose to “clarify its understanding with respect to the nature 
of such decision as setting the factual subject matter of the trial”.373 From a legal point 
of view, such practice is fully correct under the principle of the rule of law. But the 
sensitivity to legalism, as to what had been done during the post-election time and 
whether those conducts constituted international crimes that fall into the jurisdiction of 
the ICC, may also make the ICC an institution which pays little attention to the root 
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causes of international crimes and whose legal practices may potentially undermine the 
chance to solve the inter-ethnical tensions throughout history. 
In Kenya, for example, the corruption in the political system, impunity among 
criminal offenders, the economic imbalance between the rich and the poor, the long-
lasting prejudice and hatred between tribes, were all present in the form of unrest 
conflict based on political and ethnical identity difference. 374 But the ICC is only 
capable of dealing with the superficial causes, though the Prosecutor had carefully 
investigated and prosecuted all political sides to avoid bias. The incapability of the ICC 
under the current legal framework and ideas left the situation continuously vulnerable 
to those very reasons, which may cause further violence; the damaged social 
relationships were not restored, and inter-trust between citizens and the government and 
mutual respect between ethnical groups remained un-rebuilt. The risk of violence was 
not only a hypothesis but it became a reality as the violence prior to the 2013 election 
in Kenya, which was caused by almost the same root causes as those in the post-election 
violence between 2007 and 2008, according to the observation of Human Rights 
Watch375. The fear of violence aroused by the political elections in Kenya continues to 
be a concern to the international community as a threat to local security and human 
rights protection in 2017, which, as this study argues, results from the unresolved 
abovementioned root causes. 
On both the purpose of the delivering of justice and of restoring damaged social 
relationships, the ICC seems to be struggling. There is always a perplexity to the ICC’s 
work when more than one military faction has committed atrocities; if the ICC chooses 
to deal with only the criminal conducts by the power opposed to the government in 
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question, as was seen in the situation of Uganda, then the ICC is confined by political 
considerations and becomes the “ally” to the evil government; if the ICC steadily 
charges the governmental officials, especially the top leaders, then it will gain no 
cooperation and be criticised as being biased and contributing to the escalating of the 
crisis; this was the complaint of the Sudanese government. When the main political 
parties are in control of the military and enjoy full political support, such as the situation 
in Kenya, the ICC’s ambition to try all the involving persons in power, could possibly 
go in vain. Since justice from the ICC will not easily be accepted and respected by any 
of the tried individuals and the supporting power behind them, there remains a 
continuing conflict in court. The difference could be that in warfare the conflict is 
fought with weapons, whereas in the court it is fought with verbal disputes. Un-
respected justice will unlikely deter crimes. Thus, the deterrent effect of justice at the 
ICC is worthy of being questioned. 
International criminal justice and cultural diversity 
The difficulty to achieve effective retribution and deterrence in international 
criminal cases at the ICC can also be caused by cultural diversities. This phenomenon 
has created noteworthy problems to criminal justice proceedings. Decades ago, when 
the US Institute of Justice analysed the results in a victimisation survey, the extreme 
low rate of immigrant victims reporting certain kind of crimes, such as domestic 
violence, was disclosed, which was then attributed to some cultural differences in 
viewing crime.376 The question on how to deal with such differences becomes an 
urgent issue for lawmakers and law-enforcers. 
Diversity indicates that similar things may mean or be viewed differently between 
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people who do not hold the same values. It causes various reactions of people toward 
certain incidents, hence, may make people draw distinctive or even opposite 
conclusions on the same thing. The recognition and respect for cultural differences, 
without any doubt, ensures for everyone an equal level of caring regardless the 
identities deriving from specific backgrounds. The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), cherishes the value of cultural 
diversity as being guaranteed by human rights law. 377  Cultural diversity, unlike 
diversity between persons, is shaped by certain traditions and values that are commonly 
by people in a group. It is one of the decisive aspects that influence people’s opinion 
on the right and the wrong, which forms the view of justice. Justice that is based on the 
respect of specific culture is easier to be accepted by the people who feel familiar with 
such culture. Therefore, the effectiveness of justice for people must take culture 
diversity in consideration. The justice that is designed on unfamiliar cultural factors 
may not reach the desired goal. If such justice is forced onto the participants of the 
justice process, it will cause much weaker effects. 
Some studies in minorities in formal criminal courts discover many uneasy 
issues.378 The first challenge is the linguistic barrier. In modern criminal courts, if any 
participants of the proceedings find it difficult to understand the meaning of language 
before the court, certain legal assistance will be offered. However, the real problem is 
not the translation, but the accuracy of cognising the concepts, values, and spirits 
therein. When people who do not originally see themselves as members of the western 
culture, which is the dominant culture in organising courts of justice, they will express 
a strong negative attitude towards such form of justice, and then receive similar 
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negativity from the court and law. 
Secondly, the refusal to acknowledge some special cultural traditions relating to 
the sense of justice by the court through making judgements or legal decisions will 
elevate the conflict of understanding between cultures to a higher level; the “cultural 
outsiders” could transfer issues in single cases to the national policies, then believe that 
they are “targeted” and their culture is “criminalised”. Third, when punishments, as a 
response to “wrongness” in law, are not able to match the anticipations of a particular 
culture, the legitimacy of the court and rigorousness of justice will be heavily crippled. 
If the spiral of culture ignorance continues in the formal justice procedure, the gap in 
the meaning of justice between law and minority people will become more widened 
through every case judged. 
The relationship between culture and justice can be concluded as a circle. Culture 
provides intellectual pillars for people who are in its regime. When an unfamiliar form 
of justice replaces the well-constructed culture in a group or society, problems in the 
conflict of concept will stand out. Justice without acknowledging cultural difference 
firstly challenges the identities of certain groups of people, enforces them to take 
punishment regulated by law as the final consequence to offenders, answers to victims, 
and offers solutions that may harm a community. The desert may not be something 
offenders truly deserve. 
Furthermore, because the denied cultural tradition by the courts can in turn be 
utilised by perpetrators as a defence to deny the charges, the deterrent effect of 
punishment in formal criminal justice for those who insist in their own cultural believes 
would be very limited. The analysis in earlier parts of this chapter has pointed to some 
reasons why the ICC’s justice may and will be fragile if it is to signify desert or deter 
culprit; it hardly touches the root causes of international crimes, struggles to deliver 




international crimes. The conclusion in fact indicates that according to the deterrence 
theory, the power or threat of punishment at the ICC is not that potential as people could 
have thought. If the power of threat in punishment is not reliable for the ICC, there must 
be other directions for accomplishing its ambition to deter. 
One suggestion is that the ICC should focus on improving the certainty in 
imposing punishment in order to ensure the effect of deterrence.379 But such studies 
also listed numerous complexities for the ICC to guarantee certainty, especially when 
it gains little support of the UN Security Council or faces relatively more powerful 
counties. The point is, since the threat from the ICC is not “frightening” enough, it may 
have to abandon the motive of the threat. Instead, some studies opine, the ICC needs to 
seek possibilities of satisfying deterrence from threatening to persuading, and “should 
aim their denunciatory judgments at strengthening a sense of accountability for 
international crimes by exposure and stigmatization of these extreme forms of 
inhumanity”.380 
But considering the current legal frame of the ICC and relevant principles, it is 
almost impossible to imagine that the ICC would become “softened” and take up the 
role of a moral instructor. The ICC may have failed in achieving many goals, however, 
it is the only permanent court of criminal justice in the world insofar, and as Cherif 
Bassiouni avowed, “[c]ompromise is the art of politics, not of justice”.381 It is true that 
if the ICC starts to negotiate with perpetrators of international crimes it will lose the 
role as a permanent court to deal with international crimes. After all, the ICC has vowed 
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that international crime perpetration will not “go unpunished”. 
Then the legal response of the ICC to the most serious crimes must be made more 
acceptable. The difficulty of achieving this goal is that at the ICC there shall only be 
one system of justice which lacks the capability to reflect other cultural thoughts. For 
example, when almost everyone denounced the usage of children into military services, 
many have also underlined some cultural facts in identifying “child”: 
“In contrast to developed nations, many cultures define individuals as 
adults if they have participated in the culturally appropriate rites of 
passage. Developmental science has tended to embrace a universal 
model of childhood and to overlook the fact that ‘the child’ is a socially 
constructed idealization that reflects the values and agendas of 
particular researchers, cultures, and traditions.”382 
Such difference is not to be used as justification of conscripting child soldiers in the 
military. Lacking certain knowledge of human rights law cannot be the ground for 
excluding responsibility.383 Besides, both Lubanga and Katanga in the situation of 
DRC argued their contribution to disarm and demobilise children from military forces, 
implying that they did realise that conscripting and enlisting child soldiers is a violation 
of international law. However, the issue is that using the threshold of certain to identify 
a child was somehow convenient for the ICC, but it did not apply to local people. The 
former child soldiers faced extreme difficulties reintegrating to the community because 
their identity was that of a perpetrator to those who suffered in the civil war. Often, in 
contrast to the attitude of the ICC, former child soldiers were deemed as extremely 
dangerous because they were even more fearful than adult soldiers.384 Whether the 
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former soldiers are children or not does not really matter under such circumstances 
where child soldiers’ pain and trauma continue after they were rescued and “purified” 
by the legal judgements of the ICC. 
That is a simple example of issues brought by of how to identify a child between 
international law and local culture in the situation of DRC. When facing so many 
countries with highly diverse cultures around the world, the simplified response at the 
ICC, namely imprisonment and fine, cannot provide a totally satisfying answer. The 
key issue is that the ICC is not able to represent any specific culture, nor is equipped 
with any single culture that unifies all the others. In formal criminal justice, punishment 
is repressive and depriving, and focuses on causing loss to crime perpetrators with 
explanations to why causing pain to criminal offenders by law makes things right. But 
punishment has failed to justify itself for making things right again. It is analogous to 
fighting against Leviathan without Poseidon’s mighty trident, which may only hurt one 
of the monster’s heads instead of all. The ICC needs flexibility in its legal proceedings 
to address the diversity in cultural perspectives. 
The gravity of criminal consequences 
International crimes often cause more severe consequences than ordinary crimes. 
The violence in Kenya between 2007 to 2008 affected six of the eight Kenyan Provinces; 
it caused a large scale of human rights violations, including “reported 1,133 to 1,220 
killings of civilians, more than nine hundred documented acts of rape and other forms 
of sexual violence, with many more unreported, the internal displacement of 350,000 
persons, and 3,561 reported acts causing serious injury”. 385  The nature of crimes 
committed against those victims was vicious. In the investigation by the Office of the 
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Prosecutor, body mutilation of victims, brutal killings such as burning people alive, 
widespread sexual violence including gang rape, large numbers of population suffering 
deportation and forcible transfers, and so on, were the most recognisable 
perpetrations.386 The length of the crimes being committed, the number of victims, the 
wide territorial effect, and the brutality of the crimes in Kenya’s situation are the 
distinguishing features that have astonished the international community, 
notwithstanding the fact that this case is just one piece of the whole picture of the 
atrocities. 
On the other side of Kenya, around Lake Victoria, great tragedies also beclouded 
human rights values and human conscience. Burundi, like many other African counties, 
has been suffering long-lasting violence and mass killings. The notorious massacre of 
citizens, mainly against Hutus, committed by the local government at that time in 1972 
caused approximately 100,000 people killed. After the political and ethnical struggling 
for years, in 1993, the first multi-party election took place in Burundi. Mr. Melchior 
Ndadaye won about 63 per cent of the votes and became the first president through a 
democratic path. But the democracy did not bring peace for long. In late 1993, Ndadaye 
was killed in a failed coup d’état by renegade troops of the Tutsi-dominated army before 
the breaking-out of the Rwandan Genocide, which caused at minimum 50,000 people 
killed in its aftermath.387 The situation of Burundi is still on-going; the process of 
Investigation, where the Prosecution of the ICC concentrates on investigating and 
collecting evidence relating to the violence between 2015 and 2017, still goes on. In the 
report of the Prosecutor we read that the pre-election protest against the then and current 
President and the ruling party aggravated from being peaceful to violent since the 
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governmental security force upgraded the repression. 388  The aftermath of the 
repression resulted to a more serious police brutality and occurrence of abuses. The 
Prosecutor estimated that “more than 430 persons were reportedly killed, at least 3,400 
people have been arrested and over 230,000 Burundians forced to seek refuge in 
neighbouring countries” 389 . The UN Human Rights Council revealed that: 
“extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, 
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and sexual violence in Burundi since 
April 2015”. This has “entailed serious physical and psychological trauma for the 
victims”.390 The assessment of the gravity of human rights violations and inhumane 
acts in this situation may have reached the level of international crimes. 
The long-lasting conflict and violence in the Lake Region of Africa, including 
inter-state warfare, transnational combat, and cross-border non-governmental armed 
forces, shadows the security and stability of the whole area, and has turned this region 
into one of the most dangerous places in the world. The special geo-political feature 
and political environment of this region, the countries in which include Rwanda, 
Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Republic of Congo, Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, Kenya and Sudan, 
facilitate violence to be transmitted through these countries very easily. As a result, 
most of the violence and several human rights violations have influenced many 
countries in the meantime, and created even more tensions among them. 
The violence in this area is structured and widespread because it involves combats 
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between both governmental armies and rebel groups. The genocide in Rwanda can be 
used as an example to indicate the brutality of crimes. The Rwandan genocide is 
considered to be the most notorious systematic human rights violation after the Second 
World War, and probably the best-known genocide case after the Holocaust. In the case 
of the Prosecutor v Akayesu, Jean Paul Akayesu was charged with being responsible 
for killing, beating, mutilating, and committing other inhumane treatments of thousands 
of people, which resulted in at least 2000 killed.391 In the testimony of one witness, it 
is stated that the number of people who were killed was so tremendous that “the entire 
landscape was becoming spotted with corpses, with bodies, all the way from there, until 
almost Burundi’s border”. 392  The United Nations revealed that even though the 
Rwandan genocide resulted in approximately one million people killed and more than 
150 thousand women raped, many governmental officials and soldiers fled in to the 
territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and eventually directed the war 
between Rwanda and DRC in 1996.393 As the conflicts in Rwanda took place, the civil 
war continued in the whole area; it is hard to draw a conclusion on the number of 
casualties, injuries, and other crimes against victims, caused by the violence in Rwanda 
during and after the genocide, particularly if considering the total cost of warfare in the 
first Congo War. 
The examples above provide a glance of the gravity of international crimes. The 
violence which may constitute international crime affects the life of a huge number of 
people, causing serious physical damage and property loss. Unlike a single criminal 
case, international crimes are usually committed by certain groups in which personal 
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criminal acts are influenced and even encouraged by others, making it easier for the 
perpetrators to lose their rationality in taking action and sympathy to others’ feeling. It 
creates the tendency to commit crime in a society, and makes specific groups of people 
extremely vulnerable to violence. This is not a feature only shared by the situations at 
the ICC, but also seen in the situations at the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and other ad hoc 
international tribunals. Such feature may have brought some challenges to the formal 
justice at the ICC: It may not achieve retribution and deterrence while cogitating the 
need of victim by taking criminal responsibility of several key perpetrators, in the 
context of the high severity of the crimes; the legal response to the convicted persons 
at the ICC is not usually reparative to victims, because the damage is too serious to be 
repaired by the convicted persons’ pain; the incapability of the penal system at the ICC 
to bring adequate justice for victims, perpetrators, and the affected communities is not 
caused by the gravity of the legal punishment, but by the reality that punishing cannot 
restore the loss of people who suffered from international crimes. 
The severity of conducts in international crimes does not only lie in the result, but 
also in its nature of roots. For example, the crime of genocide does not necessarily 
involve a great number of killings, but must be driven by the intention to eradicate 
completely a certain group of people. In the case law of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the crime of genocide must be regarded as intending “to 
kill persons on a massive scale or to subject a large number of people to conditions of 
living that would lead to their death in a widespread or systematic manner”.394 But the 
requirement as “a massive scale” or “a large number” must be considered in the context 
of the whole population, which means they are relative criteria. Otherwise it would be 
extremely unfair to those minority people who consist of small amounts of population. 
Therefore, there are two sides of severity in international crimes: objectively, it reaches 
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a certain level of damage or destruction in regard to the number of people, the time 
length of crime, and the territorial influence; subjectively, it is so vicious that it damages 
the fundamental conscience of a human society. 
Professor Schabas has examined the feature of international crimes falling in the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, comparing them with transnational crimes, and implicitly 
suggests that: “the perpetration [of international crimes] is viewed as naturally or 
inherently evil”.395 He also indicates that the nature of international crimes has been 
stipulated in the Preamble of the Rome Statute and that the difference between ordinary 
crimes and international crimes rests on that the latter is “unimaginable atrocities”.396 
If international crimes are the deepest heinousness for humanity, then penalties in 
the Rome Statute based on retributivism and deterrence may appear imbalanced. 
According to retributivism, the most-wicked criminals deserve the most severe 
punishment. However, the criteria to decide the severity of punishment for criminals 
may not be stable. For example, Mr Lubanga in the situation of DRC was convicted for 
war crimes of conscripting and enlisting child soldiers under the age of 15, though 
Lubanga could have been responsible for more serious crimes. In the Sentencing 
Decision of the Lubanga case, the Trial Chamber I passed 14-year imprisonment to 
Lubanga, and declared that 
“The crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 
fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities are 
undoubtedly very serious crimes that affect the international community 
as a whole. […] The crime of using children to participate actively in 
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hostilities involves exposing them to real danger as potential targets.”397 
Both the Prosecutor and Lubanga appealed the sentence, which was rejected by the 
Appeals Chamber.398 From this view, involving children under 15 years old is severe 
enough to reach the level of international crimes. However, the sentence of 14-year 
imprisonment cannot distinguish such nature from domestic crimes. In some non-
international crimes, such as human trafficking and transnational drug dealing, children 
may have been treated much worse than being recruited into Lubanga’s army, and the 
perpetrators of those crimes could be sentenced with more serious punishments. Based 
on what the convicted persons at the ICC received as punishment, it is very difficult to 
clarify how international crimes are more serious than ordinary crimes. 
What is ironic is that Mr Katanga, who was charged with one count of crime 
against humanity (murder) and four counts of war crimes (murder, attacks against a 
civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities, destruction of enemy property, and pillaging)399, he received a joint sentence 
of 12 years imprisonment.400 By comparing the charged criminal actions of the two 
offenders, one may find that the ICC in fact concluded a hardly accepted view that real 
violence like murder, attacks on civilians, etc., is less wicked than recruiting child 
soldiers. The desert of international crimes does not match the grave nature when being 
compared with the possible punishment of ordinary crimes. And there is not a stable 
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balance between crimes of different gravities.401 
The Trial Chamber II explained its consideration to the mitigating circumstances 
in the Katanga case. After rejecting to acknowledge that Katanga had truly expressed 
his remorse to the committed crimes, the Chamber listed several reasons for Katanga 
bearing less culpability; namely, his accessory contribution to the criminal conducts 
charged, his feasibility to rehabilitation and reintegration due to his young age, and his 
supportive role in disarming and demobilising child soldiers.402 Such consideration on 
Katanga’s personal circumstances to mitigate the punishment may be understood as 
deterrence, that a shorter term of imprisonment could be enough deterrent for further 
crimes. However, the deterrence will probably only work for Mr Katanga himself but 
not for other criminals because the mitigation was solely based on this case and on the 
accused himself. It was difficult for others to imagine a similar treatment. In addition, 
even the personal deterrence of the punishment at the ICC may turn less meaningful. 
After all, it is already difficult for any perpetrator to commit international crimes after 
being isolated from power for years, which is long enough for new political powers to 
take over his/her position. 
From this view, the imprisonment passed by the ICC to international criminals 
does not need to be long. It is simply essential for the ICC to ponder an ideal length to 
diminish the perpetrators’ capability to continue carrying on human rights violations 
after being released, which is hardly the case in real life. However, in theory, personal 
deterrence is not the ultimate target. As it was stated in the decision of the sentence for 
Katanga, the Chamber insisted that: “the aim of [the sentence] is to deflect those 
planning to commit similar crimes from their purpose.”403 For that to be achieved, 
                                                 
401 Mark Drumbl, ‘Punishment and Sentencing’ in William A. Schabas (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to 
International Criminal Law (Cambridge University Press 2016). 
402 Ibid, para. 124-144. 




considering the severity of international crimes, heavier punishment could be more 
appropriate to be a threat. 
The severity of international crimes, no matter whether in its nature or in the 
influence it may have, creates a dilemma in judging the grade of punishment at the ICC. 
For both retributivism and deterrence, the ICC is not able to display convincing criteria 
to different sentences given to the perpetrators with predictable stability. Perhaps, this 
problem is caused by the fact that the punishment and sentencing must be scrutinised 
from one case to another. But in the opinion of this study, this is a result of replicating 
the experience of employing retributivism and deterrence at domestic courts into the 
ICC. On the one hand, it is very difficult to collect enough evidence to testify what 
really happened in the past, especially when it is essential to reveal all the details at the 
ICC and to really clarify the truth. Such as in the Lubanga case, the Prosecutor could 
have dug deeper, but eventually he chose a “safer” path. Without a full examination of 
the truth, the punishment given to perpetrators at the ICC may not be able to reciprocate 
the gravity of the crimes and prove the just retribution. 
On the other hand, if the ICC is able to examine all the necessary information and 
finally sentence the criminals with very heavy penalties, the possible consequences 
would be that the real criminals will try everything to resist being prosecuted at the ICC, 
including threatening to take more criminal actions and causing more harm to innocent 
people just like what Joseph Kony declared in the situation of Uganda. Thus, the 
deterrent effect of the ICC’s involvement could become a failure. In addition, 
international crimes are too serious to be dealt with through “ordinary methods”; 
imprisonment of some individuals will not be helpful or fair enough to restore the 
damaged social bond and local security. The way to view and respond to international 
crimes at the ICC needs to be more creative and flexible, just like setting the Prosecution 
                                                 




as one component of the International Criminal Court. It requires the ICC to re-consider 
the concepts of retribution and deterrence under the idea of restoration. 
 The problems in the considerations to victims’ needs 
During the negotiations of the Statute of the ICC at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference, the emphasis on the importance of victim to the International Criminal 
Court was an outstanding phenomenon. Former UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, 
stated specifically that: “the overriding interest [of establishing an International 
Criminal Court] must be that of the victims and of the international community as a 
whole”.404 His opinion was clearly an appeal that victims share the same interests with 
the international community and that all countries shall together take actions to protect 
the rights of victims. All the Participant States supported this appeal. Taking care of 
victims of international crimes thence became one of the central concerns for the ICC. 
Among all documents, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Reparation 
Principles) that was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 2005 is 
undoubtedly the latest and most laudable legal instrument providing systematic and 
direct legal resource to victims’ reparation. It encourages States to take actions to 
guarantee mainly the victims’ three rights: equal and effective access to justice, 
reparations for the harm suffered, and the right to truth.405 Its Preamble particularly 
highlights the requirement regulated in the Rome Statute, so the rules in the Basic 
                                                 
404 ‘Summary of the 1st Plenary Meeting’ (15 June 1998) UN Doc A/CONF.183/SR.1, in United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Official 
Records, vol. II, UN Doc A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), para. 11. 
405 United Nations General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law in Resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005 (21 March 2006) UN Doc 




Reparation Principles may be well understood as serving the purpose to imbed its legal 
provisions into the relevant framework of the ICC. 
The excellence of the justice pattern at the ICC, as it was previously introduced, 
is the extraordinary concern to victims by the Court. Before the sentencing provisions 
in the Rome Statute, article 75 provides rules of reparations to victims at the ICC. 
Article 75 reads as follows: 
1.  The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in 
respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon 
request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine 
the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, 
victims and will state the principles on which it is acting.  
2.  The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the 
Court may order that the award for reparations be made through the 
Trust Fund provided for in article 79. 
3.  Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and 
shall take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted 
person, victims, other interested persons or interested States.  
4.  In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a 
person is convicted of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
determine whether, in order to give effect to an order which it may make 
under this article, it is necessary to seek measures under article 93, 




5.  A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this article as if 
the provisions of article 109 were applicable to this article.  
6.  Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights 
of victims under national or international law.406 
Sub-article (1) lists three forms of reparation to victims. Restitution and 
compensation mainly relates to victims’ financial concerns, and rehabilitation is about 
making them capable of returning to the community and finding a rightful place in 
society. No specific indication of the order to apply these reparations means they shall 
be equally considered by the ICC. Sub-article (2) manifests some interesting ideas. The 
wording “may” leads audiences to guess the determination of the ICC in helping victims 
to attain reparation. However, if analysing with sub-article (4) and (5), which indicate 
that the Court shall trigger international cooperation and enforcement measures to 
ensure the success of reparation, such expression can only be interpreted as the ICC 
will choose either by directing the convicted persons or by ordering the Trust Fund to 
complete the job. David Donat-Cattin noticed the possible difficulty in achieving 
effective reparations to victims through the concerned States and perpetrators, and 
advocated the importance of a subsidiary role of the ICC in such issue.407 Rule 97 of 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence regulates the assessment of the reparation, and 
clarifies that reparations can be made on an individual, collective basis or both.408 
Article 79 of the Rome Statute and Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
specify the establishment and running of the Trust Fund to diminish the worry of 
financial problems in reparation. 
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In complying with the obligation to the right to effective justice and the right to 
truth, the ICC also authorises victims to participate at any stage of the proceedings 
provided the participation is appropriate 409 , by themselves or through legal 
representatives 410 , as observers, narrators or witnesses. It is believed that by 
participating in the legal proceedings at the ICC, victims and other stakeholders will be 
able to understand better the substantial and procedural model of the Court. Indeed, to 
guarantee the procedural right for victims and to licence them with the opportunity to 
attend hearings and make their statements during the proceedings is to fulfil the 
obligation of the ICC to the promised rights of victims. For better supporting and 
facilitating victims to participate in the legal procedure at the ICC, the Office of Public 
Counsel for Victims (OPCV) was also created in the Regulations of the Court.411 
Other than obtaining reparation and participation into legal proceedings, victims 
also receive a certain level of protection. According to article 68 of the Rome Statute, 
“[t]he Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses”.412 A Victims 
and Witnesses Unit shall be organised by The Registrar of the Court for every case to 
“provide, in consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor, protective measures and 
security arrangements, counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses […] 
[and] victims”. 413  The Rules of Procedure and Evidence offers more details in 
indicating protective measures.414 All the legal provisions at the ICC have shown that 
there is a holistic and protective framework to cover the rights of victims. 
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In short, at the ICC, victims are granted different roles as it may be required by 
international norms. They have rights to be necessary participants, witnesses to the 
proceedings, the beneficiaries of physical or mental reparations, and they are the 
protected objects of the Court.415 
The troublesome victim participation 
In general, the rights of victims at the ICC as promised in relevant laws is 
procedurally characterised. Under the consideration of maximising the convenience for 
victims to access justice, victims are authorised to participate in all the proceedings as 
long as the Court thinks it proper and secure for the victim’s interests. The creative 
regulation of victim participation before the ICC has been applauded by many, and 
called as a “landmark development”,416 “[o]ne of the major innovations of the ICC 
Statute”417 , and a “significant step forward”418 . Indeed, compared to other Ad Hoc 
Tribunals and domestic criminal courts, the ICC has tried much more to care for victims’ 
rights. It is widely believed that by ensuring the victims’ right to take part in legal 
procedures before the Court is one irreplaceable part for achieving justice and 
delivering it to victims. However, such belief may not be totally correct in some other 
aspects. 
Firstly, it is hardly evident to state that getting victims involved into legal 
procedures at the ICC is achieving justice. When victims take part in proceedings, they 
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could express their ideas and opinions on the case and tell their own stories, which 
allow their voices to be heard by the international community. But in reality, victims 
make statements before the ICC through legal representatives in hearings. Very few 
personal opinions have been expressed directly by victims. The indirect participation 
of victims in the ICC’s proceedings will not reach the goal, which will bring victims 
close enough to justice. As a result, the impact of victim empowerment through 
participation may even be declined. In addition, because many victims are not familiar 
with formal criminal justice, the participation of victims to proceedings in most cases 
has to be managed through the internal organs of the ICC, namely, the Office of Public 
Counsel for Victims. The consequence of such unfamiliarity of victims of the formal 
legal procedure at the ICC is that it makes it difficult for them to sense justice, because 
they are strangers to justice rather than participants. At best, the participation 
mechanism at the ICC is making external observers the people, who believe in the 
formal criminal justice procedure, and feel that justice has been done. It is justice for 
non-victims. 
Secondly, the relevant chamber dealing with the case must be the one that gives 
permission to victims for such participation at any stage, including granting the victims 
to be present in direct or indirect ways. Participation of victims before the Court may 
raise many concerns. The issues, such as security of victims under specific 
circumstances, financial availability, procedural convenience, may lead the Court to the 
conclusion that the appearance of victims in a case may be improper or risky. It could 
be difficult for victims and their legal representatives to assent to a decision as such. 
For example, in the Ntaganda case, in answering the request of victims’ representatives 
to participate in the “Status Conference on Disclosure Issues and on the Organisation 
of the Confirmation Hearing”, the Judge underlined the following: that pursuant to 




present their views and concerns “if their personal interests are affected”419; and that 
whether legal representatives of victims can submit a request to question witnesses at 
this stage is “subject to the directions of the Chamber”420; so, eventually the Judge 
rejected their application for joint participation421. This decision may be challenged for 
many reasons, but this is not the intention of the present study. The Judge could have 
particular considerations for the whole situation to draw such conclusion to the request 
to participate. It is the rationale behind this decision that is worthy of paying attention 
to, that victims are still objects of the ICC’s procedure so that their “fate” in proceedings 
is mastered in other people’s hands and subject to the peculiar needs of the Court.  
Thirdly, participation of victims before the relevant Chamber at the ICC could be 
painful, and in effect renders a “second harm”. It is not hard to understand that when 
recalling those memories about war and armed conflicts where brutality and death is 
often seen and fallen upon the victims and the people they care, it may be useful for the 
Prosecutor to forego the case at hand; victims will experience a certain level of stress 
or even depression because such memories are meant to be forgotten. However, the 
victims’ nightmares will be utilised from time to time during the proceedings at the ICC. 
In the Ongwen case in the situation of Uganda, victims were asked to expose much 
valuable information to the charged crimes as well as Ongwen’s personal responsibility 
therein. As it was confirmed, victims had witnessed intentional attacks on civilian 
populations in different camps and a mass scale of serious human rights violations, 
including “murder; torture, sexual slavery, rape, the conscription and use of child 
soldiers as well as pillage and the destruction of property”422. As usually, the victims’ 
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statements were abbreviated into several concise sentences to clarify the points made 
by the Prosecutor. However, what hides behind the emotionless and disinterested words 
are the tears and blood of victims. The impartiality and formal procedures at the ICC 
do not allow too much room for humane care towards victims in order to avoid 
“unnecessary bias” to the Judges. Although it is declared that the role of victims in the 
ICC proceedings is backed by the principle “true justice is achieved when voices of 
victims are heard and their suffering is addressed”423, the justice at the ICC is, in fact, 
“by the law, of the law, and for the law” based on the fact that victims’ mourning 
experience is transferred into evidence, rather than on the benefit of victims’ interests. 
One example of victim participation is the second review of the sentence in the 
Lubanga case. The Court invited all the possible parties of the case, including the Office 
of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV) and Legal Representatives of victims, to submit 
written materials for the Judge to scrutinise. The review was based on Article 110 of 
the Rome Statute and Rule 223 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and examined 
seven specific issues relating to the case, namely, (i) the early and continuing 
willingness to cooperate with the Court, (ii) the voluntary assistance to enable the 
enforcement of the Court’s judgements and decisions in other cases, (iii) the genuine 
dissociation from convicted crimes, (iv) the re-socialisation and resettlement for the 
sentenced person, (v) the risk to arise social instability of an early release of the 
sentenced person, (vi) the impact of early release of the perpetrator on the victims and 
their families, and (vii) the individual circumstances of the sentenced person to approve 
an early release.424 
The victims’ concerns, expressed through the OPCV and the Legal 
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Representatives, were mainly about the possible danger of the early release of Lubanga 
to the local society and the security of the local people, particularly the victim 
participants to the ICC’s legal proceedings. The basic attitude of victims in the relevant 
submissions was that the sentence of Mr Lubanga should not be reduced, considering 
that his remorse to the crime that he was responsible of, had not been evident, and his 
reappearance to local society would cause much fear and unease among the victims. 
This could give rise to the social instability, detrimental influence on the reparation 
progress. Such opinion reflected the real worries of victims as being described as “fear”. 
On the one hand, it has been suggested that a traditional ceremony would be helpful for 
the social reconciliation where the participation of the convicted persons is very 
important for delivering a message of regret and recognition of the wrongness of the 
crimes of the past. On the other hand, because victims realised that the influence of the 
sentenced person, Mr Lubanga, was still considerable on his former followers, and that 
the participation of Mr Lubanga would make the victims’ identities revealed and cause 
retaliation to victims, they argue that the sentence of Mr Lubanga shall not be reduced. 
But the problem is, as the ICC also understands, Mr Lubanga will not be kept in 
detention forever. His sentence will expire on 15 March 2020. Now he is serving the 
rest of his sentence in his home country, and eventually shall be released. What shall 
the victims do then? Would the fear be diminished when Mr Lubanga returns? The ICC 
may have postponed the potential risk for some years, but has not solved the problem 
from its roots. The participation of these victims at the ICC, whether it was done directly 
or through legal representatives, did not mitigate the distrust and tension between 
victims and the offender, or between the different communities. 
In regard to victims’ concerns about social stability and personal safety, the Judges 
simply suggested that there should be no indication of Lubanga’s early release, as this 




judgements have tried to make any contribution to those issues.425 If the ICC had not 
reduced the feeling of fear among victims or the risk factors to social stability, the 
benefits of victim participation at the ICC might have been overrated. 
In other words, the participation of victims in the legal proceedings at the ICC is 
almost for the convenience of the prosecution and the image of the ICC that the 
permanent court is different from other ad hoc tribunals, due to the “extraordinary care” 
that it offers to victims. The victim participation, however, is based on the related 
procedure of cases and has to be determined by the Court. It is not dependent on the 
fact that the victims had truly suffered from the serious human rights violations 
committed by the local government, by the anti-government armed groups, or even by 
organised groups of normal citizens with dangerous malice, or sometimes by all of the 
parties above. The status of victimisation does not need to be confirmed or 
acknowledged by any court, because it is part of the truth in international crimes. It is 
true that if the ICC does not take actions for those international crimes, the victims may 
not even have any chance to express their opinions to the international community. 
However, the ICC shall not consider victim participation as a special procedural 
authorisation for the people who had suffered enough. After all, the real persons whose 
pain needs to be eased by justice are victims, not the staff of the ICC. The voice of 
victims shall be heard, not used in order to build the ICC’s fame or to make the legal 
procedure feasible, but for real human care. As it has been emphasised on many 
occasions by the ICC, victims are the central concern of the Court’s work. It shall not 
be the law that should consider the reasons for victim participation, but the true human 
conscience. It is time for the ICC to treat victims as one of the people whom it vowed 
to protect, rather than the object utilised in legal proceedings; it is time for the ICC to 
                                                 




consider justice as being achieved for whom, rather than justice for what. 
The problem of being witnesses and the protection 
In domestic court, witnesses are not always victims of the alleged crime. They may 
be the ones who simply saw the commission of the crime, but have no direct interest in 
the case. There can be several witnesses in a criminal case, and each one of them may 
describe the whole situation from different angles. Their words, regarded as the 
testimony, must be closely relevant to the crime, so that can be used by both the 
Prosecution and the Defence for their purpose. The statements from witnesses will be 
restrictedly tested in court so that the alleged persons will not be wrongly convicted. In 
addition, witnesses cannot express their opinion at their will. They must obey the 
disciplines of the court, and only provide the information that are wanted by the major 
“players” in court. The role of witnesses, if assessed in an exaggerated way, is important 
all because of their words, rather than who they are. It means that witnesses shall be 
treated like objects but not living beings in court. Of course, their personality shall be 
tested before or after they give oral evidence. But such test only aims at the credibility 
of their testimony, which is nothing about their identity. 
Victims of the alleged crime are the most direct witnesses. They saw the 
commission of the crime, and more importantly, experienced the pain. In theory, victims 
may not be properly deemed as pure witness in legal proceedings because their 
testimony is hard to stay neutral, but will naturally be influenced by their personal 
feelings, which create bias in their words. The special feature of victims in a criminal 
case creates a trouble for the court: On the one hand, victims’ words provide the basic 
information about what happened; on the other hand, all the details in the testimony of 
victims shall be carefully checked to avoid wrongful verdict. Therefore, victim 
participation in criminal procedure not only relates to justice itself, but also involves 




victims’ requests of participation must comply with pre-existing legal procedure and be 
transmitted to prosecutors. Similar to the role of witnesses in court, victims can only 
give the information that are needed by the Prosecution, the Defence, or the Judges. 
The possibility for victims to speak of their feelings about the crime is extremely 
confined. The relationship between victims and the criminal court is one of cooperation. 
They help the court to clarify the details of the case, rather than being assisted by the 
court to ease their pain. In short, it is the authoritative institutions that execute victims’ 
power and rights, and the role of victims is not more than just people waiting for the 
judgement and hoping that their request will be fully considered. 
At an international level, this mechanism may have to make some amendments 
due to some unique features of international criminal cases. One significant reason is 
that the number of victims in an international crime is often too huge, that the neglect 
of the need of victim in such context calculates injustice. In addition, as it has been 
stated, the consequence and the nature of international crimes are far more severe than 
ordinary crimes that are dealt in domestic court. The suffering of victims in international 
criminal cases, which makes victimisation a social phenomenon, causes long-lasting 
effect to every victim in the sense of security and the hope toward future. It is different 
from ordinary crimes in which victims suffer but still know that the whole society is 
safe. The deep influence of international crimes amplifies the urgency for victims to 
express their feelings or even emotions. Unfortunately, the platform where victims can 
play the main role and release the depression does not exist in the legal framework of 
the ICC. 
The special feature of victims in international crimes also requires some changes 
in the legal process at the ICC. In international criminal cases, victims are often, if not 
always, the necessary witnesses of the gross violence. It is hardly to find anyone who 
has witnessed the crime but has not bear the loss caused by the crime. In reality, victims 




witnesses are all the victims of the crime. When a person is both a victim and a witness, 
the relationship with the Court becomes complicated. As victims and participants of 
legal proceedings at the ICC, they are empowered to tell their stories and challenge 
those perpetrators personally in an environment that they are free from the political or 
military privileges of the alleged persons. However, as witnesses, it is essential for them 
to provide the Court effective, valid, and neutral testimonies, especially as the witness-
hood is against the Defendant. The problem for the ICC is how to give equal respect to 
both the characteristics. It is about a question of supporting people with enough 
tolerance and space for emotional expressions and helping them to hold back the grieves 
and asking them to be “professional”. Some studies discovered the sense of duty among 
witnesses, who testify before the Chamber for the horrific past atrocities and deaths of 
other people.426 The consequence of this mixed motivation of stating at the ICC causes 
a dilemma: too much respect for personal emotions will contaminate the formal 
meaning of justice in international criminal law; the efforts to keep the victim-witnesses 
neutral will only just scratch the surface of hope of fully delivering justice for victims. 
The ICC now needs to satisfy victims to consolidate its global acceptance and 
legitimacy; also the victims of international perpetrations need the ICC to regain the 
sense of security, justice, and dignity. But on the meaning of justice, there exists a 
prodigious gap between the legalism in Court and the reality of victims. 
The protection of victims during their participation is a responsibility of the ICC, 
not the bonus that is created by the Court in honouring victims. As it has been stated 
above, one of the great features of the ICC distinguished from ordinary courts is that it 
shall deliver justice for victims by “[b]ringing the alleged perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes of international concern before justice” because “[v]ictims are indeed 
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central” to the ICC’s work.427 The importance of victims for the ICC should not only 
rely on the role they play in the legal proceedings or the support they offer to maintain 
the image of the Court. Participating in the proceedings in criminal cases is risky, and 
such risk is multiplied in international criminal cases. Therefore, the ICC must ensure 
the protection of victims, especially when they take the key role as witnesses. But 
compared with the power owned by domestic courts to criminal offenders, in the ICC’s 
cases, the balance of power tilts toward those alleged persons on many occasions. It is 
unforgettable that in 2015 some key witnesses, who survived the 2007-2008 post-
election violence in Kenya, were found murdered, though proper means of protection 
should have equipped witnesses with the ICC’s external work. Considering that through 
mistakes that might have exposed the identities of witnesses during the procedures at 
the ICC, such sad result had corroborated the worries of the Prosecutor that the 
protective measures should be largely improved to keep the confidentiality of witnesses 
and victims uncovered.428 
Nevertheless, witnesses relevant to the Kenya situation became silent one after the 
other, and finally led the Court to vacate all the charges against Mr Ruto and Mr Sang. 
This was due to the interference and political pressures applied on the witnesses, but 
still leaving an open possibility to resurrect the prosecution in afresh future. The Trial 
Chamber V(A) of the ICC announced the following to indicate that the case should be 
terminated, which resulted in a protection of witnesses’ interests in effect: 
“The incidence of interference was bolstered and accentuated by an 
atmosphere of intimidation, fostered by the withering hostility directed 
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against these proceedings by important voices that generate pressure 
within Kenya at the community or national levels or both.”429 
Realising that at times the legal procedure regulated by international criminal law 
could potentially be jeopardised by the lack of cooperation of witnesses, among the 
ICC’s Judges this is considered a tragedy, but not a shame. As mentioned in Judge Eboe-
Osuji’s reasoning in the Decision above, the aggressive atmosphere from both the pro-
conviction and pro-acquittal sides on the case in Kenya had placed tremendous pressure 
on the witnesses and those victims who were about to confront the high profile persons 
before the ICC, but the latter had grown overwhelmingly strong to interfere in the 
normal work of the ICC because of the support from the Kenyan government. 430 
Unfortunately, the Court only implicated that under such conditions the validity of 
witness testimony would be dramatically infringed; thus the legal proceedings had to 
stop, but the influence on the security of witnesses and victims was not clearly 
highlighted. From this view, the protection of witnesses and victims is mainly for the 
foregoing of the legal procedure at Court, and that is probably the only end. “Making 
use of people’s suffering and miserable past” by the ICC could be an overly strong 
accusation, but could also be an inevitable impression. 
The protection of witnesses is a heavy and necessary duty for the prosecution at 
domestic level. For the ICC, the protection of witnesses who are often also victims is 
the obligation of the whole organisation. Where there is the urgency to protect, there is 
always a high risk of being hurt or even killed for both witnesses and victims. For one 
reason, the expressing of opinions against the alleged persons is in effect challenging 
the power of the criminal perpetrators; this could damage the very basic un-
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challengeable image with which the perpetrators control a political or military group. 
In addition, to testify before the court at the ICC is the goal to proving the guilty and 
criminal responsibility of the alleged persons through revealing the truth. A successful 
testimony against the perpetrators will largely increase the chance of the prosecution to 
being accepted by the Judges, and consequently result in the conviction of those who 
were in charge and possessed great power at the time of the atrocities. With being 
sentenced an applicable penalty, imprisonment with or without a fine, the perpetrators 
will be deprived of their freedom and political, military, or economic power as a result. 
This is unquestionably the most undesirable outcome for those perpetrators. The alleged 
perpetrators would utilise all the resources possible to rebut the prosecution, including 
denying the alleged crimes logically or by destroying the possible testimonies. The 
detrimental situation for witnesses has also been recognised by the ICC. For instance, 
in the Jean-Pierre Bemba case, considering the possible danger if the identities of 
witnesses would go disclosed, the Prosecutor had requested the Chamber for special 
measures to protect the confidentiality and other sensitive information of witnesses, 
including (i) image and voice distortion; (ii) continued in-court use of the witness 
number and pseudonyms in lieu of names; (iii) private or closed sessions for the 
portions of testimony where the witnesses’ identities might be disclosed when they 
provide information.431 
One noteworthy aspect of the Jean-Pierre Bemba case is that the Defendant also 
submitted a Request to the Court to employ special protective measures for his invited 
witnesses at trial. It cited the rationale of Trial Chamber III in the Motion that 
“Balancing its duty to respect the principle of publicity and its 
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obligation to protect victims and witnesses, the Chamber considers that 
protective measures such as image and voice distortion and the 
assignment of pseudonyms are generally non‐intrusive measures in 
cases where a witness could be at risk on the account of their testimony 
at the Court.”432 
The request for special or protective measures for witnesses from the Defence implies 
that being a witness can become very complex if the hidden political conflicts continue 
in the concerned case, and the risks for witnesses do not only result from the 
perpetrators who are being charged or have been convicted. Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba was 
the former President of an influential political party in DRC and the Commander-in-
Chief of the military branch of the party. The military force under his command was 
requested by the then President of CAR to defend the Government from the attack of 
the then rebel group. The rebel group at that time seized power in 2003, and referred 
the situation in CAR in 2004, which was mainly focused on the violence committed by 
Mr. Bemba’s soldiers. The voluntary referral of the case by the Government of Central 
African Republic to the ICC creates some imagination to the request for protection of 
witnesses for Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba. Nevertheless, it must be noted that to testify at 
trial for either the Prosecutor or the Defendant at the ICC is inevitably dangerous. As 
well, this would be surfacing from all the possible powerful stakeholders and become 
real outside the trial.  
For the meaning of justice at the ICC, the calling of witnesses by any the parties 
in the procedure, and the subsequent testimonies may have been helpful for examining 
the evidence and clarifying the truth. If seeking such a purpose the ICC will put the 
called individuals in danger; so, the ICC must take its obligation of protection very 
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seriously. In terms of the protection of victim as well as witness protection, the Victims 
and Witnesses Unit must be established to serve and provide the necessary protective 
measures within the function of the Registry of the ICC,433 and ensure the long-term 
and short-term plans for victims and witnesses protection.434 Those plans, particularly 
the long-term ones, could be very troublesome as it will involve the .protection 
undertaken by the ICC, which is always the weak point for the Court. The Appeals 
Chamber in the Katanga case considered the dangerousness of “preventive relocation” 
of a witness proposed by the Prosecutor where protective measures for them are not 
approved at the Registry 
‘[R]elocation of witnesses is a serious measure that can […] have a 
“dramatic impact” and “serious effect” upon the life of an individual, 
particularly in terms of removing a witness from their normal 
surroundings and family ties and re-settling that person into a new 
environment. It may well have long-term consequences for the 
individual who is relocated - including potentially placing an individual 
at increased risk by highlighting his or her involvement with the Court 
and making it more difficult for that individual to move back to the place 
from which he or she was relocated, even in circumstances where it was 
intended that the relocation should be only provisional.’ 
Recognising these facts and concerns, as stated above, choosing to take up a role that 
provides the Court with essential information for the case in question requires great 
bravery; any involvement and approach to the ICC’s work could increase the risk of the 
involved individuals’ life. Again, it proves that cooperating with the ICC in its legal 
proceedings is conflictive to a degree; the difference is that the involved persons -
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victims and witnesses- have to confront those alleged vocally or verbally rather than in 
action or physically. 
The weak function of the reparation mechanism 
What is even more dramatic, yet not very surprising, is the development of the 
case against Mr Ruto and Sang in the situation in Kenya. After the Chamber V(A) of 
the ICC decided to terminate the case, victims submitted an emotional request to the 
ICC asking for further reparations through the common legal representative. They 
asked the ICC to (i) find that the Kenyan government bears all obligation to provide 
reparations to all victims; (ii) order the Trust Fund for Victims to initiate and provide 
assistance to all victims; (iii) invite the Kenyan government and the Trust Fund for 
Victims to submit further types and modalities of providing reparations or assistance in 
lieu of reparation to all victims, if needed; (iv) make further orders and give other 
directions with similar nature as it finds fit in the circumstances.435 
As a response, the Trial Chamber V(A) of the ICC stated that the termination of 
the case means the end of all related trail proceedings at the Court, so that the ICC is 
not “the right forum to entertain such views and concerns”436. In particular, the Judges 
pointed out that the legal representatives of the victims in this case “stated that the 
Chamber lacked jurisdiction over that matter”437. The motivation of the victim side 
behind this Decision was hard to understand and still remains unknown, and probably 
will stay as a mystery forever. In any case, it unfolds problem in the reparation 
mechanism at the ICC: reparation for victims is highly dependent on the trial 
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proceedings of every case, and unless crimes are confirmed and criminals are found 
guilty, there could be no real reparation granted for victims. Reparation at the ICC is an 
attachment to the main legal procedures. It is not enough to trigger or initiate reparations 
for victims when only real damages are proved, because damages must be affirmatively 
linked to suspected perpetrators’ personal responsibility in order to establish criminal 
accountability. If the effort to the conviction of those perpetrators fails, the hope to 
receive reparations from the ICC of victims will fail too. 
The result of the demand for reparation for victims in the cases where the alleged 
persons had been convicted does not count to be satisfactory. In the Katanga case, Trial 
Chamber II of the ICC granted each acknowledged victim 250 US dollars as a 
“symbolic reparation” and offered a collective reparation plan as a further award.438 
Furthermore, the Court also suggested that Mr Katanga might also contribute to the 
reparation for victims by giving a voluntary apology, provided it would improve the 
reconciliation between himself, the victims of the crimes, and the affected 
communities.439 The Trust Fund for Victims submitted a draft plan to implement the 
reparation Decision after several months, explaining that the reparation shall be only 
granted to 297 identified beneficiaries rather than on a community-wide basis.440 In 
total, the Trust Fund for Victims decided to complement monetary payment at 
1,000,000 US dollar, in which $74,250 should be for individual compensation and 
$925,750 collective reparation respectively.441 In regard with the possible contribution 
of Mr Katanga, the Trust Fund for Victims stated that his apology and will to take part 
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in the inter-communal traditional ceremony for healing and reconciliation might not be 
realistic considering his continued detention.442 
In the Lubanga case, a finalised and detailed plan for reparation has not been 
available yet while this study is being written. Two dimensions of reparation, individual 
and collective reparation, have been decided and confirmed to be employed into four 
modalities: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and other necessary reparations.443 
The Trial Chamber I opined that individual reparation in the Lubanga case might be 
scheduled within collective reparation due to “the uncertainty as to the number of 
victims of the crimes”444 and that such opinion was not overturned by the appeal 
judgement. The Trust Fund for Victims was requested to prepare an implementation 
plan for the reparation in this case, and then submitted the filing to the Trial Chamber 
II on 3 November 2015. In the implementation plan, several important aims in the 
reparation were emphasised for maximising the effect of the ICC’s work onto victims, 
including: (i) to relieve victims’ suffering; (ii) to afford justice by alleviating the 
consequences of the wrongful acts; (iii) to deter future violations; (iv) to contribute to 
the effective reintegration of former child soldiers; and (v) to promote reconciliation 
between the convicted person, the victims and the affected communities.445 The Trial 
Chamber II approved the implementation plan on 21 October 2016. As well, it 
demanded that the Trust Fund for Victims must update the progress made every 3 
months.446 Like the Katanga case, Mr Lubanga was recommended to show remorse 
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and give an apology to the victims in ways available.447 
Mr Al Mahdi in the Mali situation was convicted of war crimes as a co-perpetrator 
in attacking the protected architectures. Because the damaged architectures were 
acknowledged by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
as World Heritage sites in Mali, the attack and destruction of them was recognised by 
the Trial Chamber VIII; The Trial Chamber VIII said that although it was not as serious 
as criminal conducts against natural persons, it largely caused harm to people local-
wide and/or world-wide as the destroyed sites held special religious and historic 
meanings.448 Furthermore, the destruction of World Heritage sites constitutes an insult 
on the entire human dignity and mutual assistance and concern in different people; 
potentially it creates a negative influence on the education of justice, peace, and cultural 
diversity.449 
It seems that reparation in this case shall be wider, if not global, considering that 
the crime has brought harm to the world’s values as a whole. The Trial Chamber VIII 
took Mr Al Mahdi accountable for reparation to victims of the crimes, irrelevant to his 
indigence, which makes him almost totally incapable to any monetary reparation.450 
Nonetheless, as the Chamber assessed, the convicted should be liable for the damage to 
the protected buildings at 97,000 euro, the consequential economic loss at 2.12 million 
euro, moral harm to the people concerned at 483,000 euro.451 As per to the dimensions 
of reparation, the Chamber established both individual and collective forms. The 
beneficiaries of the individual reparation were limited to those (i) whose livelihoods 
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exclusively depended upon the Protected Buildings and (ii) whose ancestors’ burial 
sites were damaged in the attack452. The Chamber considered that traditional measures 
would not be optional due to the potential discrimination towards women.453 The Legal 
Representative of Victims appealed the screening criterion of “exclusive dependence” 
in the submissions to the ICC, 454  which remains to be decided in the next legal 
proceedings while the present study is being written. 
One similarity of victims’ reparations in the Katanga case, the Lubanga case and 
the Al Mahdi case is that the convicted persons were recognised as indigent so that the 
monetary compensation to victims, individually or collectively, would have to depend 
on the support of the Trust Fund for Victims. In other words, though the convicted 
persons were obliged to pay the compensation to victims and the communities because 
of the damages that their criminal actions caused, the real monetary payment will be 
done by the Trust Fund for Victims. So, although the symbolic reparation needs to be 
accomplished by the offenders, in fact it is the financial duty for the Court. As one 
elemental consideration, the ICC assumes that the reparation approaches ordered or 
organised by its mechanism shall be of a reparative nature for victims. But such good 
intentions of the ICC may not be of real function or meaning for achieving its aim. 
The problem is that it is the perpetrators and their followers who had caused the 
damage to the victims and to the communities concerned, not the ICC. It should be 
common sense that the culprits should be the ones repairing the damage or harm they 
caused, as they are the real perpetrators in the view of the victims. As a third party and 
a non-stakeholder to the damage, the reparation brought by the ICC has relatively a 
weak influence on the victims’ pain and loss since it is not the one to be blamed and 
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condemned. Victims of international crimes suffered the most serious crimes that can 
be imagined. They need the acknowledgement that the crimes which they suffered are 
the most unacceptable malevolence to humanity as a whole. It is not the role for the 
ICC to repair the damage for victims, just like it is not the right entity to take over the 
liability of perpetrators and to pay the required compensation ordered by its own 
Chambers. Perhaps, under some specific circumstances, the ICC could give some 
money to victims in order to recover the physical and material losses to a degree, as a 
concern of human conscience. But it shall not be recognised or named as “reparation”. 
It is a condolence from all other humans, if the ICC is the appropriate entity to represent 
all humanity. What could be much worse than physical and material loss for victims is 
the mental and psychological damage and fear, due to the fact that the former can be 
restored in a relatively short period by financial support from other international 
organisations and other countries, but the latter lasts a very long time and is hardly fully 
remedied. One study on mental health in conflict and post conflict environment reveals 
that the direct war exposure significantly affects a population’s mental health, and some 
stressful conditions created by warfare may have had paralleled effect onto victims’ 
psychological stability. 455  The effect of international crimes where serious human 
rights violations and tremendous brutality are always observed could contribute more 
to victims’ loss, but the ICC’s reparation is not able to play a considerate role. 
Reparation must be conducted by those perpetrators, otherwise it will lose its meaning 
of being reparative. 
Another problem of the ICC’s reparation is that it is hardly considered enough to 
victim’s pain and loss. As it was shown above in the Katanga case, every participant 
victim will receive $250 from the Fund for Victims, as symbolic reparation. Since such 
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reparation is only available to those who had to be recognised as victims by the Court 
and applied for participation of legal proceedings at the ICC, the symbolic meaning of 
reparation seems indeed “symbolic”; it has almost no helpful support in ameliorating 
the life of the participant victims, let alone any impact on the wider range of victims 
outside the case. People may argue that the ICC is not the institution or subject to fully 
repair victims’ losses because it is an international court that focuses on justice rather 
than “charity”. If that is to be insisted, then the ICC should quit being the organisation 
that is involved in any material compensation for victims; sometimes promising 
reparation to victims but eventually only achieving a negligible proportion can be worse 
than promising nothing; for doing that it gives the victims hope and yet it ends up 
depriving them of hope yet once more. 
The true reason why the ICC had to face so many unnecessary troubles when 
making huge efforts to establish the reparation mechanism in and out of its legal 
procedures is that it does not properly understand its position in dealing with 
international criminal cases. Indeed, it is merely a criminal court, which shall always 
stay neutral and impartial to both sides of the cases. From this view, the ICC owes 
nothing to victims in regard to the damage caused by those criminal offenders. It is a 
good sign that the ICC is voluntarily caring for the need of victims, and recognises that 
the interests of victims is an inseparable aspect for the justice that is to be achieved and 
brought to them. However, such good will has not become an ordinary aim to any 
domestic criminal court globally, which share a similar culture, tradition, and views on 
values and justice. Such extraordinary aim for the ICC has created extra problems in 
restoring the pain and damage for victims as part of justice, especially when the ICC is 
answering the call of the victims, but in the meantime is incapable of taking care of all 
their requests. The legal framework of the ICC originates from formal criminal courts 
at domestic level, which are neither prepared, nor designed, to deal with criminal cases 




without making amendments to its basic structural idea. One principle in reparation 
should be remembered and upheld: wrong doing can only be undone by the wrong doers. 
In the case of the ICC, those perpetrators shall be the subjects achieving reparation for 
the sake of justice for victims, including offering apologies, recognising the wrongness 
of the crimes, listening to the stories of the victims, revealing the truth to victims and 
the affected communities, as well as doing their best to help rebuild the livelihood of 
victims and the damaged social bonds. The ICC’s work on reparation might be 
comforting, but always insufficient in terms of getting the offenders to express their 
remorse. 
 Summary 
This chapter discussed the meaning of justice at the ICC, starting from the main 
two philosophical schools on the view of justice to the main aims of punishing. The 
current legal mechanism at the ICC cannot be explained by neither the legal moralism 
or the harm principle, because of the cultural diversity behind international crimes and 
the huge damage that is caused by international crimes. It is also difficult for the ICC 
to achieve retribution or deterrence, due to the inadequate capability to deliver the 
message of condemnation to different groups of people and establish reciprocal 





Chapter 4: The Potential Contributions of 
Restorative Justice to the ICC 
The last chapter has examined the problems in the ICC’s view of justice. This 
chapter will analyse that with integrating the idea of restorative justice, the problems 
can be resolved. 
Many countries have experienced or are experiencing a vast scale of human rights 
violations, especially the violence committed as a consequence of civil war or political 
violence. Certain mechanisms that help to solve the problems during a transitional 
period are urgently necessary to end such violence, or to mitigate the effects thereof. 
Transitional justice has been applied to such circumstances, as it was utilised in South 
American countries as a pioneer example. Transitional justice then became renown in 
South Africa countries, which consisted of rebuilding of democracy, re-establishment 
of rule of law, national memorial, and victim compensations. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa acknowledged the potential role of 
restorative justice to achieving reconciliation, stating the following: 
“We have been concerned […] that […] amnesty cannot be viewed as 
justice if we think of justice only as retributive and punitive in nature. 
We believe, however, that there is another kind of justice - a restorative 
justice which is concerned not so much with punishment as with 
correcting imbalances, restoring broken relationships – with healing, 
harmony and reconciliation.”456 
In this statement, restorative justice is clearly understood as an optional path to seeking 
justice with a distinguishing feature from formal criminal justice, which is not 
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retributive and applies less punitive methods to treat criminals. 
In another truth and reconciliation commission, the TRC of Sierra Leone, 
restorative justice was identified as a process to bridge truth and reparation and 
eventually reach and strengthen national reconciliation.457 Among many aspects of the 
restorative justice idea, the function of unfolding the truth of past human rights 
violations is specifically highlighted, and easily leading to a conclusion that restorative 
justice mainly focuses on truth to satisfy victims. Furthermore, both of the TRCs in 
South Africa and Sierra Leone recognised that pardon and amnesty to the crime of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity will not be accepted under the 
requirement of international legal instruments, which is also a principle to comply with 
the “rule of law”458; so, for accomplishing these goals, truth and reconciliation have to 
be progressed within another mechanism. And such mechanism shall be the restorative 
justice. The understanding of restorative justice in the field of international criminal 
justice, combined with the purpose to achieve reconciliation through truth and truth-
telling, in practice it may have limited the potential of the restorative justice idea in 
order to bring more benefits. 
1. The acknowledgement of restorative justice at the ICC 
Considering that restorative justice is usually seen as the most recognisable part in 
transitional justice, it is necessary to demonstrate clearly that the major focus of this 
study is on the relationship of restorative justice and formal criminal justice at the ICC, 
apart from analysing them in transitional justice. As it has been stated above, formal 
criminal justice is also one of the components of transitional justice. But the fact that 
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restorative justice and formal criminal justice can co-exist in one system cannot draw a 
conclusion that there is not any conflict between them. 
In many situations where serious human rights violations have been committed to 
calculate to international crimes, transitional justice does not always include both 
formal criminal justice and restorative justice. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa, for example, was designed to prevent retaliation and 
promote solution459 to the crimes in relation to apartheid. Criminal prosecution against 
the perpetrators of serious human rights violations was not an option in South Africa’s 
TRC process. The TRC in Liberia, which was established in 2005 and is still working, 
on the other hand, specifically emphasised that it shall provide a forum to “address the 
issues of impunity” and an opportunity for “genuine healing and reconciliation”. 460 
The Commissioners of the Liberia TRC called for both formal criminal justice and 
restoration, and recommended that criminal prosecution against the “gross human 
rights violations” at the court of competent jurisdiction, as well as appropriate 
reparations, are both desirable for ending impunity and achieving reconciliation.461 
However, the transitional justice in Liberia that is based on the TRC mode has not 
brought any perpetrators of gross human rights violations to justice when this studying 
is being written.462 In other words, even the importance of formal justice in transitional 
justice has been confirmed,463 judicial mechanism can still be absent. It implies that 
formal criminal justice may not be an indispensable component to transitional justice 
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Restorative justice approach may not be integral part in transitional justice, though 
many transitional justice processes have been featured with it. The example of the 
transition in Central African Republic (CAR) may have evidenced that formal criminal 
justice can be well set up without being associated with restorative justice. In 2015, a 
national reconciliation conference, known as the Bangui National Forum, was held 
from 4 to 11 May. In this conference, several post-conflict issues on the social and 
national re-build were discussed and decided, including the recommendation to 
establish “a commission on truth, justice, reparation and reconciliation and the 
operationali[s]ation of the Special Criminal Court”.464 The Special Criminal Court in 
Central African Republic was created pursuant to the Organic Law No. 15-003465 and 
has been operating since 2015, resulting from the recommendation of the Bangui 
National Forum. But the establishment of the well operating national mechanism to 
pursue truth, reparation and reconciliation has been postponed, and there has not been 
any noteworthy achievement on this aspect when this study is written. 
The Independent Expert of the UN Human Rights Council also expressed the 
worry of the lack of functional restorative justice approach in CAR’s transitional justice, 
466 though the meaning of restorative justice approach was indicated as seeking truth, 
justice, reparation and reconciliation. 467  Combing with the conclusion in the last 
paragraph, it shall be stated that restorative justice and formal criminal justice do not 
often cooperate in dealing serious human rights violations. Consequently, it worth an 
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analysis on the attitude of the ICC in viewing restorative justice, since at domestic level 
there is not a necessary link between restorative justice and formal criminal justice.  
The national practices have not provided a manifest clue to whether restorative 
justice is accepted by the ICC at all. Since there is not any obvious opposition to the 
ICC’s work in restorative justice, it requires to check the ICC’s view on restorative 
justice. One question that needs to be discussed is the opinion of the ICC on transitional 
justice and restorative justice. That is because if at domestic level formal criminal 
justice is not always a necessary option, there may be an even bigger challenge for 
international justice to be triggered. And a close examination of the ICC’s work and 
restorative justice needs the intervention of the ICC to a state’s transitional justice. The 
challenge for the ICC to play a crucial role in transitional justice is that it is an 
independent international organisation. The involvement of the ICC’s work in the 
transitional justice of a state depends on many factors, including the jurisdiction over 
the situations and the admissibility of the cases. Nevertheless, Mr. Luis Moreno 
Ocampo, the former Prosecutor of the ICC, expressed his opinion on the relation of the 
ICC and transitional justice in the inaugural paper for the first edition of the 
International Journal of Transitional Justice. He said: 
“The International Criminal Court is part of the transitional justice 
project because it aims to confront centuries-old methods of behaviour– 
those of conflict and war, the abuse of civilians, woman and children – 
and to reshape the norms of human conduct while violence is still 
ongoing, thus aiming, as stated in the Rome Statute, to contribute to the 
prevention of future crimes.468” 
This statement supports the ICC’s engagement in transitional justice and its 
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contribution to the political and democratic reconstruction of a country. The affirmative 
attitude from the first Prosecutor of the ICC in fact encourages the cooperation with the 
Court of a state that is under transitional justice or plans to initiate transitional justice. 
But the wording in this statement does not clearly suggest what role shall the ICC play 
in transitional justice, and how it interacts with restorative justice idea. Additionally, 
the remarkable point in this statement that the ICC’s intervention “while violence is 
still ongoing” contributes to the “prevention of future crimes” may not be accurate. This 
point exaggerates the impact of the ICC to situations of ongoing conflict, and does not 
pay equal attention to restorative justice. 
In the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in 2010 (the Review Conference 
2010), Ms. Yasmin Sooka examined the judicial and non-judicial mechanisms in 
transitional justice.469 It firstly admits the significance and “complementary” of the 
TRC mode in confronting impunity and building national reconciliation470, and then 
confirms that the elements of justice and peace are both necessary for sustainable 
peace.471 In this examination, the ICC conceives the formal criminal justice, at either 
domestic level or international level, as the elements of “justice”, and other aspects in 
relation to restorative justice (such as truth recovery and reconciliation) as elements of 
“peace”. Such opinion resonates the conclusions472 presented in the official report of 
the conference on Fighting Impunity in Peacebuilding Context in 2009, which 
specifically highlighted the importance of “facilitating inclusive, transparent 
discussions on transitional justice” and “addressing root causes, facilitating 
                                                 
469 See Yasmin Sooka, ‘Confronting Impunity: The role of Truth Commissions in Building Reconciliation and 
National Unity’ (30 May 2010), for Review Conference of the Rome Statute. 
470 Ibid, para. 2. 
471 Ibid, para. 20. 
472 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Beyond Peace versus Justice: Fighting Impunity in 




implementation, and ensuring sustainability of transitional justice measures”. 473 
Although Ms. Sooka was not an official of the ICC, her idea has been upheld by the 
prosecution of the ICC in some public official statements. 
In remarking the role of the ICC in the situation of Colombia, the Deputy Prosecutor 
of the ICC, Mr. James Stewart, re-affirmed that criminal prosecution, together with 
truth commission, reparation programs, and institutional reform, constituted the 
common measures in transitional justice.474 In addition, he held the position that the 
work of the ICC shall be seen as “an integral part” of the judicial system of Colombia, 
because Colombia has already become a State Party of the Rome Statute. 475 This 
statement did not bring much change to the relationship between the ICC and restorative 
justice, because it still listed restorative justice (reparation) and formal criminal justice 
as parallel routes. Especially, it insisted that the national judicial activities should not 
be assessed within transitional justice mechanism.476 
However, in explaining the concern of the ICC Prosecutor on the execution of the 
sentences on the convicted criminals, it required that the suspension, reduction and 
alternation of the sentences should be assessed with the genuineness of the intent to 
bring the persons concerned to justice.477 The reduction and alternation of sentences in 
Colombia’s transition, as it was already reviewed by the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, 
did not constitute a violation of the ICC’s legal principles if they were undertaken in 
restorative ways.478 It implies that certain restorative measures are tolerable within the 
                                                 
473 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
474 James Stewart, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, keynote Speech in the Conference of ‘Transitional Justice 
in Colombia and the Role of the International Criminal Court’ (13 May 2015), at pp. 4. 
475 Ibid, at pp. 5. 
476 Ibid, at pp. 9. 





understanding of justice at the ICC, notwithstanding the toleration of restorative justice 
here is not about the internal prosecutorial system of the ICC. A space to acceptance of 
restorative justice in the ICC’s legal framework has been opened. 
In the latest review of the role of the ICC in Colombia’s transitional justice in 2018, 
the Deputy Prosecutor provides a much softer re-examination on the compatibility of 
restorative justice with the ICC’s legal framework. Firstly, it confirms that other aspects, 
“such as truth commission or reparation” are relevant to the ICC.479 Secondly, it admits 
that the assessment of the genuineness of the intent to achieving justice needs to be 
considered in the context of transitional justice.480 It means that the Prosecutor of the 
ICC, whom was represented by the Deputy Prosecutor here, realises the importance to 
set the prosecution against international crimes into the holistic background. The most 
impressive changes made in this statement by the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC can be 
seen in the following: 
“Effective penal sanctions may take different forms, as long as they 
serve appropriate sentencing objectives of retribution, rehabilitation, 
restoration and deterrence. 
Sentences may achieve these goals in different ways, provided they 
reflect public condemnation of the criminal conduct and recognition of 
the suffering of victims, and contribute to deterrence.”481 
Although the statement above relates to the assessment by the ICC of a state’s 
domestic judicial measures against international crimes, it does reflect the general trend 
to highlight the function of restorative justice at the ICC. If the Prosecutor of the ICC 
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accepts that restorative justice idea is compatible with the implication of justice at the 
ICC, and restoration serves the “appropriate sentencing objectives”, it is possible to 
integrate restorative justice idea into the ICC’s work, which is beyond the parallel 
relation between them. 
In the stage of reparation stage in Lubanga case, the Office of the Prosecutor in 
the submission on the principles of reparation suggested to include a wider class of 
victims in the reparation and to provide restorative justice to the affected community482, 
recalling the  announcement by the former President of the ICC that the reparation 
scheme in the Rome Statute “is designed to offer victims a measure of restorative justice 
through their restitution” 483 . In response, the Trial Chamber I of the Court fully 
considered different opinions gathered from the prosecution and other Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and made the decision to include restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation into the reparation modalities.484 The decision did not 
directly refer restorative justice. Instead, it contained the idea of restorative justice in 
some expressions, such as “restore the victim to his or her circumstances”, “restoration 
of an individual’s life”, compensation to “moral and non-material damage”, the 
rehabilitation of former child soldiers back to community as well as to address the 
shame felt by them.485 Those proposed reparative methods to victims and the affected 
community signify that the ICC is willingly to utilise restorative justice within its legal 
mechanism to make the concept of justice more than just a word in court. 
Similar attitude can be found in statements by the ICC to the Assembly of States 
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Parties. In 2012, the ICC reported the strategies designed to improve the work in 
relation to victims. In “Objective 1: Communications”, it examined the vision of justice 
set in the Preamble of the Rome Statute and indicated that 
“That vision is of justice in the broadest sense, an end to impunity for 
the perpetrators of mass atrocities, and the notion that justice is not just 
punitive but restorative – and hopefully preventative.”486 
The expression on the strategy of communication of the Court with victims 
categorised the understanding of justice into three aspects. Punitive justice should be 
recognised as punishing the perpetrators of international crimes; restorative justice, 
though was not demonstrated clearly in this report, could be interpreted as the non-
punitive function of the ICC’s work; preventative justice, might be understood as the 
power of the combination of punitive justice and restorative justice, or a third function 
inside the ICC’s involvement in international criminal cases. It was the first time that 
restorative justice was acknowledged as one internal element in the spirit of the Rome 
Statute at the Assembly of States Parties.487 One may argue that the statement made in 
this report might have come from the urgent request in the Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute in 2010,488 so that it could only be seen as a response to such request, 
rather than the official confirmation of the position of restorative justice in the meaning 
of justice at the ICC. This argument may not be accurate, because before the Review 
Conference 2010, in 2009, the ICC had already considered the value of restorative 
justice by denoting that 
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“A key feature of the system established in the Rome Statute is the 
recognition that the ICC has not only a punitive but also a restorative 
function. It reflects growing international consensus that participation 
and reparations play an important role in achieving justice for 
victims.”489 
As the first report on the strategy in relation to victims to the ASP of the ICC, it 
noticed the increasing attention to victim participation in justice in international 
community, and managed to acknowledge the demand to investigate the possible 
function of restorative justice. After the Review Conference 2010, which brought huge 
impacts to the development of the ICC, the role restorative justice received more 
emphasis in 2012, as it described above. Furthermore, in the latest ICC report on the 
implementation of the strategy in relation to victims in 2013, some changes were made 
but the practices of restorative justice had been improved in many aspects. For example, 
ICC’s Protection Program covered more victims in 2013, and the protection regulated 
in the Protocol on protection with the Office of the Prosecutor might also applied to the 
Defence; 490  victim application form had been made simpler 491 ; victims could 
participate the legal proceedings of the ICC through their legal representatives492; etc. 
Those changes shifted the lens of the ICC on restorative justice to the more practical 
aspect. The intent of the ICC to include restorative justice into its legal mechanism does 
not need more evidence. 
The recent report made by the former President of the ICC, Ms. Silvia Fernández 
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de Gurmendi, concluded the work during the term as the President. When talking about 
restorative justice, the former ICC President confirmed the restorative characteristic of 
the Rome Statute, but also indicated that the work on practice restorative justice was 
just to “test” such idea at the ICC.493 It suggests that, though restorative justice has 
been carefully examined in order to be utilised in practice at the ICC for many years, 
the idea is still not familiar to the Court. The ICC may have misunderstood the idea of 
restorative justice and the core values in it, and thus has not fully invoke the potential 
of restorative justice in the legal framework. It is also possible that because of the 
inaccurate understanding of restorative justice, the ICC has already made some 
mistakes when utilising it. 
2. The misinterpretation of restorative justice by the ICC 
A big difference in the view of crime between lawyers and criminologists is that 
the former consider crime as a violation of criminal law, yet the latter conceive crime 
as a consequence of complex reasons. It is generally agreed that in the regime of 
criminology, crime is 
“[C]entrally bound up with the state’s attempts to impose its will 
through law; with the meaning of those attempts to lawbreaker, law-
enforcer, observer, and victim; and with concomitant patterns of social 
order and disorder.”494 
In the view of criminology, crime cannot be simplified as the violation of legal 
provisions. Instead of only concentrating on the question of how to make law more 
effective, criminologists turn to find answers from a wider perspective; thus, they 
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started to challenge the formal model of criminal justice. In such context, restorative 
justice emerged with the “increasing scepticism towards both retributive and 
rehabilitative models”.495 The idea of restorative justice was first underscored to make 
a progress in the pitfall of formal criminal justice; the progress involved reducing both 
the crime rate and recidivism rate; as well, more advantages were gradually discovered 
with the wide application of restorative justice approaches to real cases, such as 
mitigating the fear and anxiety among victims, encouraging offenders to accomplish 
the obligation of restitution and compensation to victims.496 The original target of 
restorative justice was not only to satisfy the need of victims, but also to achieve a 
general success against committing crime. 
The ICC also admits the importance of restorative justice. The former President of 
the ICC, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, stated that: “the ICC is about much more than just 
punishing the perpetrators. The Rome Statute and the ICC bring retributive and 
restorative justice together with the prevention of future crimes.” 497  Unlike the 
development of the studies on restorative justice in criminology, the definition and 
periphery of such term was not clarified within the work of the ICC. One notion is that 
restorative justice, in the view of the ICC, is distinct from retributive paradigm. In an 
earlier statement, Judge Sang-Hyun Song particularly indicated that the reparation 
scheme at the ICC was “designed to offer victims a measure of restorative justice 
through their restitution”.498 This address in fact has implied the attitude of the ICC 
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towards restorative justice, that the reparation mechanism is based on the restorative 
justice idea, and that exercising reparation to victims could be seen as implementing 
restorative justice values. 
The (then) ICC President, Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (Judge Fernández) 
resonates the basic attitude of the ICC towards restorative justice on many occasions. 
For example, in 2016, she announced what follows, which once again addresses the 
relationship between the reparation mechanism at the ICC and restorative justice: 
‘This [legal] system [of the ICC] is a unique “hybrid” that combines 
elements of different legal systems and traditions and includes elements 
of restorative justice through a system of victims’ participations and 
reparations.’499 
This statement instead of implying, it directly notes that the ICC’s legal framework has 
included restorative justice by authorising wide-range victim participation and access 
to reparation. In 2017, such opinion was underlined with a more crystal indication that 
restorative justice has been integrated into the substantive law of the ICC in the 
following: 
“The Rome Statute […] has made progress from an exercise of purely 
retributive justice to a new dimension that includes elements of 
restorative justice. Accordingly, victims may participate in all phases of 
the proceedings to express their views and concerns, and to seek 
reparation in the event of a conviction.”500 
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The above statement can be interpreted in the following way: the practices involving 
victim participation at the ICC shall be attributed to the exercise of restorative justice, 
but restorative justice approaches may be contingent to the success of conviction of 
those suspected persons. 
The Prosecutor of the ICC has expressed the same idea. In her submission on the 
reparation process in the Lubanga case, she suggested to enlarge the reparation to a 
wider range of victims in order to ensure the victims’ right to collective reparations 
“consistent with the overall intention to provide restorative justice to affected 
communities”.501 
From the abovementioned statements, the role of the restorative justice idea for 
the ICC can be concluded as the single reason to support victim participation and 
reparation schemes. In other words, the ICC admits that in its formal criminal justice 
frame that centres on retribution and deterrence, restorative justice idea cannot play a 
bigger role to include more conversations between victims and the perpetrators or . As 
a result, restorative justice works only for victims. The narrow view on restorative 
justice by the ICC has not scrutinised the possibility of restorative justice to make 
improvements in the paradigms of retribution and deterrence, simply because the ICC 
considers restorative justice and retribution as being incompatible. However, as it has 
already been analysed in chapter one, restorative justice is a very inclusive idea, and 
both retribution and deterrence are available in the restorative justice mechanism. It has 
been pointed that the ICC has not made great use of the restorative justice approaches. 
Furthermore, as the reparations to victims in all the current cases at the ICC are of a 
dominantly monetary compensation nature, the idea of restorative justice has been 
contaminated with the concept of financial support only, leaving the core value -the 
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restoration of the damaged social bond- forgotten or dismissed. Perhaps the ICC is 
afraid to carefully examine the true meaning of restorative justice because it might 
marginalise the formal criminal proceedings and modify the very basic legal 
foundations. But such fear has not helped accomplish the kind of justice that the ICC 
desires due to the difficulties in bringing retribution, deterrence, and restoration. The 
ICC needs to reconsider restorative justice in a wider and deeper level in the view of 
justice. 
3. Main focuses of the restorative justice 
The prime focus: the damaged social bond 
It has been broadly indicated that restorative justice is first and foremost victim-
centred. Yet such assumption may not be correct, since restorative justice is indeed 
victim-centred but does not necessarily set victim as its prime focus. As one may 
remember, the rising of the restorative justice idea was the re-consideration of options 
to face the shortages within the formal criminal justice. Albert Eglash in his study on 
restitution in criminal justice categorised formal criminal justice into three dimensions: 
the retributive justice that addresses the reasons and limits to punish offenders; the 
rehabilitative justice that examines the social and individual causes directing the 
commission of crime; and the restorative justice, which, in his opinion, regards the 
question of how to make offender’s actions less harmful for victims.502 The term 
“restorative justice” was probably used for the first time in this study in the background 
of examining restitution as a method to repair the harm to victims. Thus, the harm 
caused by crime, or in the description of this study, the damaged social bond, should be 
the prime focus of restorative justice. 
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When focusing primarily on the harm, it would be more persuasive to rationalise 
the fact that what criminal offenders had done was wrong, rather than hitting the point 
with strong emotions. This may be easier to understand through legal moralism and the 
harm principle. The consequence of crime causes damage to the social bond, which is 
underpinned by generally accepted moral disciplines. In addition, crime, in most cases, 
cause physical damage to victims and mental harm to a degree. Some of the damage is 
measurable and the rest is not; only those who experienced the loss are able to feel the 
rest of the damage. Nevertheless, restorative justice addresses the tension between 
victims and offenders because of the existence of damage. 
Recognising the damaged social bond in criminal cases also guarantees the general 
acknowledgement that the crime is condemnable. What is important in restorative 
justice is that it deems crime as an issue that concerns the victim and the offender, as 
well as the affected community. If the issue is only a private problem at an individual 
level, the interference of restorative justice will not be powerful enough because both 
sides can simply make statements from their personal angle. As it has been discussed 
in the former section, the most effective condemnation to crimes comes from the 
confirmation of the wrongness thereof by the group where the criminal belongs. In 
international criminal cases, the general acknowledgement of the wrongness in crimes 
must reach the community level and the national level, which is better achieved through 
patient discussions and dialogues among the stakeholders of the crime. This is the 
reason why it is simple and clear: in formal criminal justice, it is the authorisation of a 
State that make the decisions in court. Judges and the Prosecution cannot represent the 
community or any stakeholder, and usually remain the power within the Court. Juries 
(albert the jury trial was not adopted in the Rome Statute) who are selected in court 
cannot be stakeholders of the case at all. The only stakeholder who plays a major role 
in formal criminal justice procedure is the Defendant. But the obligation for the 




than recognising the damage that had been made. As a result, in formal criminal justice, 
one non-stakeholder who represents the dignity of the law and one stakeholder who 
tries to deny the responsibility endeavour to address the dispute in front of an authority 
which executes the judicial power of the State. It seems like one crucial point is 
forgotten: It is the bond between victim, offender, and the community (society) that has 
been damaged, not the one between the defendant, the Prosecutor, and the Court. 
Focussing on the damaged social bond allows restorative justice to connect the 
proper responses to crime with relevant legal principles. It is a dangerous presumption 
to isolate restorative justice from law, because in real life the rule of law is a universally 
acknowledged idea, and legal principles provide basic guidelines to people’s behaviour 
and choices as well as to the standards of judging people’s actions. Legal principles 
reflect some basic values and criteria in morality for all social members through law 
and legislation process. The values recognised in law and legislation process are the 
cornerstones for restorative justice. Restorative justice and formal criminal justice are 
both centred on the idea of justice. They simply interpret justice through different paths. 
Without the legal principles providing standards in examining the nature of the damage 
to the social bond and measuring the degree of such damage, restorative justice will 
become arbitrary and therefore lose its purpose of achieving justice. 
The problems of the view in justice at the ICC firstly fall into the lack of 
connecting international crime and the bond in international community. Dependent on 
the principle of the rule of law, and at times abiding by the path of legalism, the ICC 
was established for humanity, holding the ideal purpose to prosecute the perpetrators of 
international crimes. After people have witnessed great tragedies and atrocities 
committed to humanity throughout history, the founding of the ICC bears the hope of 
humanity to prevent international community from being “shattered” 503  by 
                                                 




international crimes. The rules in the Rome Statute (the substantive law), Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (the procedural law), and Elements of Crimes (the 
supplemental law to the Rome Statute) have learned from the experience of former 
international tribunals, including the Nuremberg Trials, the Tokyo Trials, the ICTY and 
ICTR. Thus the legal provisions on which the ICC’s work is based shall be seen as 
embracing the essence of human conscience.504 
From this view, the laws and legal provisions of the ICC also consider the crimes 
under its jurisdiction as causing damage to the social bond that connects all humanity 
with the past and the future. The ICC, as the only permanent international court for the 
unimaginable atrocities, shall be seen as a lighthouse of human conscience that guides 
that world, exposes the evil, and scorches the gross violence. However, the ICC has 
been disposed such a high place, that it has not succeeded in repairing the damaged 
social bond of the areas affected by serious violence. If the ICC could learn from the 
restorative justice idea to view justice as restoring the damaged social bond at both 
international level and local level, interlinking international law with local culture and 
values, such justice will become more meaningful and tangible. 
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The focus on victim 
Restorative justice focuses on the victims’ need in a stance different from that of 
the ICC. In lieu of authorising the victims’ right to participate in the legal proceedings, 
restorative justice considers that listening to victims and sharing their stories is a 
significant part of the proceedings themselves. It is a fact that in the disputes of criminal 
cases, victims are actually on the one side of the conflict and criminal offenders on the 
other side. So the ideal solution to the conflict should be to guarantee victims similar 
roles or importance in the proceedings. However, victims are not treated properly before 
the criminal courts; as many criminologists argue, there are efforts to displace the 
victims from the position where they should belong in the conflict; this is done through 
administrative programs in which states seek control of the procedure in a pre-
institutionalised pattern.505 As well, it seems to be the real situation, which victims are 
now facing at the ICC. In compliance with the legal framework of the ICC, victims are 
authorised with rights to participate in the procedure where their voice is represented, 
their concerns about the crime are heard and disputed without them being the main role. 
On some occasions, victims are provided with monetary compensations if the alleged 
persons are convicted. But at the time of this study being written, the compensations to 
victims who have been qualified with such identity have not be effectively reparative, 
since all the compensations are paid by the Trust Fund for Victims. The reason is very 
simple: in the light of law, international crimes are primarily deemed as the violation of 
legal provisions, and the victims’ personal interests must be subordinated to the dignity 
of law. Although judging the crime by a third party can bring relatively impartial 
outcomes, such outcomes may have been the result of sacrificing the active engagement 
during the proceedings. Restorative justice, on the contrary, believes that a due justice 
must fully respect victims’ need because they have already suffered and experienced 
                                                 




disrespect from the crime and criminals. In the cases dealt with at the ICC, such respect 
is more necessary to victims because they could not obtain or expect to obtain enough 
respect from local authorities. 
Restorative justice also tries to re-establish the confidence in victims. Many 
victims of crimes have reported their doubts about life and the future due to the brutal 
treatment they had received and the status of being victimised. In international crimes, 
victimisation can be transferred from terrifying experiences to intense suffering through 
two ways. First, long-lasting torture, threat, poor living conditions, and other serious 
human rights violations change the attitude of the victim toward life. One victim of the 
Mucić et al. case in ICTY, Mr. Nedeljko Draganić, described the torture, humiliation, 
and other forms of inhumane treatments against victims in the Čelebići prison camp 
with his own experience and witnessing during the period when he was detained. In his 
description, all detainees suffered from a terrible living environment, malnutrition, 
random beating by wardens, lack of medical assistance, extreme humiliation including 
forcible drinking of each other’s urine.506 Those memories are not easy to erase or 
pacify, but usually haunt the victims for considerably long periods of time as was 
highlighted by the victims in the “Glogova” case in ICTY. 507  The experience of 
victimisation also creates an atmosphere of distrust toward the police among victims, 
who have been observed in the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS). 508 
International crimes, which have been acknowledged as “crime of states”509, will cause 
victims to lose their faith and confidence in the national authorities and their will and 
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capability to achieve justice, and even the hope of living in the whole society. 
International criminal justice at the ICC may not be able to help victims to re-establish 
their confidence because it cannot make local societies reliable again. If the ICC fails 
to take perpetrators into accountability, which is quite normal in formal criminal justice, 
victims’ confidence will again be harmed. That is the place where restorative justice is 
needed. 
Victims of international crimes always feel and carry the fears of the horrifying 
past. It shall be perceivable that after experiencing the most serious human rights 
violations or watching large populations being killed, wounded, forcibly displaced, 
raped, victims’ fear to almost everything around them will consistently increase. In the 
Akayesu case, the Trial Chamber I examined the witness testimony and stated the 
impact of such fear as follows: 
“Many of the eye-witnesses who testified before the Chamber in this 
case have seen atrocities committed against their family members or 
close friends, and/or have themselves been the victims of such 
atrocities. […] The recounting of this traumatic experience is likely to 
evoke memories of the fear and the pain once inflicted on the witness 
and thereby affect his or her ability fully or adequately to recount the 
sequence of events in a judicial context.”510 
In international criminal trials, the focus on the reduction of the impact of fear to victims 
is limited to the extent that the possible negative effects of re-opening the wound of 
victims must be carefully considered when calling them to participate. Many victims 
have to find a way to overcome those fears, to confront the perpetrators before the court 
for achieving international law’s justice. But it does not mean the fear will disappear as 
                                                 





a result of participation. For those who did have a chance to be involved into related 
legal proceedings, fear is a daily problem; beyond the charged international crimes there 
are other influences on victims such as telling the truth in public.511 It is urgently 
essential for victims to know that violence, hatred and discrimination will not continue 
in the future so that they do not need to feel fear any longer. Restorative justice aims at 
reducing the fear among victims to a further degree through its approaches where 
victims are empowered in the conversation with perpetrators and backed by their 
community, morality, law, and making clear of the past and protecting the future. 
The focus on offenders 
One point that both lawyers and criminologists will agree on is that formal criminal 
justice utilises offender-centred mechanisms. The action elements and mental elements 
of crimes regulated in substantive criminal law are observed, theorised, and then 
codified from criminal behaviours. The investigation of crimes mainly targets revealing 
the links between what criminals have done and the consequences of their actions. The 
charges against criminals at trial also rely on their actions and mind-set, which will be 
debated on the point of how much the alleged persons have contributed to the crime in 
question. When it is time to decide the sentence for criminals, Judges must scrutinise 
the severity of the criminal conducts, the gravity of the criminal consequences, and the 
dangerousness of the convicted. Almost all aspects in formal criminal justice procedure 
are filled with the endeavour of the wickedness of the offenders and the legitimacy of 
the treatment of them. In understanding crime, formal criminal justice comprehends it 
as the unilateral action taken by criminals without linking it with other imperative 
contextual factors. Thus, criminals are given an identity all based on the information in 
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association with the alleged crimes, and only re-figured into some persons recognisable 
in the case. It is the same situation at the ICC. 
Restorative justice depicts the whole identity of offenders by seeing them as living 
persons rather than just names that are being described by criminal actions. Criminals 
are still humans, and they have needs that must be respected just like the needs of 
victims; as well they have stories to reveal. Even for the perpetrators of international 
crimes respect from justice proceedings is necessary in order to encourage them to 
engage more with victims and to reach some expected outcomes, including showing 
sympathy, remorse, and desistence from crime. When criminals feel that they are treated 
as humans, they would prefer to actively cooperate with the justice procedure rather 
than resisting it, because enough respect of their needs makes them feel involved and 
more respectful.512 Another effect that restorative justice may have on offenders is that 
it helps offenders to re-identify themselves through interactions with victims in front of 
other people. In formal criminal trials, offenders are positioned at a specific corner in 
the court and are bestowed the role as the Defence, subject to procedural principles and 
restricted from communicating with victims and other stakeholders. Under such 
circumstances, they incline to understand themselves as one person against the whole 
state, but not the one who has caused harm to victims and the social bond. The 
restorative justice approach brings back the comprehensive identity to offenders with 
their own stories and experiences, making them feel alive and inspired to learn from 
their responsibilities. 
The instance of Dominic Ongwen in the situation of Uganda may have displayed 
some issues that the ICC cannot take into consideration according to its legal framework. 
As Mr. Ongwen confessed, he was involved in several incidents of terrible violence 
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against Ugandan civilians during the time when he took charge of one military unit 
under the control of Joseph Kony, the Commander-in-Chief and the self-announced 
“Holy Spirit” of the LRA. On the other hand, he also claimed that he was a victim of 
the violence committed by the LRA, that he was abducted “on his way to school” and 
“[s]tolen from his family and community”, and then shifted into a child soldier after 
trying to survive the torture and beating.513 In other words, Ongwen believes that he 
was forced to participate in violence and was shaped into a criminal by years of 
maltreatment in military training. He admitted his criminal actions, but denied his 
responsibility in them. The Pre-Trial Chamber II of the Court refused to consider this 
background, and clearly stated that “this argument [of non-responsibility] is entirely 
without legal basis, and the Chamber will not entertain it further”.514 
It is correct that the Court did acknowledge that Ongwen still enjoyed protection 
from international law rendered from the identity of being a former child soldier, but it 
may seem arguable to totally neglect the implication of such important information. 
The relationship between childhood maltreatment and abuse to adolescent criminal 
behaviours has been proved in many studies.515 Recent studies even discovered that the 
experience of maltreatment in childhood results in approximately a double possibility 
for adults to engage in crimes, which is more evident for boys than girls.516 Based on 
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those findings, the miserable life after being abducted must have had decisive influence 
on Ongwen’s choice and conduct, which may not exclude his criminal responsibility, 
but could considered as the mitigating element in judging the wickedness in his criminal 
motivation. If this case were dealt with the restorative justice idea, Ongwen would be 
seen as a former military leader, a son to a family, a boy who was abducted and tortured, 
and a perpetrator who were made by others’ criminal acts inflicted on him. Only through 
this way his identity would become complete, which is more useful to understand who 
he really is and to conceive the full picture of the life among child soldiers and military 
leaders. 
As a comparison, some former child soldiers received help from the ICC and 
functioned as witnesses to testify against Ongwen. The Court realised that some 
witnesses themselves had committed crimes, and attributed those crimes to Ongwen’s 
command.517 It is not difficult to imagine that one of those witnesses might grow into 
another Ongwen if they were not rescued, and that the boundary between victim and 
perpetrator perhaps lies on fortune and timing. Nonetheless, perpetrators of 
international crimes shall be taken into accountability, whether based on formal 
criminal justice or the restorative justice idea. Different from the formal procedure at 
the ICC, restorative justice provides space for those perpetrators to narrate their own 
stories; it manifests a better view to judge their conducts, and uses their experience to 
educate people to facilitate the re-integration process for former child soldiers. 
Restorative justice and community 
The relationship between restorative justice and community has been analysed in 
the context of achieving peaceful solutions of conflicts. And as it has been discussed 
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above, restorative justice links international criminal justice with local values, making 
the ICC’s judgements and decisions more attached to the local people. The 
effectiveness of restorative justice will be extremely weakened if the role of the 
community is displaced in its proceedings, since community equips justice with 
collective meanings to which both victims and criminals submit. It does not suggest 
that restorative justice must be located in or operated by communities as many studies 
advocate.518 Rather, the restorative justice process must include communities where 
the harm to victims and the guilt of offenders are more meaningful than personal issues. 
The ICC underscores the role of community in the meaning of justice. But the 
community often refers to the international community, not the specific community 
where the crimes occurred. The high position of the ICC in viewing justice is pillared 
with the inspirational thought that humanity bears the same fate and shares a common 
future. The emphasis of the ICC on the international community is more or less 
metaphysical. Restorative justice ponders the significance of communities in fortifying 
the meaning of justice with more realistic reasons. 
Communities too feel the damage alongside the victims. On one point, 
communities can be the major side subject to the crime committed in its area. The Al 
Mahdi case in the situation of Mali exemplifies the first “non-victim” criminal case at 
the ICC where Mr Al Mahdi was only convicted with destroying historical buildings. 
The prosecution did not include violence against natural individuals; however, in the 
Office of the Prosecutor’s report on the situation of Mali it had been observed that 
killings, torture, executions without proper judgements, rape and other forms of cruel 
and inhumane treatment to combatants hors de combat and the civilian population in 
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Mali provided reasonable basis to initiate the investigation.519 The Trial Chamber III 
confirmed that the crimes of this case were not against persons but solely hurt the 
collective feeling of the community.520 Considering the fact that Al Mahdi was one of 
the members of the community, sentencing him and his followers with participating in 
the re-construction of the destroyed buildings, through restorative justice, may have 
been more meaningful and suitable to the community’s needs rather than imprisonment, 
where he can pay neither compensation nor express any remarkable remorse to the 
community. The Judgement at the ICC of Mr. Al Mahdi, to a degree, may have wasted 
Al Mahdi’s influence on others and the opportunity to restore the emotional loss of the 
community and its residents; local people had great respect for the destroyed buildings 
because they represented for them symbols of religious, emotional and spiritual values, 
much more than simply their physical form. 
In addition, it must be noted that the community is a place where people reside, 
live, and conceptualise security and peace. The environment of a community, especially 
the sense of safety, order, and mutual trust, is closer to victims than the punishment of 
criminals at the ICC. Thus, efforts to stabilise and secure the community are a salient 
aspect of viewing the meaning of justice for local people in post-conflict regions.521 A 
survey on the people’s attitude towards the social re-construction and their feelings 
about security establishment in Liberia the following recommendations were made to 
the local authority: strengthen and professionalise the police system to improve security 
and stability in the communities, as well as increase access and improve the quality of 
formal justice together with local dispute resolution mechanisms.522 A study on the 
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post-conflict trauma among people in Guatemala shares similar findings, and 
specifically indicates the necessity to create various values and practices conducive to 
peaceful non-violent conflict resolution, and reduce the stress caused by intense social 
relationship at community level.523 Those field studies are persuasively evident for the 
importance of community environment to the meaning of justice. 
The relationship between victims and offenders, and the connection between 
different communities have a key impact in making people feel safe in international 
criminal cases, because those crimes are not normally committed by a single person, 
but by large numbers of persons against groups or even against the entire community; 
this has been noted in both the atrocities in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. In post-
conflict societies, communities are often newly re-established, and people who used to 
serve different factions now have to live together in order to survive. Co-existence has 
become a common theme in post-conflict societies.524 The main concern about justice 
and peace for people living in such environments is about their feelings towards each 
other in their daily lives. Under such circumstances, justice that brings some individuals 
before international trials and sends them to prison may not be enough. People need to 
feel that the pressure and hostility coming from their neighbourhoods or close 
communities will not continue to be a problem. This expectation of justice can be 
achieved through the restorative justice approach but not through the formal criminal 
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4. Desert and accountability in restorative justice 
Accountability as a criterion for justice 
The core idea of the retributivism theory in punishment is that for answering the 
requirements of justice, criminals must be held responsible for their criminal actions. 
The penal system arranges different tiers for convicted criminals according to the 
severity of the crime, and then decides what is the just desert for criminals. Punishment 
does not need to be agreed by the convicted persons. It simply forces criminals to bear 
the pain and loss because they caused such consequences to others in the first place. 
Von Hirsch in his study on the philosophy of criminal law and penalty indicates that the 
just desert must not strive to seek for internal acceptance on behalf of the criminals for 
a punishment.525 Indeed, criminal legislation that strives for the voluntary serving of 
punishment of criminals is not often observed. On most occasions, sentencing at a 
criminal court is generally achieved on external criteria whereby people -judges and 
juries- scrutinise the nature of criminal actions and the dangerousness of the offender. 
By giving criminals a deserved punishment, formal criminal justice takes them into 
account to fulfil people’s expectations. 
Criminal accountability is of external nature. In common sense, accountability 
refers to an individual person’s or an organisation’s compliance with public norms 
which deeply relate to certain common values and traditions of a society. This type of 
accountability is conceptualised as a normative form that is used to evaluate people’s 
actions from the public view. Another form of accountability, which regulates people’s 
behaviour, is the accountability as mechanism.526 Accountability as mechanism sets up 
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a series of rules for conducts and roles for persons, in order to keep an institution 
operating well. The source of accountability as mechanism may differ from that as 
virtue, but their common nature is to restrict people’s actions from the outside rather 
than inspire them to seek a certain outcome. From this view, the accountability for 
criminals in international criminal law is to examine whether their actions are accusable, 
judged by relevant legal principles and reflected in what criminals shall receive. 
Accountability can also be internally motivated. For example, generally all 
citizens make their decisions and behave accordingly without violating the law or 
causing harm to others. For most law-abiding people, not to violate the criminal law is 
not a restriction that comes from external pressure, but simply an instinct in their daily 
life. People voluntarily, though unconsciously, prove that they are liable to account for 
their actions by avoiding the commission of any crime. This phenomenon clearly shows 
that people living in a society take accountability by nature; it cannot be interpreted by 
their fear of being judged by external criteria. The sense of accountability had been an 
integral part of human mentality. This dimension of accountability is understood as 
internal accountability. Richard Mulgan examined the usage of the concept of 
“accountability” in regard to political practice and individual responsibility, and argued 
that the implication of accountability should be expended into internal accountability 
that is more encouraging than constrictive. 527  The encouraging aspect of internal 
accountability may not be easily sensed since it does not intensify any relationship at 
individual level or at social level, or result in any severe legal response as the 
accountability in formal criminal justice does. But when it is required to correct the 
wrong, internal accountability is more effective than external accountability. The 
internal accountability is part of the human morality, driving people to avoid causing 
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harm to others or to try to restore the harm if it has already been caused, rather than 
alluring people to deny or escape from the consequences. So internal accountability for 
criminals is about what they should do but not what they should receive. 
Internal accountability sometimes directs people to do things in which risk 
overweighs benefit for good reasons. For example, in the Second World War, Oskar 
Schindler, as a member of the Nazi Party, employed Jews in his enamelware 
and ammunitions factories, and helped to rescue about 1200 Jews from being killed by 
Nazis; he did that with the knowledge that by doing so he could be “cleansed” under 
the conditions. In China, another Nazi Party member, John Rabe, after witnessing the 
astonishing “Nanjing Massacre”, made great efforts to record the atrocities of Japanese 
soldiers and established a safe zone which provided shelter for approximately 200,000 
Chinese so that they could be protected from the brutal slaughter. Their actions 
apparently exceeded the ordinary consideration of “profit and loss”, because the 
possible price for the choices they opted could have been too heavy to be “reasonable”. 
The proper explanation shall be that their internal accountability compelled them to 
fight against the evil, even if the consequences could be to pay with their own life. 
Hence, taking internal accountability is not necessarily inferior to be taking external 
accountability. It may require bravery to correct the wrong and it may be more difficult 
than passively following external judgement. 
Restorative justice aims to achieve such internal accountability for criminal 
offenders. It depends on making clear of the facts in relation to the crimes.528 In the 
restorative justice process, offenders join the group together with victims and other 
community members and get empowered to face the harm and loss of victims and the 
negative influence on the community. Through informal discussions and by exchanging 
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sincere information, offenders will be able to understand better the real pain of victims, 
and acknowledge their position in the community and the just desert, without 
necessarily being isolated from the victims and the community or suffering deprivation 
of freedom or property; instead they could be making a contribution to the restoration 
of the damaged social bond and to the re-establishment of the community. Internal 
accountability motivates offenders to feel responsible towards real humans rather than 
to bitter rules; in addition, restorative justice evokes such internal accountability of 
offenders and impels them to fulfil their responsibility through active conducts. This is 
the reason why restorative justice can make improvements to the formal criminal justice 
process: inspiring offenders to stand out, not coercing them to deny. 
Acceptance of the past 
Just desert as one central concept in justice is majorly determined by the past, thus 
it has a different impact on victims, offenders, and the law. For victims, knowing that 
offenders will be given just desert and are being punished, may release their eagerness 
to seek personal vengeance against offenders. But the legal principle of proportionality 
in punishment limits the way and the degree to punish; this will not bring ultimate 
satisfaction to victims on the point of seeing offenders fully “pay back”. If just desert 
is basically driven by negative motivations, including hatred and revenge, then the past 
that is identified by law for victims will be full of wickedness, and victims will 
anticipate no more than making offenders suffer the same way victims suffered. When 
the punishment does not match their anticipation, it is easy for victims to feel that the 
court has not acknowledged their past. This feeling can be even more furious in crimes 
of high severity, such as murder, torture and rape. In international crimes where serious 
crimes occur on a large scale and for long periods of time, negative feelings of victims 
are harder to ease because the perpetrators’ punishment can never reciprocate the 
damage they caused. When victims do not have enough chance to express their opinion 




be obsessed by the past. This is a potential risk in the just desert that the ICC manages 
to deliver. 
For law, especially for international law in the present study, just desert is about 
people’s compliance with, and obedience to legal provisions. From the legal perspective, 
international crimes offend the dignity of well-established rules and the conscience of 
humanity. By exercising international law, we, as non-stakeholders, declare that it is 
painful for all humanity to see what happened to victims so that just desert must not 
remain un-accomplished. But is it ethical or legitimate that the legal professionals, such 
as judges and prosecutors, feel close to victims, something that may possibly affect the 
fairness of the trial for the alleged persons? And if just desert is not made in regard to 
victims’ pain, it can only be on the basis that the law has been violated. Punishment, 
which does not consider the concerns of victims, only labels perpetrators as “law-
breakers” and the “enemy” of international law. The result of punishment at the ICC, 
therefore, shows that just desert is not about the victims’ interests, and that the painful 
past of victims is not as important as it is announced to be. In other words, the ICC only 
accepts the past it needs to justify the conceptual desert for the offenders. 
It has been proved that the just desert in connection with the power of 
condemnation of perpetrators of international crimes cannot be functioning well 
because the perpetrators do not willingly accept it. As it has been discussed above, the 
alleged persons incline to defend themselves with the denial or alleviation of the 
charged criminal actions and responsibility. They may acknowledge what they have 
done in the past deeply in their minds, but they will not reveal their true 
acknowledgement before the court, because by doing so, they could increase the risk of 
receiving severe penalties. As a matter of fact, all the convicted people so far at the ICC 
hereto have expressed remorse to victims and the affected communities, but did not 
completely waive their right to defend themselves against the charged crimes and the 




Prosecutor and made an admission of his guilt to the Court, but reserved his right to 
defend himself, because he thought that this might result in the exclusion of his criminal 
responsibility. His cooperative attitude and regretful expression was taken into 
consideration during the sentencing process, and was recognised as mitigating 
circumstance to the punishment.529 Since the acceptance of the past by criminals could 
reduce the gravity of their sentence technically, the real motivation of the remorse 
expressed before the Court remains unclear. It is possible that criminals will accept 
some aspects of the past that the Prosecutor concentrates on, for a mitigated punishment 
rather than for taking accountability. Furthermore, the Prosecutor does not examine the 
whole picture of the committed crimes; even when criminals are willing to be 
accountable to the past, they are not able to fully repair the damage and then expect to 
be included in reconciliation programs. As a result, restorative justice needs to take a 
role in the legal proceedings at the ICC to make criminals fully conscious of the past, 
and to provide space for them to take complete accountability. Only when they start to 
disclaim the righteousness of their actions in the past it is justifiable to confirm their 
sincerity in taking accountability. 
Solving the dispute and improving performance 
In retrospect of the past, formal criminal justice assumes punishment is the just 
desert for criminals, but fails to explain how inflicting penalty on criminals would repair 
the damage they caused, and why depriving specific rights from them could be 
beneficial to victims and communities. After all, isolating criminals from other people 
and normal life does not bring back the victims’ loss or make the wrong right. It is 
hardly rational to believe that we can un-harm something or someone that has already 
been harmed by causing pain to the wrongdoer; bringing loss to criminals is not a better 
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accountability than offering them a chance to make a contribution to society. But since 
in criminal courts, in particular the ICC in this study, the legal mechanism has 
subordinated victims and communities to law, both technically and in reality, the 
isolation of criminals, as described above, might be most often the form of holding them 
accountable. Other than re-toning the solemnity of international law at the ICC, 
retribution could not alternate the tragic situation for victims and local communities 
through its penal system. The penal system at the ICC solves the guilt and wicked nature 
by identifying the criminals with deserved endings, but it does not have concrete plans 
for the aftermath of punishment, which is being served by criminals. To a degree, the 
consequences of punishing those perpetrators may not be a problem for the ICC to 
consider. 
The restorative justice idea presents to the ICC more obligations by including the 
aim of creating better ends to perpetrators, victims, and the community. The extra 
obligation set by restorative justice idea to the ICC is not difficult, but will make the 
ICC’s work closer to the stakeholders. Thus, it may in fact assist the ICC to achieve its 
promised goals. In the restorative justice mechanism, the just desert is decided by the 
accountability for both the past and the future. The effectiveness of restoration is 
dependent on how much criminals truly sense the wrongness of their actions and admit 
the guilt of the past, so that the justice process is more persuasive than coercive. One 
significant aim in restorative justice is to reduce the criminals’ intention to defy and 
replace it with a true will to be better. The difficulty of delivering condemnation to the 
alleged criminals at the ICC can be pacified through the restorative justice mechanism 
because the latter involves the group to which criminals belong in the justice process 
and it places them at the focal point together with all the stakeholders. These criminals 
will receive justification from their people, making the solution more influential. Or the 
whole group of their people should hear the voices from other groups so that they can 




Through this way, criminals can regain the trust from their victims and from those 
whose lives have been affected by the crimes. 
The purpose of accountability has three folds. 530 First, taking account of the 
committed crimes by offenders aims to improve their quality of performance, thus 
bringing more beneficial results to the society. Unlike formal criminal justice where 
victims’ harm is not repaired, social bond’s damage is not restored, and offender’s 
reconciliation is detrimental, restorative justice includes all concerned parties and gives 
equal space to each one of them ensuring everyone’s story is heard and understood. All 
individuals shall be empowered and encouraged so that victims can obtain satisfaction 
from offenders, offenders will regain trust from victims, and the community will 
acquire harmony from both. Hence, everyone’s performance will be improved because 
all are reunited to share the same values and feelings towards each other. Second, the 
strengthened empathy and improved performance will enhance the legitimacy of 
criminals’ conducts in the future. It is not difficult to perceive that if people have 
positive feelings for the people of other groups, institutions, or culture, they incline to 
avoid any harm towards them. Because perpetrators of international crimes do not sense 
enough attachment to their victims and their communities, they have no deep sense of 
guilt to commit atrocities against other people; even though they might have realised 
the illegitimacy of such acts, they can still do so for personal or group interests. Through 
the restorative justice idea that can be utilised at the ICC, the relation of victims and 
offenders will be ameliorated, making it easier for the offenders to respect law and then 
to integrate legal rules into their actions. The constructive influence of restorative 
justice to reducing recidivism, caring for human rights, and correcting criminals’ 
behaviours has been empirically evidenced in many observations. 531  If criminals 
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become more respectful to laws and show enhanced understanding for human rights 
values after experiencing the restorative justice process, then the ICC needs to include 
some of these good practices in its justice procedure. Third, the outcomes of restorative 
justice can be better pursuing accountability ends. As it has been analysed above, 
restorative justice is able to achieve many goals that formal criminal justice cannot. 
Undoubtedly, more serious crimes cause more severe harm, and more severe harm 
needs more efforts to restore resulting in greater accountability for criminals. At 
international level, because the damage to communities and harm to victims are often 
tremendous compared to ordinary crimes, the need for restoration and the urge for 
accountability up-grades accordingly. Under this situation, mutual trust and respect 
between victims and perpetrators and between perpetrators and social rules and laws 
should function in the justice process in order to forge law compliance to prevent further 
crime. As Declan Roche argued, “[a]ny discussion of compliance would be incomplete 
without a discussion of the importance of trust in promoting good decision-making.”532 
Since in the formal process at the ICC, trust and respect are not recognised as central 
values, restorative justice needs to be introduced to play a significant role. 
Deterrent effect in restorative justice 
The sense of belongingness 
As it has already been discussed in the earlier parts of this study, formal criminal 
justice creates a barrier between criminals and social values that have been recognised 
and protected by law. Where there exists the formal criminal justice process, there will 
be a conflictive dispute-resolution, which positions criminals at the opposite side of law 
and the people whom the law announces to represent. As Karl Marx and Marxists 
analysed, law and the legal system, in particular criminal law, is structurally twined 
                                                 




with conflict and oppression due to the basic demand of one social class to rule and 
control another.533 Though the Marxist idea on difference, conflict and suppression 
between classes divided by economic status, has been contradicted by many; criminal 
law does establish a wall between offenders and victims, and generates “classes” of 
different people: the “law-violators” and the innocents. Criminals are seen not as part 
of the society during the trial process; thus, it vanishes the sense of belongingness of 
criminals with the harmed people and the damaged social bonds. As a result, the 
deterrence that criminal justice seeks turns less feasible because those, who are being 
prosecuted or punished are less empathetic and connected to their victims. The ICC that 
predominately relies on the formal criminal justice process cannot evade such criticism. 
Technically, the ICC did not create any classifying or identifying process that may 
separate people’s connection to each other. In most international crimes people 
belonging to different groups already suffered pre-existent hostilities. For example, in 
the civil wars, which finally developed into the violence of genocide in both Burundi 
and Rwanda, the lack of belongingness and the moral detachment between the Hutu 
and Tutsi people have been observed.534 However, the problem at the ICC is that it does 
not respond to those issues. The meaning of justice as the core purpose of the ICC is 
narrowed. At domestic level, crimes normally do not create a huge impact on the social 
order or the integrity of the state, but often remain as disputes between individuals, 
whereby national authorities need to get involved to build an impartial platform of 
resolution. As a result, the negative outcome of isolating the criminals from normal life 
and people they care about will not be as big as that of an international court. On the 
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one hand, punishing perpetrators could enhance the emotional link between 
perpetrators and their supporters, and could accelerate the disconnecting of offenders 
group from the victims group. Such danger has called for concerns, when Jean-Pierre 
Bemba was convicted,535 and could eradicate the conditions for achieving national 
reconciliation and social stability for both CAR and DRC, since Jean-Pierre Bemba was 
the former vice-president of DRC. So, punishing key criminals could result in departing 
from different groups of people conceptually but not visually. On the other hand, when 
international crimes are usually committed by one group against another, or by large 
numbers of people against others, isolation as a corollary of punishment at the ICC 
seems more problematic. First, isolating merely key criminals from their society does 
not reflect the severity of the crimes, as vast criminals may not face the same form of 
justice at all. When criminals do not commit the alleged crimes directly, like the Jean-
Pierre Bemba case 536 , the victims could deem such result as unfair. Second, it is 
impossible to isolate all criminals from victims, whether in domestic courts or in the 
ICC. Because such form of isolation means the factual secession of a state, which 
causes more problems to the situation. 
Consequently, the isolative method inside the penal system at the ICC may not be 
a functional idea at all. Being cognate to the domestic criminal justice but lacking the 
essential social, cultural, political and powerful support that appears to assist domestic 
courts to administrate cases, the justice process at the ICC could not duplicate the 
success of domestic criminal courts from a similar justice mechanism. 
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Restorative justice manages to include criminals and victims together and regards 
all people who are responsible for the crime equally. It does not isolate criminals at trial 
or in their treatment. Instead, all criminals must get involved in hearing the stories of 
victims and express their ideas about the crime. Most conflicts in Africa have been 
brought forth by different exclusive identifications between groups, which largely 
undermine the sense of belongingness with others537; it is more realistic and effective 
to achieve deterrence from this view rather than utilising the “threatening image” of 
punishment. Deterrent justice should not be an end, and deterrence should not be 
respected as the necessary conclusion of punishment. It is noteworthy that everyone 
must belong to a group in a modern society, and that no one should be alone living in 
the world. On many occasions, interacting with others in the community will establish 
the connections, especially when someone makes contributions to others’ lives and 
toward the construction of community. For raising the sense of belongingness to 
criminals as well as to victims, the justice process shall call for criminals to serve the 
victims and communities as their punishment to convey the message of belonging and 
achieve deterrence. 
The power of shame and guilt 
The function of shame in restorative justice has been placed at the central part in 
many related studies. Sometimes shame punishment is viewed as an alternative to 
incarceration in the penal system to reach the desired ends.538 Shaming has a long 
history in punishing criminals. 539  For example, in Ancient Greece, people would 
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publically shame the criminals if they were judged as being guilty.540 In Ancient China, 
a special facial tattoo was used to shame the criminals by discriminating them from 
others with making permanent symbols onto their appearance.541 John Braithwaite 
argues that shaming is an important component in a society’s culture for people to 
understand what is wrongdoing.542 He examined the shaming effects in formal criminal 
justice and stated that the form of the shaming process in formal criminal justice is 
“stigmatising” nature, which pushes criminals to incline from committing a crime 
again.543 He further indicated that restorative justice applies another form of shame- 
“re-integrative” shame, to improve the conscience building for criminals and to achieve 
re-offending reduction.544 
The role of shame in justice is not unchallenged. Some researchers have 
confronted the re-integrative shame theory and argued that it is guilt that relates to 
empathy and reparation, but shame inclines to provoke more negative emotions causing 
the rejection of responsibility.545 In criminal justice the main mission is to prove the 
guilt of offenders and then to decide the form and severity of punishment. The guilt of 
criminals that we see in court is determined by others rather than by the criminals 
themselves. It does not require the criminals to become conscientious about their 
perpetrations. However, the true guilt that is found by criminals about their wrongful 
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actions needs self-questioning. True guilt comes from the negation of their past and 
their criminal actions therein, proceeds to the concern in victims’ pain and the respect 
to legal and social values. On this point, the internal guilt of criminals may be dependent 
on the feeling of shame. Shame is a painful feeling of humiliation or distress caused by 
the consciousness of wrong or foolish actions. It can derive from the treatment of others 
towards us and it can turn into humiliation; otherwise, it may stem from self-
consciousness reminding us of the mistakes we committed towards others. From this 
view, shame does not necessarily direct the rejection of responsibility, as long as 
criminals do not feel the unbearable humiliation during the justice process. 
Furthermore, positivistic research has disclosed a phenomenon that in restorative 
justice shame is more re-integrative; here the shaming mechanism works well, rather 
than in formal criminal justice.546 However, when shame is understood only as other 
people’s disapproval, the criminals would perceive the stigmatising effect, whether it 
is in restorative justice or formal criminal justice.547 Therefore, it seems that stigma in 
bringing shaming cannot be simply avoided, even in restorative justice. The issue that 
is more important in managing shame in the justice process is how to use shame to 
promote deterrence to crime rather than resistance to justice. As Howard Zehr stated, 
“[s]hame is a basic emotion that can be used for good or ill but cannot be ignored”.548 
In fact, formal criminal justice, including the legal proceedings at the ICC, does not 
consider the advantage of shame to ameliorate criminals’ behaviour, but weighs more 
on the shaming influence itself in punishment. The ethical problem of taking shame as 
a “threat” to prevent crime is not a concern of the present study. From the standpoint of 
effectiveness in deterrence, formal criminal justice at international tribunals lacks the 
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motivating mechanism to self-conscious shame. For example, the first guilty plea case 
at the ICTY, the Erdemović case, Mr. Erdemović stated in his confession to the Court 
that he was fully aware of the wickedness of his actions to victims and to the country, 
and admitted his crime openly even before he was arrested in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia549. His guilty plea cannot be recognised as being driven by pure conscience 
because he argued for his acquittal based on his confession550, meaning that at least he 
had the intention to avoid or to mitigate punishment through a procedural technique. In 
the first guilty plea case at the ICC, Mr. Al Mahdi showed similar intention when he 
confessed his crime. In fact, all criminals who ended up in a guilty plea at all 
international criminal tribunals asked for mitigated punishment. Since they think that 
their sentences are too heavy for their responsibility in wide-spread, or systematic 
murders, rapes, abductions, forcible displacements and disappearances, tortures, and 
other forms of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, as well as for 
the tremendous suffering and loss of their victims, it is hard to justify how much 
sincerity there was in their confessions. 
Why self-motivated shame and guilt is better than externally caused shame in 
achieving deterrence? It mainly relates to the genuineness of criminals in desistance 
from crime. One imperative value of a guilty plea is that the alleged understands the 
guilt and the gravity of it. It is hardly believable that criminals feel guilty without 
sensing any shame for the violent crimes and the consequences of them that they caused. 
When feeling shameful, the criminals, who are responsible for extremely serious crimes, 
do not tend to argue for being less responsible, because they should understand that 
their sentence could not at all repair the pain and loss of victims of international crimes. 
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Externally caused shame changes the criminals’ words, but self-motivated shame 
changes their will. 
However, it must be noted that self-motivated shame/guilt is very difficult to 
achieve. At the ICC, alleged criminals are taken into account for crimes that were 
committed by numerous persons, so the shame of being judged as the enemy of 
humanity is too painful to be admitted. The restorative justice idea can help the ICC 
obtain a better chance to achieving self-motivated shame. In the restorative justice 
approaches, crimes are spoken, shared and discussed by the whole group, and the shame 
is often borne by all criminals, or even by other stakeholders. More importantly, in 
restorative justice criminals are treated as normal people, not enemies. What is denied 
in restorative justice is not the criminals, or the group they serve, but their overall 
conducts in the past. Criminals must finalise their crime, fully recognise what is wrong, 
and then leave the shame in the past rather than bearing it continuously. Shame is used 
to inspire criminals to change their will and ameliorate their actions in the future. That 
is the true power of shame and guilt that the ICC needs to explore for achieving 
deterrence. 
Forgiveness and hope for future 
Forgiveness from victims is not a necessary outcome of justice. In formal criminal 
justice, victims’ feelings are not a concern to the court. The interest in law and the 
proper treatment of criminals are the focus of formal criminal justice. On ordinary 
occasions, victims experience a loss from part of themselves, the uncertainty of safety, 
vulnerability, and the feeling of inequality and injustice.551 They have to participate in 
several types of therapeutic programs to recover their pain and trauma caused by 
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crime.552 Restorative justice tries to include the care for victims in its process, and 
creates a pattern in which victims, together with offenders at times, can feel the 
concerns from others so that their pain can be healed, and their anger and fear can be 
restored. Forgiveness is acknowledged as an important value in restorative justice, but 
not a goal that must be obtained. John Braithwaite averred the value of forgiveness in 
justice to achieve restoration, and pointed out that 
“Forgiveness is the most powerful emotion tool for encouraging the 
perpetrators of evil and the contributors to evil to own their contribution. 
Nurturing forgiveness often requires considerable reticence in resorting 
to selective use of the criminal process.”553 
Even forgiveness is difficult to achieve, there still needs criminal justice procedure 
to endeavour in bringing about forgiveness. The primary reason for justice to focus on 
forgiveness is that it benefits victims in many ways. It is not hard to understand that 
after being victimised, people easily feel negative emotions. Early psychological 
research revealed some bright effects of forgiveness in diminishing those feelings. 
According to some scientific observations, forgiveness (i) is helpful for victims to 
forget the painful experience or their past and frees them from being trapped by some 
persons and events of the past; (ii) facilitates the reconciliation process and repairs the 
broken relationships more successfully than the expression of negative emotions; (iii) 
decreases the possibility that negative feelings will be misdirected to some innocent 
people in the future; (iv) lessens the subconscious worry about the influence of negative 
emotions.554 Hence, forgiveness could contribute to the health and mental stability of 
                                                 
552 Frank M. Ochberg (ed.), Post-traumatic Therapy and Victims of Violence (Routledge 2014). 
553 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press 2002), at pp. 
203. 
554 Richard P. Fitzgibbons, ‘The Cognitive and Emotive Uses of Forgiveness in the Treatment of Anger’ 




victims, reduces the painful feelings, and empowers them with hope for the future with 
bravery to overcome the impact of being victimised.555 Those benefits can help victims 
feel less disappointed in the negligence of their needs in formal criminal justice, so the 
likelihood for victims to take personal actions against offenders, which indicates more 
permissiveness rather than deterrence to crime, will be refrained to a low degree. 
Forgiveness functions as a mediator between victims and offenders. When 
offenders feel true and self-motivated shame, they will need to go through a process 
that will transfer the shame to the motivation of being better persons or to behave better. 
However, the need to release offenders from shame does not mean that victims have 
moved on from the effects of crime. Victims and offenders may have different views 
on the crimes especially the effect of crimes that would continue to be a concern for 
victims even if offenders consider those crimes to be over. The criminals who are ready 
to alter themselves need the approval from victims. Without forgiveness expressed by 
victims, there is a risk that criminals may deny their effort in restoration and the 
necessity of feeling shame, thus undermining the deterrent outcome of justice. But to 
forgive is a long process that requires patience on behalf of the criminals, who have to 
wait for the victims to stop blaming them. Studies state: “victims who forgave were 
more likely to demonstrate perspective taking and emotional concern for their offender 
than were victims who did not forgive”.556 So the mutual concern between victims and 
criminals is epochal for both to overwhelm the negative emotions and to ensure the 
effectiveness of justice. 
Recent studies also discovered similar findings on the role that forgiveness plays 
in criminal justice. It is indicated that forgiveness can be positively linked with the sense 
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of justice that individuals may be motivated to perceive a general feeling of fairness in 
social interaction, and when justice belief is thought salient, it can encourage rather than 
impede forgiveness.557 In addition, when the feeling of revenge is not viable, the belief 
of justice is better established among victims and offenders.558 On this point, if the 
desire for revenge is detrimental for maintaining the belief of justice, criminal justice 
must develop a system that will reduce the desire of victims and those who care about 
them to seek revenge. It is well known that in modern society, seeking personal revenge 
for criminal offenders is highly discouraged, illegal and forbidden. In restorative justice 
revenge is also not permitted. When forgiveness increases, there will be less space for 
revenge because forgiveness and revenge are often opposite emotions for humans. 
From the viewpoint of evolution, research has concluded that revenge has been a natural 
response for human ancestors to put an end to aggression. As well, the opportunity to 
achieve forgiveness in the aftermath of criminal offense is generally higher among those 
who have a history of association, shared values, similar interests, and good mutual 
understanding.559 All the indicators above show that for reaching the end of forgiveness 
to substantiate the belief of justice, formal criminal justice falls short of capability. 
Relevant studies support restorative justice as a better mechanism for forgiveness. 
Victims are more likely to associate increased forgiveness, benevolence and reduced 
avoidance and revenge motivations with intimate relationships that are created in 
restorative justice; also in the de-individualised context of formal criminal justice 
victims incline to feel the opposite way.560 The supportive and empowering mechanism 
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in restorative justice where victims have enough time and respect to speak out their 
stories as well as the negative emotions therein can facilitate their motivation to move 
on. Thus the forgiveness received by criminals will truly accomplish the healing effects 
of crime to victims, communities, and the criminals themselves. 
However, there is a noteworthy concern in forgiveness. As it has been analysed, 
forgiveness shall not be pushed or compelled. If forgiveness is forced upon victims, the 
restoration will turn into a denial on the part of victims’ need or even a humiliation. 
Philosophical principles have signalled that hasty forgiveness, or forced forgiveness, is 
sometimes called “cheap grace” and will harass justice.561 One who understands the 
victims’ feelings must consider the following: 
“Reconciliation [and forgiveness] is not an event. People cannot simply 
one day decide that they want to forgive and forget. Most of the victims 
in this community are committed to a process of reconciliation. They 
are not necessarily demanding vengeance. They are, at the same time, 
not simply willing to move ahead as if nothing happened. They demand 
to hear the truth and to be given time to consider it. They are often not 
willing to forgive unless the perpetrators show remorse and some form 
of reparation is offered”.562 
Victims have been harmed once by crimes so that it is absolutely understandable 
that they take a long time to re-establish their confidence in life and in the future. It 
does not mean that there will be hardly a hope for forgiveness and reconciliation. 
Empirical survey on the post-conflict social re-construction in Liberia informs that the 
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majority of victims have positive opinions about forgiving criminals, which is more 
frequently an answer compared to “making criminals face trial”. 563  Victims of 
international crimes are stronger than people think, and they know that reparation and 
healing is better undertaken with their willingness to forgive and reconcile. 
Nevertheless, as so many countries have mistakenly understood the meaning of 
restorative justice and conceptualised forgiveness as a policy to restoration, it shall be 
reminded that as the centre of restorative justice, victims must not be compelled to 
express forgiveness, even if forgiveness has many positive influences on deterrence. 
Similar to shame for criminals, true forgiveness is an internal feeling that cannot be 
imposed externally. 
5. Restorative justice ends impunity in international criminal 
justice 
The principle of non-impunity and anti-amnesty: the concept of 
accountability 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, impunity generally means the 
“exemption from punishment or freedom from the injurious consequences of an action”. 
This definition shows that non-impunity can be regarded as the practicing of 
punishment, and furthermore such punishment must be executed to the offenders. In 
the instruments of international law, impunity is defined as “the impossibility, de jure 
or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account”564. According to this 
definition, impunity is also associated with “accountability”. Non-impunity, thus, could 
be acknowledged as “taking accountability of the perpetrators of international crimes”. 
                                                 
563 Patrick Vinck, Phuong Pham and Tino Kreutzer, ‘Talking Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes 
about Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia’ (2011) University of California, 
Berkeley: Human Rights Center, at pp. 68. 
564 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion 




It is supposed that such accountability shall only be taken through formal criminal 
justice procedure. 
The principle of non-impunity to international crimes has obliged states to take 
necessary actions to bring perpetrators to justice. The International Law Commission 
adopted and then submitted its final report named the Obligation to Extradite or 
Prosecute at its 66th session in 2014, which answered the question of how to fight 
against impunity at international level. In that report, the obligation of fighting against 
impunity for perpetrators of international crimes demands the following: when a 
perpetrator is responsible for serious violations of international human rights or 
international humanitarian rights appears in the territory of a state, that state must take 
necessary judicial actions to either (i) prosecute the perpetrator; (ii) extradite the 
perpetrator if it has been proven to be more proper for the interest of justice; (iii) submit 
the perpetrator to a competent international criminal tribunal/court whose jurisdiction 
the State concerned has recognised.565 The obligation to extradite or prosecute is based 
on the requirement of the rule of law that was adopted by the UN General Assembly at 
its 67th session in 2012 which declares that 
“[I]mpunity is not tolerated for genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity or for violations of international humanitarian law 
and gross violations of human rights law, and that such violations are 
properly investigated and appropriately sanctioned, including by 
bringing the perpetrators of any crimes to justice, through national 
mechanisms or, where appropriate, regional or international 
mechanisms, in accordance with international law, and for this 
purpose we encourage States to strengthen national judicial systems 
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The International Law Commission specifically distinguishes the English 
expression of “the obligation to prosecute or extradite” from its Latin form, aut dedere 
aut judicare,567 to make clear the obligation of fighting against impunity is not based 
on the pure retributive desire. If the principle to end the impunity in international crimes 
does not demand the punishment of criminals, the obligation of states shall be 
interpreted as taking proper legal actions, in particular prosecutorial actions, to respond 
to the serious violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, even the criminals might not be convicted eventually. Such nature of 
impunity may provide a breakthrough to examining the relationship of restorative 
justice and the formal justice proceedings at the ICC. The principle of non-impunity in 
international criminal law means taking accountability of the perpetrators of 
international crimes, but not necessarily punishing them. 
This interpretation is supported in international legal documents. The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights investigated the political transition in Sri Lanka and 
the resolutions of human rights violations in the past, and found that the failure of the 
Government of Sri Lanka to comply with the obligation to end impunity was caused by 
the insufficiency to address the accountability for the most serious human rights 
violations and crimes.568 In the recent report, the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights highlighted that ending impunity through strengthening the 
accountability of those perpetrators of gross human rights violations had received 
remarkable outcomes in different states and regions; as well, taking account of the 
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atrocities had also prompted national legislations to protect human rights and the 
wellbeing of local people.569 On this point, taking accountability of perpetrators of 
international crimes has been practically connected to the obligation to end impunity. 
Academic studies also underscore the importance of recognising accountability as 
a contributor to the non-impunity principle. The International Commission of Jurists 
treasures the value of holding human rights violators accountable for their actions in 
order to put an end to impunity, restore the rule of law and address the need of victims 
through the provision of justice accompanied by reparative progress. 570  Relevant 
research on post-war reconstruction indicates that the wide application of impunity has 
exposed the confirmation of the lack of accountability in many countries, which denied 
the wrongness of the criminal actions of past regimes and even denied the very 
existence of those crimes themselves.571 Taking no accountability of past international 
crimes, which is a violation of the non-impunity principle, can cause continuous 
instability to a country, thus undermining the efforts toward sustainable nation 
building.572 The lens of non-impunity principle shall not be limited to that perpetrators 
of international crimes must be punished in accordance with the set penalties in 
international law. Rather, it requires that the perpetrators must take accountability to the 
atrocities that they committed to victims and the community. 
The principle of non-impunity in international criminal cases is linked with 
amnesty. Amnesty usually implies that no penalty would be sentenced to the offenders. 
The Oxford Dictionary of Law defines amnesty as “an act erasing from legal memory 
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some aspects of criminal conducts by an offender” and it is “wider than a pardon which 
merely relieves an offender of punishment”. According to this definition, amnesty is 
perhaps the most intolerable form of impunity for perpetrators of international crimes. 
It may not the case in discussing issues in relation to amnesty in international criminal 
law. 
In the discussions on international law, amnesty may not be understood differently 
as impunity. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
provided in its publication that amnesty has the legal effects to prospectively bar 
criminal prosecution and any forms of civil actions against the perpetrator(s) of 
international crimes, and retrospectively nullify the legal liability of such person(s).573 
The definition of amnesty concluded by OHCHR regards amnesty and impunity for 
international crimes as having similar effect, though it had distinguished amnesty from 
official immunity in the later part of the same publication.574 Official immunity for 
perpetrators of international crimes is often referred to the situation that officials of a 
State can be shield from being prosecuted at a foreign court. Amnesty for international 
crimes, which is usually granted by an authority of a State to its own civilians, triggers 
the legal effect that other competent national or international court could exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime and repeal the extraterritorial effect of such amnesty.575 
Normally, in the situations of serious human rights violations and gross violence, 
impunity is guaranteed to the offenders through national amnesty legislation. In nature, 
the principle of non-impunity and anti-amnesty in international crimes both insist that 
there shall not be obstacle to exert criminal prosecution against the perpetrators. For the 
perpetrators who are not officials of a State, non-impunity and anti-amnesty are of the 
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same legal effect. In this perspective, anti-amnesty is also centred on the accountability 
that perpetrator must take. 
Michael P. Scharf argued for amnesty in dealing with issues in on-going conflict 
and post-conflict States, and stated that “amnesty is not equivalent to impunity”.576 But 
his argument did not regard non-impunity as taking accountability. In fact, his argument 
highlighted the significance of accountability in practicing amnesty: 
“It is a common misconception that granting amnesty from prosecution 
is equivalent to foregoing accountability and redress… [A]mnesty is 
often tied to accountability mechanisms that are less invasive than 
domestic or international prosecution. Where amnesty has been traded 
for peace, the concerned governments have made monetary reparations 
to the victims and their families, established truth commissions to 
document the abuses (and sometimes identify perpetrators by name), 
and have instituted employment bans and purges (referred to as 
‘lustration’) that keep such perpetrators from positions of public trust. 
While not the same as criminal prosecution, these mechanisms do 
encompass the fundamentals of a criminal justice system: prevention, 
deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation.”577 
It is the capability of amnesty to achieve certain forms of accountability of the atrocity 
perpetrators that has made many experts to advocate such measure. However, the ICC 
has its own way to judge the implication of accountability. The capability of amnesty 
to achieve accountability has not been acknowledged at the ICC. 
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The complicated attitude toward amnesty 
The way to view non-impunity and anti-amnesty has influenced the work of the 
ICC Prosecutor. In examining the role of the ICC in the transitional justice in Colombia 
in 2015, the OTP affirmed that one crucial purpose to establish the ICC was to hold the 
individuals accountable for the serious crimes they committed,578 and there could be 
many ways to achieve such accountability in transitional justice.579 Amnesty to some 
crimes could be granted through national practice, however, it should not be issued for 
the most responsible persons whose acts were involved in Rome Statute crimes.580 This 
statement emphasised the importance of holding accountability of the perpetrators for 
the most serious atrocities, but refused to admit amnesty for the most responsible people 
as an adequate way. In September 2015, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) was 
established as the judicial component for the transitional justice in Colombia, which is 
based on the peace agreement signed by the Government of Colombia and the rebellion 
group. The Prosecutor noticed in the annual Preliminary Examination Report for 2015 
that the legal text for SJP had excluded the amnesty for Rome Statute crimes581, and 
expressed the will to respect the effort at domestic level to end impunity of international 
crimes.582 
In the 2017 Report on Preliminary Examination, the Prosecutor underlined that the 
Amnesty Law in Colombia enabled granting amnesty for war crimes committed in 
systematic manner, warning that it might result in the admissibility of the situation in 
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Colombia at the ICC.583 In 2018, the Office of the Prosecutor reviewed the transitional 
justice in Colombia one more time. In the review, the Office of the Prosecutor addressed 
that the values shrined in the Rome Statute are share by States Parties of the ICC, which 
“embrace accountability, to put an end to impunity for crimes, such as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, and deterrence of the commission of such crimes.”584 As to 
the transitional justice approaches, the OTP paid specific attention to the changes in the 
Amnesty Law in Colombia which overruled the granting of amnesty for war crimes of 
systematic manner in the original text in 2016. The OTP praised the changes, and 
iterated the importance of being consistent with “the position that OTP takes”.585 Once 
again, the Office of the Prosecutor announced that amnesty could be granted in 
transitional justice process, but would never be applied to the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. 
The attitude to amnesty has been self-consistent at the ICC. In the situation of 
Uganda, the granting of amnesty for Joseph Kony and others was examined in Pre-Trial 
Chamber II’s Decision on the admissibility of the case, which indicated that the 
amnesty legislation in Uganda had limited the capacity of Ugandan authority to pursue 
proper accountability. 586 The Decision of the Court invoked the discussion on the 
ICC’s impact to peace and justice. During the Review Conference of the Rome Statute 
in 2010, the topic “Peace and Justice” was discussed in the panel run among several 
experts, receiving many written contributions as material background. The moderator 
of the panel listed many disadvantages of enabling amnesty to deal with international 
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crimes, including that amnesty “often did not lead the hoped-for peace” in short term, 
and “failing to address crimes could result in renewed cycle of violence” in long 
term.587 Although all the participants of this panel acknowledged that amnesty is not 
an option for the most serious crimes under the Rome Statute, many also suggested that 
amnesty could have played significant role in the situation of transitional justice in 
making peace.588 
Four experts were invited to give lectures in this panel. Mr. David Tolbert, the 
President of International Center for Transitional Justice, highlighted the impact of 
amnesty in peace negotiation to end on-going conflict. He also noted that the Prosecutor 
should be mindful to the political reality and meanwhile avoid to get involved into 
politics. It was also suggested by Mr. Tolbert in the discussion panel that some 
mechanisms other than judicial process could help to achieve reparation, reconciliation 
and security, which “could be a fundamental complement” to the formal criminal justice 
for the perpetrators.589 Mr. James LeMoyne and Mr. Barney Afako respectively spoke 
of their experience in Colombia and in Uganda, implying their support to amnesty for 
ending conflict. Mr. LeMoyne pointed out that though justice would make peace long-
lasting, there were also some example in which peace was achieved without addressing 
justice.590 Mr. Afako emphasised the opinion in local population in hoping that the 
armed conflict could be ended by granting to the rebels. Among other issues, such as 
the lack of capability of the ICC to enforce the warrants of arrest again the LRA leaders, 
Mr. Afako admitted that ICC’s indictment had play a key role that LRA leadership 
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decided not to sign the peace agreement. 591  What is noteworthy is that both Mr. 
LeMoyne and Mr. Afako advocated to utilise flexible measures in the work of peace 
negotiation process.592 Mr. Youk Chhang, Director of the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia, on the contrary, expressed the idea that justice against the offender of serious 
human rights violations could be late, but should never be delayed.593 He argued for 
the role of justice as essential for a broken society and preventive to future crime, and 
urged real criminal court in dealing with atrocities in the past.594 One significant reason 
for the opinion of Mr. Chhang to be different from other panellists’ may be the security 
situations, that Cambodia was facing post-conflict social rebuild, but in Colombia and 
Uganda armed conflict was still a threat. Different situations made them worry different 
problems. It did not contest the short term effect of amnesty in peace negotiation, but 
simply suggested that when social security had been controlled, amnesty for 
perpetrators of international crime would not be necessary. The general opinion on 
amnesty that had been reflected in discussing peace and justice in the 2010 Review 
Conference, according to the panellists’ statements, was that notwithstanding amnesty 
being prohibited under Rome Statute, it should still be carefully weighed based on 
realistic issues. 
The received written materials for the panel also displayed a complicated situation. 
Many experts steadily support the ICC’s position that amnesty should not be granted to 
the persons responsible for the most serious crimes. For example, professor Juan E. 
Méndez criticised the idea that peace could be achieved through negotiation which 
granted amnesty by indicating that any peace process was not initiated in Sudan until 
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ICC decided to intervene the situation.595 He highlighted the influence of the formal 
criminal justice at the ICC in preventing violence and in marginalising the alleged 
persons. He might have missed some points that in the examples listed in his argument, 
in the situations where the ICC’s work was believed as playing an important role, such 
as Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, and Sudan, external political and military influence could 
have played a much bigger role than the ICC. Some recent developments in the security 
issues in Africa, particularly in Sudan, has shown that ICC’s role in preventing violence 
and marginalising the alleged persons has not been a total success. Nevertheless, his 
statement did remark one core problem of the ICC’s work, that for long-term success 
the ICC needs all States Parties’ sincere cooperation. “If the ICC is contemplated simply 
as a lever, it will be undermined as some will expect it to be turned on and off as political 
circumstances dictate.”596 
Another expert, Yasmin Sooka, did not discuss amnesty in international criminal 
cases. Instead, she analysed combating impunity under such situation. It mentioned in 
the article that the recent armed conflicts were intrastate struggles, which caused much 
more damage for civilian population of the State than for other States. The “hit and run” 
tactics in the intrastate struggles made it very difficult to end the conflict with military 
interference. Therefore, the intrastate armed conflicts had to be ended with peace deal, 
granting amnesty to the combatants.597 However, the solution of ending armed conflicts 
with granting amnesty had been rejected by the ICC in its work. Furthermore, the 
aftermath of the signing of a peace deal is more significant because “[a]ttitudes and 
behaviours do not change from genocidal to collegial just because of a declaration of 
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peace”. 598  The system of impunity would undermine the peace building process, 
regardless whether a peace agreement had been signed or not. The question in peace 
building is not “whether to pursue justice and accountability, but rather when and 
how”.599 The discussion in this article exposed the nature in the debate of “peace and 
justice”: the accountability. Taking the accountability of the perpetrators of 
international crimes is indisputably welcomed by all people- except for the perpetrators 
themselves, of course- if there is any chance to achieve justice without sacrificing peace. 
However, the time and the way to take the perpetrators accountable must be carefully 
calculated. 
The UN Special Rapporteur, Sean Murphy, also discovered the difficulty in taking 
the accountability of the perpetrators. In the third report on crime against humanity, it 
informed the UN General Assembly on behalf of the International Law Commission 
that on the one hand, “[a]mnesties have been found impermissible by regional human 
rights courts because they preclude accountability under regional human rights 
treaties”.600 But on the other hand, it also finds that amnesty has been utilised through 
history in States’ practice, even for serious crimes.601 Treaty law and case law provide 
evidence to both supporting amnesty and precluding amnesty, making it hard to 
conclude whether there exists consensus on the absolute prohibition of amnesty in 
dealing with international crimes. Specifically, it points out that the Protocol II 
additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions has clearly encouraged States to end armed 
conflict with amnesty, which is read as 
“At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to 
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grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in 
the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related 
to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.”602 
Professor Schabas examined this treaty law by checking the original draft, but 
found it not sufficient to exclude amnesty granted to international crimes. 603 It is 
explained that it is the wisdom in utilising amnesty to solve issues in conflict that must 
be respected: 
“Human societies have been negotiating peace agreements since the 
beginning of recorded time. Amnesties have often been part of such 
transitional justice mechanisms, which existed, after all, long before 
the modern term ‘transitional justice’ had been invented. The relevant 
treaty provisions probably reflect the inherited wisdom derived from 
these peace processes.”604 
In the analysis on amnesty and international law, professor Schabas checked Sierra 
Leone’s peace agreement which granted amnesty for war crimes, and referred States’ 
attitudes of acquiescing in the amnesty when it was discussed at the UN Security 
Council in 1999. 605  It was not the peace agreement that international community 
objected, but the capability to hold the accountability of the most responsible persons 
for the serious crimes. The Delegate for Sierra Leone admitted that the negotiation 
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the rebel group was long and painful, but 
local people had prepared for the coming peace. It was stated by the Delegate of Sierra 
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“Despite the destruction of life and property and the maiming 
committed by the rebels against the people of Sierra Leone, including 
children as young as six months old, they are prepared to bury the 
hatchet for the sake of permanent peace. It is a bitter pill to swallow, but 
that is the price they are prepared to pay for peace.”606 
The Delegate of UK expressed the understanding to Sierra Leone’s choice, and 
noticed that international community must help Sierra Leone to ensure taking 
accountability of the alleged person.607 The Delegate of Netherlands disagreed with the 
amnesty in the Sierra Leone’s peace deal, and underlined that without taking 
accountability of the heinous crimes there would be no lasting peace.608 The Delegate 
of US stood at the position to support the peace deal and the amnesty, and in the 
meantime urged for the pursuit of accountability of the international crimes.609 The 
opinion of these three Delegates are typical examples demonstrating the worries in 
making compromise to amnesty and in fighting against impunity. It must be noted that 
during the whole process of discussion, the idea of accountability was not challenged 
by any State Member. Delegates tried to seek the satisfactory way to guarantee to end 
impunity of international crimes from different angle of understanding accountability, 
which made them struggle in viewing amnesty. It clearly evident the fact that the 
concept of accountability is the key to adjust the relationship between amnesty and non-
impunity principle in international criminal justice. 
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The turning point: pursuing non-impunity beyond punitive response 
The accountability has been understood in retributive way, as it has clarified in the 
early part of this chapter. The retributive ideology at the ICC, especially that held by 
the Prosecutor, is that the perpetrators must be prosecuted in the formal justice 
procedure, and when convicted, they must be given the desert set in the Rome Statute. 
In other words, the accountability at the ICC is based on the penalties in the Rome 
Statute system, and the Prosecutor is the core in achieving such accountability. 
This insistence on the key role of the ICC in pursuing accountability of the 
perpetrators of international crimes could be helpful in avoiding the ICC from being 
marginalised in international criminal justice. But if States’ practice and local culture 
have not been respected, such effect might be weakened, because the States whose 
situations have been intervened by the ICC’s work would feel detached from the Court. 
Now the granting of amnesty cannot be used as a gist by the Defendant in court. The 
most responsible persons for international crimes must go through prosecution at 
domestic court or at the ICC, leaving no place for amnesty and very limited space for 
restorative approaches. As a result, the perpetrators are asked to be accountable for legal 
principles and the Court, but not for victims and the affected community. The negative 
side of the ICC’s view on accountability has been analysed by scholars. It has been 
argued that 
“[T]he anti-amnesty norm has been justified predominantly as a 
component of a battle against impunity, and impunity has been 
understood virtually entirely in non-consequentialist terms, as a 
retributive principle of narrowly defined criminal justice according to 
which the desert of punishment alone grounds a positive duty to 
prosecute and punish, on deontic grounds. If this positive duty- either 




taken as a serious side constraint to any consequentialist evaluation of 
policy options for overcoming endemic violence, then the anti-amnesty 
norm seems… to be fatally weak, intuitively implausible, and very 
defeasible by the kinds of consequentialist considerations…”610 
For making the pursuit of accountability more meaningful and more realistic for 
fulfilling the goal of achieving justice, the ICC must recognise the accountability for 
the perpetrators of international crimes, and shall take the idea of restoration into the 
consideration of accountability. Being responsible for international law is just one 
aspect in non-impunity principle. Restorative justice idea, which has been affirmed by 
the ICC on different occasions, requires the Court to take one brave step forward. 
For fighting impunity, the penal system in international criminal law is not the only 
path. The UN Human Rights Council proposed that  
“The occurrence of a human rights violation gives rise to a right to 
receive reparation for or on behalf of the victim or their beneficiaries, 
and a duty on the part of the State to make reparation and provide a 
possibility for the victim to seek redress from the perpetrator. The right 
to the truth entitles the victims, their relatives and the public at large to 
seek and obtain all relevant information concerning the commission of 
the alleged violation, the fate and whereabouts of the victim and, where 
appropriate, the process by which the alleged violation was officially 
authorized, as well as the extent and pattern of past violations, and their 
root causes. It requires States to establish processes that lead to the 
revelation of the truth about what took place. Such processes contribute 
to the fight against impunity, the reinstatement of the rule of law and, 
                                                 
610 Max Pensky, ‘Amnesty on Trial: Impunity, Accountability, and the Norms of International Law’ (2008) 




ultimately, reconciliation. Truth-seeking processes also contribute to the 
prevention of violations through specific recommendations, including 
on reparations and reforms.”611 
Professor Bassiouni expressed the same idea before the Rome Statute went into force, 
stating that the elimination of impunity in dealing with international crimes calls for 
more efforts than those in formal criminal justice, and that “the ICC will not prevent 
injustice, conflicts, or crimes. It will neither end impunity nor will it consistently 
achieve justice. The ICC is merely an added means by which to achieve 
accountability”.612 
Non-impunity does not necessarily mean that criminals of atrocities must be 
punished in the way stipulated in criminal law, nor does it limit relevant activities to 
absolute legalism; the obstacle between restorative justice and the ICC, which is placed 
by impunity/amnesty, should not be problematic anymore. As it has been introduced in 
the third chapter, restorative justice is not made of a certain pattern or model with 
constant steps. Rather, it is more about criminal philosophies and concepts.613 So, 
theoretically speaking, restorative justice does not pay too much attention to what 
methods should be used in its process. Restorative justice may be seen as a practice of 
the philosophy of pragmatism, which may utilise different measures to fulfil one 
purpose or value.614 In fact, the proponents of restorative justice do not spend time in 
recognising the philosophy behind the restorative justice idea. They focus more on the 
values of restorative justice. 
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The first and pivotal value of restorative justice is the engagement of all parties of 
the criminal case. Many supporters of restorative justice criticise formal criminal justice, 
as it does not consider victims’ needs throughout its procedure. The criticism 
demonstrates that formal criminal justice puts focus on laws and how certain behaviours 
break the law. Therefore, it leaves little space for victims to fully participate in the 
criminal procedure. Furthermore, formal criminal justice positions crime between 
criminals and States rather than victims who are really harmed by the criminal 
behaviours, neglecting the requirement of the victims’ healing needs.615 Others argue 
that formal criminal justice drives offenders away from victims because they 
concentrate on their “fight” with prosecutors. 616  Also, there are many other 
stakeholders who may be influenced by the crime but have no opportunity to take part 
in formal criminal justice. For restorative justice, “[s]takeholder participation is a 
central component and core value”.617 It encourages all parties to solve the issue caused 
by the crime positively, rather than denying each other’s responsibility. As well, “the 
goal [of participation and engagement] is to build understanding, to encourage 
accountability and to provide an opportunity for healing”. 618  From this angle, 
restorative justice reaches further in compliance with the principle of non-impunity, 
rather than violating it. The improving function of restorative justice to non-impunity 
principle in international criminal law needs to be executed in association with the 
power of a well-acknowledged organisation, so that the idea of taking accountability 
will not be void. In international criminal cases, non-impunity does not forbid the 
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possibility for perpetrators to participate in the restorative justice process and meet with 
victims face to face. Restorative justice may be against amnesty, because the basic idea 
of amnesty is to erase all criminal accountabilities of the offenders, but restorative 
justice pursues a complete form of accountability. 
Another value of restorative justice is addressing the harm as an aftermath of crime. 
The process includes both the healing of victims and the listening to offenders. 
Redressing is different from solving. In restorative justice, addressing an issue often 
means to recover the damage caused by crime and to calm both the victim and offender 
with the belief that crime may result from social injustice.619 For addressing the harm, 
there should be a peaceful environment in which victims and offenders can describe the 
crime from their respective view and then heal each other’s feelings. This is specifically 
useful for mental harm caused after the crime was committed. Amnesty may create an 
environment for victims and perpetrators, which allows the elimination of their legal 
obligations; however, the elimination of legal obligations could be a big obstacle to the 
healing process for victims. On the one hand, restorative justice does not prefer the 
usage of punishment for the offenders, but on the other hand and on the basis of its 
theory punishment is not naturally paradoxical to the idea and values of restorative 
justice. 620  In other words, there could be criminal punishment to offenders in 
restorative justice, if it is the outcome of the peaceful address of the crime. The value 
of preferring peaceful resolution of the damage of international crimes also fulfils the 
requirement of non-impunity principle. 
The value of respecting the diversity in achieving accountability can ease the 
confliction between the ICC and amnesty, or even make them mutually compatible 
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under the principle of non-impunity. This value broadens the understanding of the ICC 
on the concept of accountability, making it more than retributivism. Taking 
accountability of the perpetrators can be retributivism, or deterrent, or rehabilitative. 
But the ultimate aim of justice through taking accountability shall be restoring the 
damage caused by the crime. Prosecution of the crimes does not to be sacrificed for 
accepting amnesty, because it is just the initiative step for justice. In the justice process, 
flexible approaches can be used at the ICC in accordance with reality, so that the Court 
does not confine itself from acknowledging States’ practice. In this way, the ICC could 
earn respect of States rather than posing itself over all States. Through mutual respect 
between the ICC and States, the ICC’s work will get more cooperation because people 
believe the ICC is here for resolving the problems in international criminal cases, not 
making situations more complicated. In addition, a broader understanding of 
accountability that asks the perpetrators to repair the damage they caused to victims and 
the affected community will allow the Court to hear more voice from both victims and 
the alleged persons. Hence, both victims and offenders will feel that they are valued, 
and their words matter for the Court. It is helpful for clarify the whole picture of the 
truth about the crime, thus the justice pursued at the ICC can be more meaningful and 
tangible for the stakeholders, beyond punitive treatment for the convicted persons and 
barely compensation for victims. 
Other aspects of restorative justice, such as community caring, respectful dialogue, 
forgiveness, apology, and making amends621 are all important approaches in taking 
personal accountability of the perpetrators of international crimes. They are all based 
on the values that engage stakeholders for restoration through flexible process. These 
values are all centred at the dignity of human beings and the mutual respect between 
the stakeholders in international crimes. Because the principle of non-impunity is not 
                                                 




about punishing but taking accountability of the perpetrators of international crimes, 
utilising restorative justice in international criminal justice is not the violation of such 
principle. The considerations that can be added by restorative justice to international 
criminal justice is that the perpetrators shall be responsible to the people they harmed, 
which is beyond the criminal responsibility set by law. 
In conclusion, under a broader meaning of accountability, restorative justice 
complies with the legal proceedings of the ICC even according to the principle of non-
impunity. Restorative justice makes perpetrators of atrocities accounted in several ways 
which include legal sentences, participation to community re-building, apology to 
victims, re-confirming the culture and values in the damaged society, re-integration and 
reconciliation, etc. In fact, restorative justice offers to the ICC more types of 
accountability in fighting against impunity; in addition it equips the ICC with a “zero 
tolerance policy”622 to crimes, which precisely echoes the legal principles of the Rome 
Statute. Furthermore, blanket amnesty is not tolerated in restorative justice because it 
harms victims for a second time and grants criminals the un-thinkable privilege of 
taking no accountability for their crimes. 
6. Summary 
This chapter firstly indicates that the idea of restorative justice has been accepted 
and advocated at the ICC in many formal occasions. However, the way to understand 
restorative justice is wrong. If the ICC can take the idea of restorative justice seriously 
and utilise restorative justice in a correct way, the difficulties in achieving retribution 
and deterrence can be overcome. Furthermore, it is necessary for the ICC to evolve its 
view on justice to a more restorative one. Also, it is urgent for the ICC to consider 
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international crimes as firstly the atrocities against real humans, then as the violations 
of international law. Humanity shall be at the centre of international justice, but not the 







The first situation that was referred to the ICC by a Member State, the situation of 
Uganda, did not leave a very positive impression of the ICC to the international 
community and local Ugandan people. The warrants of arrest against the alleged 
criminals firstly became a strong factor to convince the warring parties, including the 
Ugandan government, to consider to end the long-lasting conflict with peace agreement. 
The involvement of the ICC was used as an important support to disarm the opposition 
groups and achieve permanent ceasefire eventually. Hence, it was hoped that the ICC 
would bring peace as well as deliver justice. However, when the alleged criminals 
realised that it was not possible for them to exchange the privilege of being un-
prosecuted at the ICC with the declaration of participating the peace negotiation with 
the Ugandan government, the ICC’s work turned to the obstacle to achieving peace. In 
many people’s opinion, including many scholars, the ICC’s insistence of its jurisdiction 
over the cases in Ugandan situation has caused serious problems to ending the mass 
violence sooner. One of the most remarkable problem is that whether the ICC, which 
represents international law mechanism, should compromise to the possible chance to 
achieve peace and retrieve the issued warrants of arrest, even the formal criminal 
process had initiated. 
The ICC faced a critical issue that had also occurred in the pre-existing ad hoc or 
special court of international crimes: compromising to peace or insisting on justice. The 
dilemma has been haunted international criminal justice since the difficulties in 
prosecuting Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić at ICTY, and Charles Taylor at SCSL 
when they were still in charge of political and military power. The ICC did not choose 
to compromise with the alleged criminals’ requests, and the “justice” of the ICC was 
believed as ruining the chance for peace. The dilemma has been abstracted as the 




incompatible “trophies” for international criminal justice. The topic of “peace versus 
justice”, in which restorative justice is seen as the path to peace and the legal mechanism 
at the ICC is regarded as the platform of justice, has become one of the most difficult 
problem for the ICC. 
However, is it errorless that peace and justice cannot be achieved harmoniously? 
Or, can the spirit of peace be integrated into the effort to justice at the ICC? The deeper 
analysis on the situation of Uganda indicates that both peace and justice are very 
important to local people and the whole country, and it is hard to tell whether peace is 
more desirable than justice. This discovery is supported by some field studies on the 
impact of the ICC to Uganda. Those field studies, which aim at clarifying the real 
attitude of Ugandan people to the crimes prosecuted at the ICC, demonstrate that there 
needs an approach through which truth-telling, regret and reintegration of former 
offenders, forgiveness and reparation of victims, community rebuild, just process and 
deserved punishment for the criminals, can be equally accomplished. These goals all 
are believed indispensable to both peace and justice. In other words, if it is true that 
restorative justice attributes to peace and the legal mechanism at the ICC delivers justice, 
restorative justice and the ICC need to coordinate to achieve those goals. But restorative 
justice has always been placed to the opposite side of the formal criminal justice at the 
ICC in almost all the researches. The main problem between restorative justice and the 
ICC is the so-claimed issue of “impunity/amnesty” for the indicted criminals. What has 
been upheld among researchers is that restorative justice is based on non-punitive 
treatment to criminals, which grants huge space to impunity and amnesty; but the 
principle of non-impunity to international crimes is the fundamental rule in 
international criminal justice, which leaves no permission to impunity or amnesty. The 
question is that only a few studies have discussed the relationship between restorative 
justice, impunity/amnesty, the international criminal justice, and the real function of 




The cases at the ICC and at the other international courts display a very 
complicated picture on what is the effective and satisfying way to solve the mass 
violence and serious human rights violations, as well as the social restoration issues. 
Firstly, not every country which experienced mass violence has decided to solve the 
problems through restorative justice, but impunity or amnesty has been announced. This 
solution shows that restorative justice and impunity/amnesty are not necessarily linked, 
because restorative justice aims at reparation, but impunity/amnesty is simply a way for 
the perpetrators to continue their life without being prosecuted or punished. 
Impunity/amnesty does not need restorative justice to be triggered, and restorative 
justice does not always result in impunity/amnesty. On this point, the premise that 
restorative justice grants impunity/amnesty is not accurate in reality. Secondly, in the 
countries where impunity/amnesty was announced as a policy to solving the mass 
violence in the past, peace was not always guaranteed as the outcome. In fact, in many 
cases, impunity/amnesty might have brought ceasefire temporarily, but eventually did 
not make peace last. Sometimes the granted impunity/amnesty, especially the blanket 
amnesty, deteriorates the domestic environment toward peace building and national 
reconciliation, because peace and reconciliation must be reached from both ends. The 
granted impunity/amnesty makes criminals think that they have been officially 
absolved from the crimes they committed, so that they don’t need to do anything needed 
to pacify the feeling of victims or the victims’ families. However, to the people who 
suffered from the crimes, the granted impunity/amnesty to the former criminals, 
particularly the high-rank criminals, only means unfairness and the continuation of their 
pain, which undermines the foundation of peace. As a result, granting impunity/amnesty 
may be able to bring ceasefire between different parties in short term, but will also plant 
the seeds of hatred among people and the desire of taking vengeance against the 
national authorities. The statement that restorative justice is able to bring peace because 




justice is that the criminals must take the accountability to what they have done to the 
victims and the community, which is “zero tolerance” to crime rather than granting 
impunity/amnesty. The criticism against the ICC which is based on the benefit of 
impunity/amnesty to peace shall be regarded as pointless. 
In the countries where there is only formal criminal justice but no restorative 
justice approach, the justice proceeds slowly and sometimes results in dissatisfaction 
for victims, offenders, and the affected community. For one reason, the judgements 
against alleged criminals are often held by the victors in the conflict. Or the 
prosecutions and judgements are usually against the defeated, because any attempt to 
bring justice to the individuals who are in power of ruling has not been successful yet 
at the ICC. Such reality leaves an image that justice against international crimes relies 
on political power, and that the ICC has to be aligned with the people who are in charge 
of the government even they are not innocent. Another reason is that the formal justice 
process, at both domestic and international level, neither carefully listens to the victims’ 
voice nor pays attention to making the alleged persons feel regret and the victims feel 
being respected. That is because making the perpetrators feel regret is not as important 
as collecting evidence to prove their guilt, and making the victims feel being respected 
is not as significant as using them as witnesses to assist the prosecution. This way to 
solve the issues resulting from international crimes is never helpful to achieve both 
peace and justice, for the root causes that “nourish” mass violence and serious human 
rights violation have remained untouched. To this point, the justice at the ICC is 
incomplete because the ICC has to weigh the political power of every side in its work; 
the effort to peace can be hardly achieved through the current legal framework because 
it has very limited influence to encourage the local people to accept the “peace” that is 
only made between political parties. The tension among people must be alleviated so 
that long-lasting peace can become true, on which economic development, democratic 




Many countries have realised the importance of bringing peace through national 
reconciliation, and that formal criminal justice process alone cannot achieve such a goal. 
Consequently, as the most renowned example of solving the tension between different 
racial groups, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa has been 
learned by numbers of other states. In all the practices of the TRC mode, restorative 
justice has been claimed as the central and guiding element of the whole process. 
However, the TRC in South Africa is not seen as a perfect example of restorative justice. 
During the transition of South Africa, many people were forced to participate the 
process and asked by the authorities to accept the apologies from the criminals. In 
addition, the problem that victims’ voice was not carefully heard has been often 
criticised, which, however, turned out the common and fatal problem to almost all the 
countries that pronounced to activate “restorative justice” to solve the post-conflict 
issues. For the ruling party and the authority of a country, taking victims and offenders 
to the table of talks to accomplish the so-called “restorative justice” process is beneficial 
to leave a positive image to the outside world. But the misused restorative justice can 
only bring more pain to victims and even criminals if the government cares only its 
own profit. 
The core of restorative justice is “restoration”. It requires that all the sides in a 
crime to participate the talk where truth, feelings, need and plans are communicated 
between all the “stakeholders”. The value of restoration is that the aim of criminal 
justice is to correct the wrong-doings, and decrease effect of the damage that was caused 
by the crime. The process of restoration shall be peaceful rather than conflictive, 
because in restorative justice the wrong-doers must accept their accountability for what 
they have done. Restorative justice combines peace and justice with the consideration 
of the need of victims, offenders, and the affected community. Restorative justice is 
complicated and needs professional commissioners to practice. The reason why 




human rights and human dignity has not been fully respected. The TRC in Sierra Leone 
can be seen as the best example where the two tracks of restorative justice and formal 
criminal justice “synergised” smoothly. The experience of the Sierra Leone TRC 
indicates that restorative justice and formal criminal justice can coordinate if both the 
platforms are operated by professionals, even when dealing with international crimes. 
The success of Sierra Leone TRC may be further improved if restorative justice and the 
mechanism of international criminal justice become one, instead of just synergising. 
In regard with justice, the ICC also needs to make improvement to its work. There 
are two main aspects in the ICC’s justice: giving the criminals what they deserve, and 
deterring the commission of international crimes in future. Unfortunately, the ICC has 
not done satisfying work on either aspect. In measuring the desert for the criminals, it 
has been widely argued that the punishment to perpetrators of international crimes can 
never “reciprocate” the damage and wickedness of their crime. Punishing several 
individuals at the ICC cannot make the wrong right again because the crimes have 
affected a large number of people in a great extent of time, and at times the crimes have 
involved many different areas or even different states into chaos and havoc. The serious 
consequences of international crimes have decided that normal punishment to the 
perpetrators is not a just resolution. Victims and communities need more reparation than 
seeing the criminals being sentenced. Furthermore, the complex historical background 
of many international crimes makes the penal system at the ICC debilitated to convey 
the sense of condemnation to the alleged and the followers since those crimes have been 
often committed by all sides in the conflict. As it has stated above, being judged by the 
“enemies” or the court that is aligned with “enemies” does not make the perpetrators 
acknowledge the wrongness of the crimes, and weakens the acceptability of the justice 
at the ICC. The diversity of cultures in different states also exposes the simplified mode 
of justice at the ICC. Although the ICC has initiated many outreach work to make the 




organisation, the people being willingly to communicate with the ICC may not agree 
on the ICC’s view of justice. The ICC needs to be more flexible to the cultural elements 
when dealing with international crimes, for that the justice which is close to the local 
people’s custom will go deeper in their mind. Desert and deterrence, or accountability 
and desistance, tightly connect with each other in resolving the issues in international 
crimes. The ICC must recognise that the perpetrators shall be taken accountability on 
the behalf of victims in order to alleviate the tension between them to achieve 
deterrence; and for achieving deterrence the perpetrators must be given the rightful 
desert which is assented by both victims and the perpetrators. 
The reparation to victims also needs to get improvements. Victims are not able to 
fully express their feelings and opinions before the ICC, and usually they are asked to 
make statements on certain issues, which are necessary to the Court, rather than to all 
other aspects. The protection of victims, especially when they are also key witnesses, 
is questionable given the incidents in the situation of DRC. The reparation for victims 
at the ICC may have failed victims in two ways: the dependence on related legal 
procedures making reparation beyond the legal facets of cases, impossible and the 
insufficiency in material and mental reparation for victims. The key problem for the 
ICC in achieving effective and efficient reparation is that it integrates the interests of 
victims into the sought-after justice but has not considered essential changes of its 
structural ideas on justice. The justice on which the reparation is determined at the ICC 
askes the victims to respect what the ICC upholds, but does not appear considerate 
enough to what may be more important to victims. The apologies and acknowledgement 
of the crimes from the alleged persons, which is irreplaceably powerful to victims and 
the other former perpetrators, are more crucial to make victims feel hopeful, to lead 
other perpetrators feel regret, and to encourage the community reconciled. The 
symbolic meaning of justice, which has been proclaimed by the ICC as being 




Restorative justice advocates non-punitive methods to achieve restoration, but it 
does not exclude all forms of penalty. The clear difference between the legal mechanism 
at the ICC and restorative justice is that the former is based on the “conflict” between 
the alleged and the prosecution where the acknowledging of the guilt is at the central 
of dispute; the latter, however, is conditioned on the acknowledgement of the guilt by 
both victims and perpetrators where the following resolution of the crimes shall be 
negotiated for a better future. The ICC needs to consider restorative justice to improve 
its work, as it has been analysed in this study. In addition, unlike some studies stating 
that restorative justice may be incompatible to the ICC in law, restorative justice can 
fully be consistent with the ICC in legal principles and in the spirit of peace and 
meaning of justice. For those reasons, it is strongly recommended to integrate the core 
and idea of restorative justice is strongly recommended. Bearing in mind that it is not 
possible for the ICC to totally change its legal texts to pure restorative justice mode, 
what needs to be done at the ICC is to give more space and respect to victims so that 
their voice can be heard, and to permit more direct communication between victims and 
the accused. Undoubtedly, to make the legal mechanism at the ICC more restorative is 
challenging, and not all restorative justice approaches can be utilised to resolve the 
issues in international crimes. What must be emphasised is that being obstinate to 
current solutions to the problems at the ICC shall not be the future. The ICC needs to 
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